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Summary 
Secession is one of the oldest and probably more controversial themes of public 
international law. The potential of a right to secede draws even more controversy 
amongst international law scholars and lawyers alike. This research merges classical 
international law perspectives on secession and the right to secede in particular, 
within a contemporary setting. Two research questions are answered: (i) Does a 
legitimate right to state secession exist under contemporary international law; if so, 
what are its normative characteristics? (ii) What is the position of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in the realisation of a legitimate right to secede, considering its 
opinion in the Kosovo-case? 
 
The work follows a normative methodological approach in tackling and presenting 
the arguments towards and against the legitimacy of the right to secede. This allows 
for a clear interrogation of the norms constituting classic international law against the 
realities of an evolving pedagogy. Classical international law is traditionally state-
centred, primarily due to the 1648 legacy of the Treaty (Peace) of Westphalia. 
However, contemporary international law has come to incorporate the roles of non-
state actors and even individuals. Consequently, the impact of secession extends 
beyond traditional international law norms like; territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
nationalism and uti possidetis. Moving forward, a critical inclusion within modern 
conceptualisation of secession needs to be considerations like, the right to self-
determination and the promotion of human rights. 
  
The research departs with a clear comprehension of the status quo of a general 
theory of secession. The identification of a prescriptive general theory of secession 
remains rather elusive. However, cogent arguments are presented for the 
establishment of a right to secede with a sufficient legal foundation to support a 
general theory and find effective enforcement for the right. 
 
The arguments for the right to secede are rooted within a sound conceptual 
framework and historical context. In dealing with the normative characteristics of the 
right to secede, the historic reasoning of Shaw is utilised in order to establish a legal 
process for secession. This reasoning is applied in the presentation of the municipal 
manifestation of the right to secede, which traditionally is found in the constitutional 
entrenchments of the right. The relationship between the right to secede and self-
determination is presented through a balancing of the components that constitute the 
right to self-determination. Following the Canadian Supreme Court’s contribution on 
the right to self-determination in the Quebec-case, the aspirations of peoples for self-
determination needs to follow this dual view of self-determination as consisting of the 
right to internal and external self-determination.  
 
The contemporary position of the right to secede under international law is best 
illustrated in the ICJ treatment of secession in its Kosovo Opinion. The focus here is 
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to present new insights into the impact of unilateralism and multilateralism in the 
interaction with secession. Ultimately, this research in its normative methodological 
approach presents the arguments both ancient and contemporary for the legitimate 
potential of a right to secede. 
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Opsomming 
In die internationale reg, is sessessie (afskeiding) sekerlik een van die meer 
kontroversiële temas. Binne die geledere van akademici en praktisyns veroorsaak 
die moontlikheid van ‘n reg tot afskeiding selfs meer onenigheid. Met hierdie 
navorsing word die klassieke sienings hieroor in die internationale reg saamgesnoer 
binne ‘n meer hedendaagse uitleg. Twee navorsingsvrae word beantwoord: (i) 
Bestaan daar ‘n legitieme reg vir staatsafskeiding binne die hendendaagse 
internationale reg en indien wel wat is die normatiewe karaktereienskappe van so ‘n 
reg? (ii) Wat is die stand van die Internationale hof vir Geregtigheid (ICJ) aangaande 
die verwesinliking van ‘n legitieme reg op afskeiding in die lig van die hof se 
uitspraak in die Kosovo-Opinie. 
 
Die navorsing volg ‘n normatiewe metodologiese benadering om die argumente teen 
asook vir die legitieme reg op afskeiding te voer. Dit skep ruimte vir ‘n duidelike 
bevraagtekening van die klassieke internationale regsnorme teen die agtergrond van 
‘n transformerende pedagogie. Die klassieke internationale reg is kenmerkend 
staatsgeorienteerd, grootendeels as gevolg van die nalatingskap van die 1648 
Verdrag (Vrede) van Westphalia. Tog gee hedendaagse internasionale reg erkening 
aan die handelinge van nie-regeringsentiteite en selfs individue. Gevolglik, strek die 
impak van sessessie heel verder as tradisionele internasionale regsnorme soos; 
territoriale integriteit en soewereiniteit, nasionalisme en uti possidetis. 'n Kritiese blik 
op die moderne begrip van sessessie moet oorwegings soos die reg op 
selfbeskikking en die bevordering van menseregte in ag neem om vooriutgang te 
bewerkstellig.  
 
Die navorsing begin met 'n duidelike begrip van die status quo insake 'n algemene 
teorie van sessessie. Die identifisering van 'n voorskriftelike algemene teorie van 
afskeiding bly ongelukkig ontwykend. Tog word oortuigende argumente vir die 
vestiging van 'n reg om af te skei gevoer. Dit gaan gepaard met 'n voldoende 
regsgrondslag wat 'n algemene teorie ondersteun, asook die moontlikheid vir die 
doeltreffende uitvoering van die reg. 
 
Die argumente ter ondersteuning van die reg tot afskeiding word geïllustreer binne 'n 
verantwoordbare konseptuele raamwerk en historiese konteks. In die hantering van 
die normatiewe kenmerke van die reg word die klassieke redenasie van Shaw benut 
ten einde 'n regsproses vir afskeiding te vestig. Hierdie redenasie word toegepas by 
die handtering van voorbeelde oor plaaslike manifestasies van die reg to afskeiding. 
Hierdie plaaslike manifestasies word tradisioneel gevind binne state se grondwetlike 
erkennings van die reg. Die verhouding tussen die reg om af te skei en 
selfbeskikking word aangebied deur 'n balansering van die komponente waaruit die 
reg op selfbeskikking bestaan. Na aanleiding van die Kanadese Hooggeregshof se 
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bydrae tot die reg om selfbeskikking in die Quebec-saak, is die aspirasies van 
volkere vir selfbeskikking gevestig in die reg om interne en eksterne selfbeskikking. 
 
Die kontemporêre posisie van die reg om af te skei ingevolge die internasionale reg 
word goed geïllustreer in die Wêreldhof se behandeling van afskeiding in die 
Kosovo-Opinie. Die fokus hier is die uitleg van nuwe insig oor die mag van 
unilateralisme en multilateralisme in die interaksies oor sessessie. Ten slotte bied 
hierdie navorsing in sy normatiewe metodologiese benadering die argumente, beide 
antiek en kontemporêre, vir die legitieme potensiaal van 'n reg om af te skei. 
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1 Introduction                                                                                                                            
 
1 1 Introduction    
Legal uncertainty summarises the position of public international law on the question 
of secession. Contemporary international law presents neither a set of complete rules 
on the topic, nor a functional theory of secession. The impact of secession on 
effected communities is profound, and this necessitates a dedicated set of legal rules 
on the topic. At most, international law needs to build consensus on a theory of 
secession. Buchanan shares these sentiments in describing the process of secession 
as:   
[T]he oldest, most disturbing and profound, yet most necessary, human 
drama. There are few meaningful events in a human life that are not 
encompassed in its acts. An adequate theory of secession would be the 
application to the special case of the state of a much more general theory, 
if we could attain it.1 
 
According to Buchanan, considerable difficulties persist in establishing an adequate 
general theory of secession. One difficulty is that each incident of secession brings 
with it unique challenges. In addition to this, the facts and conditions that precede 
secession in a given situation significantly differ between instances. All of this 
increasingly makes the formulation of a general theory of secession extremely 
difficult and perhaps improbable. 
 
The research presented in this thesis aims to contribute to the field of public 
international law. The thesis investigates the subject of secession in general. This is 
towards establishing the potential of the existence and legitimacy of a right to 
secede. This chapter introduces the research problem and the rationale behind the 
study. What follows is a presentation of the research questions, the hypothesis, and 
                                                 
1
 A Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec 
(Westview Press 1991) 162. 
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the methodology that have guided the research. The chapter concludes with a layout 
of the chapters and a brief introduction of the leading ideas discussed within them. 
As indicated above, no general theory of secession exists, herein resides the 
introduction to the research problem. 
 
1 2 Research Problem and Rationale 
There is little agreement amongst scholars and international lawyers about the scope 
and content of a general theory of secession. This has led to inconsistencies in the 
approach to a theory on secession by international law scholars. Even the possibility 
of establishing a general theory is questionable, this, due to the nature of secession. 
Each instance of secession brings with it a distinctive legal and political situation. 
This attribute makes an attempt to construct the prescriptive character of a right to 
secede particularly challenging. Although certain jurisdictions have recognised the 
right to secede and included it, within their statutes, 2 the existence and operation of 
the right under international law remains contentious. One of the suggested causes 
of this could be that the prevailing theories of secession fixate on the morality of 
secession.3 This has left the concept of secession severely underdeveloped. A 
theory or process of secession needs to be established, and analysed first before a 
legitimate right to secede can be discussed. 
 
Further, the traditional view of international law seeks to maintain the status quo of 
all states, which makes the creation of a legal right to secede even more difficult. 
International law does not expressly prohibit the right to secede, however its 
doctrines are rooted in the Westphalian model of statehood plus an adherence to the 
principle of stability. This presents difficulties for the development of secession and 
the right to secede. Crawford states in defiance of the right to secede that: 
[T]here is no specific content to the so-called ‘privilege’, over and above 
the proposition that international law does not itself ultimately prohibit 
                                                 
2
 These states include Burma and most recently Ethiopia in 1994. See chapter 3 3 below for a full 
discussion. 
3
 Buchanan, Secession  (n 1). 
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secession. To the contrary, if there is a privilege here – a legally 
recognised entitlement to act – it is the privilege of the metropolitan state 
to seek to maintain its territorial integrity by lawful means.4 
 
Crawford’s statement serves as proof of the traditional approach under international 
law. He re-affirms the Westphalian model by dismissing the potential of the right and 
basing it on the principle of territorial integrity in an effort to maintain the status quo. 
It maybe that part of the normative character of the right to secede would need to be 
consistent with traditional statehood. This would also have to include the promotion 
of regional stability to enjoy full application in international law. The research 
employs the right to self-determination to highlight the changing foundations of the 
traditional notions of statehood in international law. This development produces 
contradictions in international law. An example being the paradox present within the 
relationship between self-determination and the doctrine of uti possidetis. In this 
paradox, the right to self-determination is used as the norm to liberate peoples from 
colonial rule. Conversely, international law adopts the doctrine of uti possidetis within 
this process, which aims to limit the liberties which self-determination seeks to 
advance. International law allows both principles to operate simultaneously in 
contradictions of each other’s commitment. This highlights the inconsistency in 
arguments that a right to secede cannot exist within international law, because of 
contradicts with existing principles.   
 
In Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (hereinafter the Kosovo 
Opinion), 5 the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) missed an opportunity 
to bring clarity to the question of secession. The ICJ interpreted the question posed 
by the United Nations General Assembly (hereinafter UNGA) narrowly to limit the 
discussion on the matter of secession. This was the court’s decision even though 
                                                 
4
 J Crawford, ‘The Right to Self-determination in International Law: Its Development and Future’ in P. 
Alston (ed.), Peoples’ Rights (Oxford University Press 2001) 53. 
5
 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) General List No 141 [2010] ICJ Rep. 
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both Serbia 6 and Kosovo acknowledged that secession was in question. The 
question of secession is seemingly a matter to be determined under international law. 
Primarily because secession directly affects legal personality, by having the potential 
of creating new subjects under international law. Under Article 36(1)(b) of the Statute 
of the ICJ7, the court has the authority to adjudicate ‘any question of international 
law’. The declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government of Kosovo was by its own admission an ordinance of secession. The 
main opposing state, Serbia concurred that the declaration constituted an act of 
secession. This conduct clearly brought about a question of international law. 
Pursuant to the court’s compulsory jurisdiction8 under Article 36, it would have been 
acceptable to argue that it was well within its powers to address the question of 
secession. Hence, the approach of the ICJ is probed, and an analyse of the effect of 
the court’s reasoning on the development of an internationally recognised right to 
secede, is conducted. 
 
State secessionist movements have been present on the international arena since 
the times of the Peace of Westphalia. However, recent developments in Kosovo and 
the Sudans9 as well as in the Middle East has brought renewed attention to the 
urgent need for a defined right to secede under international law. In addition to these 
recent developments, there are a number of state territories that over a prolonged 
period have been struggling with continued secession claims. Examples are 
Chechnya, the Caprivi Strip, Northern Cyprus, and Taiwan, just to mention a few. 
Consequently, the motive of the research is to try to determine the process of 
secession, and the conditions possibly underlying the right to secede. The approach 
                                                 
6
 Although Serbia conceded that Kosovo seceded from its territory, they submitted to the court that 
the secession was illegal. See, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, ICJ (Advisory Opinion) 
[2010] Written Statement of the Government of the Republic of Serbia < http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/15642.pdf> accessed 15 July 2010.  
7
 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 
1946, entered into force 24 October 1945). 
8
 See Aerial Incident of July 27 1955 Case (Israel v Bulgaria) [1960] ICJ Rep 146; and Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America (Merits) [1986] 
ICJ Rep 14, para 1. 
9
 Southern Sudan become a sovereign state on the 10th of July 2011 and the United Nations Security 
Council on the 13th of July 2011 adopted Resolution 1999 (2011) without vote to admit the new 
Republic of Southern Sudan as a member state of the United Nations. Northern Sudan is still officially 
known as the Republic of Sudan. 
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is to evaluate the potential of a certain legal right to oversee the process of secession 
and its possible results. 
 
The reasoning in this study is guided by the fact that secession is as much a 
historical problem as it is a contemporary one. It investigates and explores the 
historic conceptual contexts of state secession under international law with the belief 
that related doctrines and principles – such as nationalism, self-determination, 
territorial integrity and uti possidetis can help establish the contemporary legitimacy 
of a right to secede. As indicated above, this issue of secession is problematic, not 
only the concept of secession, but also its consequences, particularly with regard to 
issues relating to succession.10 Consequently, two problems present themselves. 
Firstly, international law is unclear, in terms of the legal status of secession. 
Attempting to determine the normative nature of a positive right to secede seeks to 
address this initial problem. Secondly, the ICJ, the most influential exponent and 
enforcement body of international law, seems reluctant to be drawn into pronouncing 
on the matter. This is a preliminary conclusion based on the reasoning of the court in 
the Kosovo Opinion. This research will also reflect on the question, what are the 
implications of the court’s decision in this regard for a positive legal right to secede, if 
any.  
 
The issue of state secession is complex and politically charged. Even though, the 
majority of states has recognised the right to self-determination through the adoption 
of international instruments recognising the norm, few are in support of a definite 
right to secede.11 This may be because of sentiments that a right to secede may 
potentially threaten their immediate sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, 
even within this international climate, the right to self-determination has developed 
from a mechanism employed to emancipate former colonial peoples into a 
peremptory norm of international law. The objective of the research is additionally, to 
                                                 
10
 One of the main problems which faces peoples after deciding to secede and form a new state is the 
issues of succession. In general see J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2007) and Alisic and Others v Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, 
Slovenia and “The Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia” Judgement (Merits) No. 60642/08 
ECHR. 
11
 This is clear from the written submission by different states in the Kosovo case (n 4). See further: 
www.icj-cij.org.  
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determine the legal qualifications of the right to self-determination and to 
demonstrate how this could potentially affect the existence of a legitimate right to 
secede. This rationale contributed in the formulation of the research questions as 
discussed below. In addition, it has also directed the research project towards 
practical conclusions on the legal questions surrounding secession. 
 
1 3 Research Question and Hypothesis  
The research problems as discussed above produced the following research 
questions: 
 Firstly, does a legitimate right to state secession exist under contemporary 
international law; if so what are its normative characteristics?  
 
 Secondly, what is the position of the ICJ in the realisation of a legitimate right 
to secede considering its decision in the Kosovo Opinion? 
 
Secession has a profound impact on legal personality under international indicated 
by Buchanan above.12 Consequently, international law provides the most effective 
and appropriate platform for addressing the issue of secession. The research 
departs from the notion that international law is the appropriate area of law to 
address the question of the normative character of a legitimate right to secede. The 
right to secede has been incorporated into individual national jurisdictions13 and the 
inquiry uses these examples to inform a potential legitimate right to secede under 
international law. Secession has the potential to lead to the breakup of the territory of 
a state. In this regard, it must be clear that secession cannot be equated with a 
revolutionary change. A revolutionary change seeks to challenge the legitimacy of 
the state in total, whereas a secessionist movement only challenges the state 
legitimacy over their group and the occupied territory they wish to claim. The right to 
secede is therefore intimately related to the group claiming the right and essentially 
                                                 
12
 Buchanan, Secession (n 1). 
13
 (n 2) supra. The basis of this hypothesis is that a few national jurisdictions have recognised the 
right within their domestic legislation. It is within the scope of international law that the legitimacy of 
the right to secede has not been tested. This research is aiming to find the right’s status under 
contemporary international law. 
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their connection to the territory. Buchanan remarks that ‘To claim the right to secede 
is to challenge the state’s own conception of what its boundaries are’.14 This 
indicates the imposition of secession on fundamental characters of statehood - this 
being sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
 
1 4 Methodology 
The sources of international law, as presented under Article 38 of the Statute of the 
ICJ, informs the methodology of this research. These include primary sources, like 
international conventions and treaties as well as customary international law. The 
subsidiary sources consulted relates to international doctrines and international 
judicial judgements and opinions. In addition, the thesis draws on the leading 
literature on secession to bring these disparate sources together. It relies heavily on 
the works of leading authors in this field, such as Buchanan, 15 Macedo, 16 Higgins17 
and Weller18. As mentioned above, even though the secondary sources have guided 
the research, the primary legal sources remain decisive within the reasoning behind 
the main ideas.   
 
The research problems, as discussed above, have guided and informed the 
approach to the different sources. Although secession is a legal concept, the theme 
of secession has a strong socio-political undercurrent. However, the quest to  
develop the concept of secession into a right, provides the legal character of the 
research. A legal positivist analysis informs the approach to discern a right. This is 
characterised by the isolation of legal attributes that underpin, confirm or dispute the 
proposed right. This further qualifies the range of legal sources utilised.  
The approach of extorting a right out of a legal concept requires the use of primary 
sources to promote the rights resulting legitimacy. A legal methodological approach 
recognises that secondary sources does not affect the legitimacy of a right as 
                                                 
14
 Buchanan, Secession (n 1) 11. 
15
 ibid. 
16
 S Macedo and A Buchanan, Secession and Self-determination (New York University Press 2003). 
17
 R Higgins, Themes and Theories: Selected Essays, Speeches, and Writings in International Law 
(vol. 2, Oxford University Press 2009). 
18
 M Weller, Escaping the Self-determination Trap (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008). 
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significantly as primary sources. Secondary sources are still pertinent and find 
application especially in guiding legal interpretation. These sources allow for 
developments into concepts that are commonly present within the fields of the social 
and political sciences. The conceptual framework presented under chapter 2 outlines 
these developments and related considerations.  
 
The research furthermore employs a historical legal analysis of state secession and 
its development within the boundaries of international law. Although reference is 
made to political and philosophical theories, comparable to state secession19, the 
focus of the inquiry remains legal and other theories provides a holistic perspective 
and context. Any legal authority outside the field of public international law will be of 
persuasive nature only. 
 
As indicated above, the motive of the study is to satisfy an aspiration for legal 
certainty, especially relating to the defined right to secede. This exercise identifies 
three areas of investigation. Firstly, the municipal manifestation and application of 
the right to secede; secondly, the legal relationship between the rights to secede and 
self-determination; and finally, the impact of unilateralism in the application of the 
right to secede; in light of the approach adopted by the ICJ in the Kosovo Opinion. 
These areas of research inform the chapter layout of the research. Below follows a 
brief synopsis of the content of these chapters. 
 
1 5 Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 commences with a discussion of the historical development of secession. 
This historic context encompasses a synopsis on the experience of secession. This 
briefly covers the pre-World War I period through to the decolonisation period. A 
discussion of the contemporary situation of secession under the various theories of 
secession follows. The aim of the chapter is to examine and challenge the traditional 
                                                 
19
 Such as the morality of state secession and the presence of national interest when it comes to the 
question of recognition of a seceding state. 
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understanding of statehood as a point of departure for the further discussions on the 
concept of secession.  
 
The contemporarily perspectives of statehood in international law remains the 
product of the Peace of Westphalia treaties of 1648. Inquiries by international judicial 
institutions have consistently reverted to this position as the start of the inquiry into 
state practice.20 This inquiry produces what this study terms the ‘principle of stability’ 
in international law. This principle is a recurring theme within international law 
jurisprudence. The principle of stability proposes the continuation of the status quo 
and to apply international law with as few as possible disruptions. The principle finds 
implied application in international doctrine, practice and judicial decisions.21 The 
investigation into the theories of secession precedes the undertaking to establish a 
definition of secession. The primary purpose of this investigation is to settle on a 
workable definition of secession that can benefit the rest of the research. The 
different theories of secession lay the foundation for the analysing of an appropriate 
definition for secession.  
 
Further chapter 2 demarcates the framework of concepts that characterize an 
understanding of the nation-state, territory and peoples’ identity. The chapter justifies 
a brief inquiry into the multi-national and ethnically diverse state on the bases that 
secession is more likely in such a context than a traditional homogenise state. In the 
context of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter SFRY), the ICJ 
also recognised the role of nationalism in the dissolution of the federation. The court 
stated in the case, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro)22 that 
‘After almost ten years of economic crisis and the rise of nationalism within the 
                                                 
20
 Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) (Merits) [1960] ICJ Rep 6, dissenting 
opinion of Judge Fernandez [Translation] para 19; Jaime Francisco Castillo-Petruzzi v Peru, 
Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (4 September 1998), concurring opinion of Judge 
A.A. Cançado Trindade, para 6. See also Miguel Castro Prison v Peru, Judgement, Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (2 August 2008) para 34. 
21See in general; Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) [1962] ICJ Reports 6; Sovereignty 
over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium v Netherlands) (Order) General List No. 38 [1959] ICJ Rep. 
22
  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) General List No. 91 [2007] ICJ Rep. 
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republics and growing tension between different ethnic and national groups, the 
SFRY began to break up’.23 The right to secede will inevitable be influence by the 
above concepts, and this necessitates the inquiry. 
 
Chapter 3 investigates the  inclusion of the right to secede into municipal statutes. 
The research appreciates that the domestic manifestation of the right might hold 
significance for the development of the concept of secession under international law. 
The chapter accordingly analyses the rationale behind the codification of the right to 
secede. Based on the discussion on the theories of secession in chapter 2, it can be 
concluded that secession is a process and not an isolatable singular event. These 
lessons learned shapes the approach to assessing the codified right. Consequently, 
the operation of the right to secede needs to be interpreted within a process of 
secession. Three elements are identified as having an impact on the legal 
functionality of the codified right to secede. These elements as proposed by Shaw, 
represents the process of secession.24 They are the legitimate claim, also the 
element of effective control and thirdly recognition. Chapter 3 evaluates each 
separately in relation to the rational of a codified right to secede. 
 
Four jurisdictions that included the right to secede within their constitutions are 
analysed within the scope of this chapter. They are the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (hereinafter the USSR), SFRY, the Union of Burma (also named 
Myanmar) and Ethiopia. These are not case studies as such but examples of real 
manifestations of the right to secede in municipal law. The codified right to secede is 
utilised in an attempt to assess Shaw’s proposed process of secession. In observing 
the manner of drafting the right into these constitutions, the objective is to identify the 
right’s ability to be functional within a legal system. The test for the right’s legal 
functionality is limited to an inquiry into the substantive and procedural features of 
the right. The chapter concludes with the reasoning deduced from the Canadian 
Supreme Court case - In Reference re Secession of Quebec (hereinafter the Quebec 
                                                 
23
 ibid para 232. 
24
 MN Shaw, International Law (5th edn, Cambridge University Press 2003) 444. 
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case), 25 from which a proposition is deduced to develop the process of secession. 
The proposition introduces the element of ‘negotiation’ into the process of secession. 
The chapter aims to demonstrate that this element is not foreign to international law, 
but forms part of the mandate of United Nations Charter (hereinafter UN Charter) 
under Article 33(1).  
 
Chapter 4 analyses the right to self-determination with reference to its relationship 
with the secession and the right to secede. The development of the right to self-
determination is identified as the most effective strategy for the right to secede to 
match towards full recognition under international law. The chapter argues that self-
determination has essentially been an ambition of peoples since the early formations 
of states. This serves as the rationale for premising the moral authority of self-
determination on the peoples’ will. This entrenches self-determination further as a 
peoples’ right. The right to self-determination consists of two different variations, the 
rights to internal and external self-determination. The recent Kosovo Opinion26 
confirms this position. It is only under external self-determination that the potential of 
secession realistically is possible. Access to external self-determination is subject to 
the denial of internal self-determination. This approach to self-determination only 
allows the possibility of ‘remedial secession’ and excludes secession as an 
expression of the will of peoples. Remedial secession could be interpreted as 
secession as a solution or remedy for cases of extreme suppression or denial of 
internal self-determination. The chapter accordingly analyses whether a related right 
to secede can emerge from such violations under international law.  
 
For the right to secede to act as a recognised right in international law,  it needs to 
be reconcilable with the predominant notions of international law. Consequently, the 
chapter approaches the right to secede from the perspective of indirect application 
under international law. The relationship of the right to secede it tested against three 
concepts of international law. These are territorial integrity, uti possidetis and a 
constitutional right to self-determination. The discussion in chapter 4 indicates that 
                                                 
25
 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 
26
 Kosovo case (n 4) para 173. 
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these concepts are not absolute under international law. Consequently, they do not 
present a complete bar to secession. From the perspective of secession as a 
process, the right is more flexible and adaptable in establishing an argument towards 
its legitimacy. 
 
The final substantive chapter, chapter 5 aims to answer the second research 
question. The research focuses on the perspective of the ICJ in the Kosovo Opinion 
primarily. The chapter interrogates potential answers through investigating the ICJ’s 
position on secession. It argues that the decision of the ICJ not to pronounce on a 
right to secede is responsible for the continuance of the status quo of legal 
uncertainty. In the absence of multilateralism, the realisation of peoples’ desire to 
secede is only possible through unilateral conduct. This forms the rationale of the 
inquiry into the role of unilateralism in relation to secession under international law. 
The perspective of unilateralism is limited to the context of a unilateral secession – 
secession without the cooperation of the dominant state.  
 
The chapter furthermore interrogates the operation and status of the unilateral 
declaration of independence. The declaration seems to be the preferred mechanism 
to manage the process of external legal recognition for a seceding state. The legal 
relevance of the act of declaring independence must hold some value towards 
international law recognising the process as being secession. Further the chapter 
explores, under the umbrella of unilateralism, the concepts of remedial secession 
and the potential right to independence as presented by the ICJ in the Kosovo 
Opinion.27 In conclusion, chapter 5 contrasts the findings on unilateralism with the 
concept of multilateralism.  
 
Lastly, the concluding chapter presents the findings of this research. These findings 
accompany some recommendations on the topic. This chapter endeavours to 
present the conclusions on the application of two approaches that have 
                                                 
27
 Kosovo case (n 4) para 79. 
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characterised secession and the right to secede over the course of this study. The 
first is the traditional approach. This approach, as covered in chapter 2, focuses on 
the history of statehood and classic international law principles. These principles 
include territorial integrity, uti possidetis and my suggested principle of stability. This 
approach uses morality as the substantive justification for secession. Consequently, 
the morality of the reasons for secession forms the premise for its  legitimacy. The 
second approach, which is my suggested approach, is the normative approach. The 
normative approach, as discussed in chapter 3, views secession as a developing 
legal concept. It considers secession as a process rather than an event. This 
approach develops the justification for secession from the moral substantive 
considerations exclusively, to include procedural considerations. The normative 
approach proposes a process of secession rather the a definition or theory. The 
elements of this process include a claim to secede, the establishment of effective 
control over a territory and recognition of a new entity under international law. The 
approach seeks to reconcile the question of secession with existing principles of 
international law. The normative approach aims to improve the traditional approach 
and enhance the legitimacy of secession and a right to secede.  
 
1 6 Qualifications and Exclusions 
The research aims to contribute to the body of work under international law. 
However, the nature of the theme of secession relates to overlapping knowledge 
fields such as the political and social sciences. The objective of the research is not to 
contribute to these disciplines. The purpose and benefit of the reference to relevant 
theories from these fields is limited to creating context for the benefit of the legal 
research.  
 
Furthermore, in the use of the phrase ‘the right to secede or secession’; no 
assumption is made as to the nature of a functioning right existing under 
international law. Such an interpretation of secession would in any case render the 
research futile. The exercise is purely theoretical in order to assess the interaction 
between the relevant concepts. Further, the exclusion of a study of indigenous and 
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minority rights and peoples is intended. This research is primarily directed towards 
the nature of a right and its practical application challenges. The issue of indigenous 
and minority peoples is far too broad, and an inclusion here would not do it justice. 
Such an inclusion would also detract from the primary objectives of this research as 
presented in the research questions.  
 
Furthermore, the use of the term unilateralism in chapter 4 is restricted to the context 
of unilateral secession. The intention is not to suggest a strong consideration of the 
concept as popularly used in the context of international humanitarian law or 
economic state practice. The intention is for a conservative interpretation, limited to 
the context of secession. The focus would be especially centred around the 
unilateral declaration of independence.   
 
Lastly, the research does not intend to engage in a substantive case study of any 
state’s situation with secession. Rather, a legal theoretical approach is followed and 
the focus is on the legal sources as listed under Article 38 of the ICJ statute. The use 
of examples relating to secession is only to highlight the operation of concepts or to 
provide context to an argument or position. International law remains heavily 
premised on the Westphalian model of establishing its legal subjects and this 
present a critical historical pinnacle for understanding statehood. The following 
chapter interrogates this background in the context of secession and maps the 
foundation for the relevant concepts. 
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2 The Historical Development and Conceptual Framework of 
Secession under International Law 
 
2 1 Introduction 
As discussed in the chapter 1, the legal concept of state secession remains unclear. 
Even more uncertain is the existence of the right to secede. Ando correctly remarks, 
that ‘Generally speaking, both in theory and practice, the right to secede has seldom 
been admitted in recent times’.28 This creates a problem of legal certainty under 
international law. An adherence to a predominantly Eurocentric model of statehood 
compounds this problem further. Harding and Lim argue that this model is 
entrenched in the system of international law dating back to the Peace of 
Westphalia.29 Consequently, the conceptualisation of legal personality under 
international law has been frozen in time and is currently unable to demonstrate the 
ever-changing legal and political realities of states. 
 
The primary objective of this chapter is to relate the historical contexts of secession 
with the concepts key to it. Furthermore, the traditional understanding of the nation-
state is challenged in the context of fundamental international law principles. These 
include the right to self-determination, nationalism and the relationship between 
national identity and territory. It is necessary to note that the right to self-
determination cannot be removed from both the historical and conceptual properties 
of secession. Self-determination potentially allows for access to the concept of 
secession. Chapter 4 below discusses whether and how self-determination informs 
the right to secede. A brief preliminarily discussion about the evolving nature of the 
                                                 
28
 N Ando, ‘Secession or Independence – Self-Determination and Human Rights: A Japanese View of 
Three Basic Issues of International Law Concerning “Taiwan”’ in M Arsanjani, J Cogan, R Sloane and 
S Wiessner, Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 393. 
29
 C Harding and C Lim, ‘The Significance of Westphalia: An Archaeology of the International Legal 
Order’ in C Harding and C Lim (eds), Renegotiating Westphalia: Essays and Commentary on the 
European and Conceptual Foundations of Modern International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1999) 1. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
16 
 
right to self-determination is also conducted. The intention is to establish a basis for 
the presentation of a normative right to secede.30  
 
The point of departure is an attempt to document and interpret the historical and 
contemporary theories that inform the right to secede. A comparative analysis is 
conducted into theories such as the Remedial Rights Only Theory, the Primary 
Rights Theory, the Just Cause Theory and other relevant theories as proposed by 
different authors on this topic. A comprehensive definition of secession is pursued as 
the study follows the various characteristics of secession. 
 
Finally, the relationship between nationalist identity and territory is investigated 
through a closer look at the doctrines that inform nationalism. Nationalism and 
nationalist aspirations could be considered one of the greatest threats to the 
existence of a right to secede. However, the desire for the nation state presents a 
paradox. In what I term the ‘nation state paradox’, the object of secessionist attempts 
is the equivalent to what they intend to establish - the unified nation state. 
Consequently, nationalism informs the conceptual reality of a right to secede. The 
inquiry into the relationship between nationalism and secession is undertaken in the 
context of the multi-national state and ethnic-culturally diverse people. The chapter 
explores the relationship between the right to secede and the multi-nationalist and 
ethnic-culturally diverse state, as concepts akin to secession. 
 
2 2 A Historic Perspective on Secession 
2 2 1 Pre – World War I 
The conceptualisation of the original subjects of modern public international law, 
their scope and nature, is often depicted as originating in 1648 with the Peace 
                                                 
30
 The right to self-determination is comprehensively discussed in Chapter 3. It is consequently 
presumed that the link between a right to self-determination and secession is only notional, in order to 
elucidate a potential framework to construct a normative approach to a right to secede. 
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Treaties of Westphalia.31 The Peace of Westphalia then concludes Europe’s Thirty 
Year War,32 which in reality were peace treaties between the Holy Roman Emperor, 
the King of France and their respective allies. Peace was declared after lengthy 
negotiations that culminated in a convention of states and the signing of two 
treaties.33 These treaties entrenched the principle of the equal sovereign state and 
the idea of collective state agreements. The collective state agreement or treaty has 
become the supreme manner of resolving political and international law disputes. 
This forms the basis of the organising ideologies of statehood in modern public 
international law. These ideologies have remained overwhelmingly Eurocentric over 
the centuries up until the present. The notion that the Peace of Westphalia informs 
the understanding of modern public international law and its subjects are sometimes 
construed as a narrow view of international law. This notion is premised on the 
presumption that no other concept or practice of international law existed before the 
European establishment. Weeramantry disposes of this notion, with his research into 
the international law under Islamic nations.34 
 
The disruption of the status quo and territorial instability commonly characterises 
secession. It could be argued that the trauma of the period before Westphalia; the 
cumulative effect of the Napoleonic War and the consequent two World Wars all 
contributed to the incorporation within international law two primary objectives. 
These are the maintenance of peace and stability and retaining the status quo.35 In 
the Temple of Preah Vihear case,36 the court held that it was in the interest of 
                                                 
31
 D Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 15-16. 
32
 This war raged on between the periods 1618 to 1648. The basis of this war was primarily, the mass 
export and entrenchment of religious dominance over all foreign territories. This was also the 
justification for the majority of Europe’s wars in the preceding century.   
33
 Negotiations dragged on from 1644 till 1648, the two treaties were respectively concluded by the 
Roman Emperor, princes of Europe and France in Münster and by Sweden in Osnabrück on 24 
October 1648. Noteworthy in relation to the emergence of new states, was the recognition of the 
United Provinces of the Netherlands whose independence from Spain was formally recognised via the 
Treaty of Osnabrück. 
34
 C Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective (Macmillan 1988) 149. I will 
not engage this topic, but it is important to note that other forms of what can be termed international 
law existed outside of Europe. However, this research is cultivated in modern perspectives of 
international law and the European legal origin is dominant and consequently is followed. 
35
 This position is evident in the development and promotion of a principle such as uti possidetis. See 
Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium v Netherlands) (Order) General List No. 38 [1959] 
ICJ Rep, 554. 
36
 Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) [1962] ICJ Rep 6. 
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stability that the original error in relation to demarcation of boundaries was rendered 
irrelevant.37 The ICJ held that ‘In general, when two countries establish a frontier 
between them, one of the primary objects is to achieve stability and finality’.38 In 
commenting on the Case Concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land 
(hereinafter the Frontier Land case),39 Castellino and Allen state that ‘This case is 
instructive since it addressed issues of status quo and territory without invoking the 
doctrine of uti possidetis’.40 They acknowledge that the wave of decolonisation, and 
the doctrine of self-determination did not have any significant effect on the judgment 
and the parties did not evoke this. However, they concluded that the case ‘provides 
an interesting perspective of the motives of the court and an indicator of the value of 
stability as perceived by the judges’.41 The position of the ICJ reflects the difficulty of 
exercising the right to secede, where it threatens both the political42 and legal 
stability of a territory.  
 
As indicated above, contemporary public international law still primarily reflects the 
heritage of the treaties of Westphalia. This hypothesis will be termed the 
Westphalian model. The idea of the centrality of the sovereign state as an actor in 
international law is still primary even after recent shifts in the influence of the players. 
As an example, this model neglects the status and influence of non-state actors. In 
what Harding terms the ‘Westphalian paradigm’43 the concept of equal sovereign 
states, is further explored. Cassese, who Harding also refers to, positions him closer 
to legal theory in labelling it the ‘Westphalian order’.44 According to Harding, the 
Westphalian paradigm concerns itself with equal and sovereign states as the primary 
and original actors under international law. Only a state can provide legal personality 
                                                 
37
 ibid 34. 
38
 ibid. 
39
 Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium v Netherlands) (Order) General List No. 38 [1959] 
ICJ Rep. 
40
 J Castellino, S Allen and J Gilbert, Title to Territory in International Law: A Temporal Analysis 
(Ashgate Publishing 2003) 124. 
41
 ibid. 
42
 Harding, ‘The Significance of Westphalia’ (n 29) 5. Here the authors argue that it is a perspective 
favoured by governments for promoting political stability in presenting this Westphalian logic as a rigid 
and conservative structure. 
43
 ibid 1-23. 
44
 Harding, ‘The Significance of Westphalia’ (n 29) 5. Cassese presents this concept as the period 
around the Peace of Westphalia that illuminates a dividing line between tradition international law 
views and the modern body of international law governing sovereign and independent states.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
19 
 
to entities legally within its territory. These would include non-governmental 
organisations or even private individuals. The non-state actors acquire a derivative 
personality, which existence and legitimacy are subject to the will of the originating 
state. This perspective can be criticised for being arcade and not incorporating the 
proliferation of many politically strong multi- and transnational corporations and 
organisations. Some of these organisations possess economic power that far 
exceeds that of a majority of the world’s governments. The secession debate cannot 
be void of these considerations. Harding and Lim quote Haufler where she states 
that: 
[M]uch of the current research slights the role of corporations and non-
governmental organisations, and concentrates on the decisions of state 
policy-makers. By doing so, it misses the important contribution of non-
state actors to the creation and maintenance of regimes (...) Private sector 
actors may construct independent national regimes, or play a relatively 
equal role with states within a regime of ‘mixed parentage’.45  
 
What the Westphalian model lacks is the role of these non-state actors in the 
maintenance and development of the system of international law. This argument 
illustrates how this historic system of international law fails to recognise the changes 
within it. With the use of the term Westphalian paradigm, Harding argues for the 
demise of the paradigm, but intrinsically also argues for a ‘shift’ in contemporary 
international law.46 The inequalities of the current international law order, predicated 
by this central notion of equal sovereign states, bear little rational or logic in an ever 
changing system. The pure adherence to the logic presented by the Westphalian 
model serves as a permanent bar to the accommodation of a legitimate right to 
secede under international law. With the construction of a normative framework for 
the exercise of the right to secede, the principle of stability needs to be 
accommodated, even though secession carries the potential of disrupting the status 
quo.  
                                                 
45
 ibid. 
46
 ibid 15. Harding and Lim argues that during the period of Westphalia there existed nothing which 
can in the current context be called international law, he proffers that the players and the game of 
international law has changed, as well as increased participation of non-state actor in the process of 
norm creation. 
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History reflects a shift in the subjects of international law and this should inform the 
development of the concept of secession. Especially, in its potential as a solution to 
territorial disputes. The nation state paradox deepens the viability of secession as a 
solution to international territorial disputes. This paradox is where,  secessionist seek 
to form a new territorial entity under the same system that protects and affirms the 
territorial integrity of the state which they want to disrupt. The current system of 
international law, premised on the rationale of the Westphalian model, seems 
opposed to secession. This situation continues primarily because the traditional 
system of international has not been harmonised with concepts that at first instance 
seems to threaten state territorial integrity. The secessionist movement needs the 
tradition institutions of statehood to be disrupted in order to forward their cause. 
However, in order to achieve success, a return to the traditional institution is 
necessary. Herein lays the paradox. The position of the ICJ in adjudicating territorial 
disputes has also favoured the principle of stability as discussed above, and a right 
to secede consequently would have to incorporate such a consideration.47 
 
2 2 2 Decolonisation 
With the demise of colonial rule, decolonised territories were presented with three 
options. These were forming a new sovereign state; integrating under an existing 
state’s control as a trust or non-self-governing territories or association with a 
sovereign state. It was under UNGA Resolution 151448 that official impetus was 
given to the process of decolonisation. UNGA Resolution 1514, in its preamble 
‘solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end 
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations’. Dugard terms this the ‘outlawing of 
colonialism’.49 Post 1960, in the aftermath of Resolution 1514, the United Nations 
(hereinafter UN) saw an immediate proliferation of newly independent member 
states. Consequently, how did the decolonisation process affect international law 
and its relationship with secession. An appreciation for the developments 
                                                 
47
 Temple of Preah Vihear case (n 36) and the Frontier Land Case (n 39).  
48
 The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, (adopted 14 
December 1960) GA res. 1514 (XV) (adopted by 89 votes to none; 9 abstentions). 
49
 J Dugard, International Law: A South African Perspective (4rd edn, Juta 2005) 96. 
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surrounding the right to self-determination during this period is necessary in 
answering this question.50 
 
Paragraph 2 of UNGA Resolution 1514 declares that, ‘All peoples have the right to 
self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’. Paragraph 6 then 
curtails this proclamation by qualifying it. The qualification aims to limit the right in 
declaring that:  
Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and 
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purpose and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.  
 
It could be argued that this qualification is a direct bar to secession. It creates a 
dichotomy that serves firstly, to proclaim the superiority of territorial integrity over 
peoples’ rights and secondly, to codify under international law the political doctrine of 
nationalism. The principle of stability as illustrated in the judgements of the ICJ51 
could also be said to inform this qualification of the right to self-determination. 
 
UNGA Resolution 1514 was followed by UNGA Resolution 2625 (hereinafter the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations),52 which further denounced colonialism and 
upheld the existence of the right to self-determination. The paragraph on Principles 
of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples, declares that: 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, 
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign independent states 
                                                 
50
 The right to self-determination could independently constitute a right to secede. Reference here to 
self-determination is limited to the context of colonialism. It is prudent to ponder the question, whether 
the right to self-determination necessarily imply a right of secession? This question closely looked in 
Chapter 3. See also, Higgins, Themes and Theories  (n 16) 968. 
51
 (n 20) supra. 
52
 The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (adopted 24 October 1970) GA 
res. 2625 (XXV). 
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conducting themselves in compliance with the principles of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples. 
 
This is again a qualification of the right to self-determination and the same dichotomy 
as in UNGA Resolution 1514 presents itself. The conclusion is similar to that this 
presents a direct prohibition against secession. Seshagiri reflects on self-
determination and colonialism, by highlighting a significant paradox. He states that:  
In particular, self-determination has been limited at international law to 
apply only to groups that constitute ‘peoples’ and whose territorial claims 
fit a particular colonial mould. In this manner, international law provided a 
limited window for colonized peoples to break free from their colonisers 
though not from colonially established borders.53  
 
Seshagiri employs the paradox to argue in opposition to the principle of uti 
possidetis, in doing so, he highlights a significant fallacy of the process of 
decolonisation. The process aimed to liberate people, but only within the contours of 
the predetermined colonial borders. The decolonisation process did not considering 
the peoples’ association with the territory.  
  
The judicial decision in Legal Consequence for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (hereinafter the South West Africa case),54 serves as a significant 
example. Firstly, because the ICJ expressly declared that the principle of self-
                                                 
53
 L Seshagiri, ‘Democratic Disobedience: Re-conceiving Self-determination and Secession at 
International Law’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 567. 
54
 Legal Consequence for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) [1971] ICJ Rep 16. The case 
concerned South Africa’s refusal to vacate South West Africa (Namibia) after the United Nations 
Security Council revoked its mandate over the territory, primarily because South Africa was extending 
its policy of separate development (Apartheid) to this territory, which it held under a mandate originally 
in place of Britain. The court agreed with the UN Security Council Resolution and declared South 
Africa’s presence in Namibia to be illegal in that it did not have the interest and development of the 
majority of the inhabitants of the territory at heart. 
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determination was applicable to all non-self-governing territories.55 Secondly, the 
court found that when interpreting international law the court could not remain 
ignorant of subsequent developments in the law.56 The ICJ went further to recognise 
that the concepts embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations ‘were not 
static, but were by definition evolutionary’.57 This position strengthens the potential of 
a right to secede, where the developing nature of the law promotes the presences of 
such a right. In the South West Africa case, the ICJ limited the interpretation of the 
right to self-determination to have bearing only on the situation of peoples living 
under colonial rule and their emancipation from alien domination.  
 
Regrettably, in just denouncing South Africa’s behaviour and its control over South 
West Africa, the court missed an opportunity to declare the system of trusteeship 
and mandated territories in its precise nature as contrary to international law. The 
principle of equal sovereign states, as present within the Westphalian model was 
flouted by the introduction of these concepts to international law. The South West 
Africa case did however materially contribute to the establishment and development 
of the right to self-determination. 
 
The Western Sahara case serves as a further example of Seshagiri’s paradox. From 
the onset in the Western Sahara case, the court accepted that the right to self-
determination had emerged as a norm of international law.58 However, the court 
limited the right, to the colonial setting and non-self-governing territories59 as was the 
case in the South West Africa case advisory opinion. The court emphasised the 
centrality of the principle of self-determination in international law, to the extent of its 
drafting  into Article 1 of the UN Charter.60 The ICJ was in favour of a normative 
approach, a responsibility that it attached to the UNGA. The court proclaimed, that 
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‘The right of self-determination leaves the General Assembly a measure of discretion 
with respect to the forms and procedures by which that right is to be realized’.61 The 
court pursued the reasoning that the legal and substantive question of self-
determination had to be answered through the free and genuine expression of the 
will of the peoples of the territory. According to the court, the form and procedural 
question lays at the discretion of the UNGA.62 The ICJ restricted the peoples will to 
only the substantive question of their self-determination. Higgins nevertheless 
believes that the issue of secession is detached from the aspiration of post-colonial 
self-determination. A complete reading of Higgins’ perspectives indicates that both 
colonial and post-colonial entitlements of peoples to self-determination are entirely 
irrelevant to the concept of secession.63 The basis for Higgins’ argument is the fact 
that peoples can secede without evoking a right of self-determination. Consequently, 
that secession does not exist as an exclusive remedy for the exercise of the right to 
self-determination. 
 
If the ICJ’s interpretation of self-determination according to the South West Africa 
case and the Western Sahara case is followed, it seems that a right to self-
determination could not have survived the post-colonial era. There is contemporary 
jurisprudential support for such an opinion. The Canadian Supreme Court argued in 
the Quebec case that:  
International law contains neither a right of unilateral secession nor the 
explicit denial of such a right, although such a denial is, to some extent, 
implicit in the exceptional circumstances required for secession to be 
permitted under the right of a people to self-determination, e.g. the right of 
secession that arises in the exceptional situation of an oppressed or 
colonial people.64  
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The Canadian Supreme Court seems to propose that a right of secession is an 
exception rather than a norm of international law. However, what is indispensable for 
the current research is the court’s recognition of the right to secession in two 
instances – firstly, as a remedial right and secondly within the context of colonialism.  
 
2 3 A Working Definition of Secession: Perspectives 
2 3 1 Introduction 
The primary objective of this sub-chapter is to lay the theoretical and analytical 
foundation for the rest of the study. The issues deliberated over in this section are 
reoccurs and inform the conceptual framework of the study. The normative character 
of a right to secede cannot become apparent without fully understanding what the 
concept of secession entails. An introductory exploration on the morality of 
secession leads the synopsis of the leading ideas on the theories of secession. The 
primary purpose is to extract a feasible definition of secession to guide the rest of the 
research. Bartkus also follows this approach in stating that: 
Critical to any specific secession is its own internal justification; of central 
importance to any study of secession crises are the moral issues 
concerning their justification. The analytical framework therefore rests on 
this normative bedrock underpinning secession.65 
 
2 3 2 Theories of Secession 
Legal theory requires a definite description of a legal concept for it to comply to with 
the principle of legal certainty. This rationale remains true for the concept of 
secession. Groarke explains that ‘The law favours certainty and there is a legal and 
moral presumption in favour of the status quo’.66 Seemingly, Groarke equates legal 
certainty with a presumption in favour of the principle of stability as discussed 
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above.67 A clear definition and theory of secession is critical in a study of this 
discourse. However, legal theorist and commentators seem to lack consensus on 
this imperative point of departure. The is diverging views on a definition and theory of 
secession which contributes to the difficulties in finding common denominators to 
define secession. A general theory of secession consequently becomes even more 
unimaginable. In addition to this,  some authors, such as Radan argues that the 
existence of the right itself is contentious and that this within itself creates this lack in 
consensus.68  
 
In interrogating the morality of secession, Buchanan suggests the existence of two 
predominant types of theories on secession.69 The first is the Remedial Right Only 
Theory and the second is the Primary Right Theory.70 According to Buchanan, all 
theories attached to secession can fundamentally be categorised and 
accommodated within his two-tier model. Buchanan’s formulation of these theories 
seeks to establish the moral and legal justification for the existence of a right to 
unilateral secession.71 In his formulation of the main characteristics of his theories, 
he approaches the matter pragmatically and uses unilateral secession as the 
premise for these theories.  
 
His first theory - the Remedial Right Only Theory, argues that a right to secede 
arises to provide a remedy of last resort in cases of grave injustices and continuous 
gross human rights violation by state forces.72 Buchanan suggests, that a right to 
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secede attaches to a group or peoples ‘only when secession is the remedy of last 
resort in conditions in which that group is the victim of persistent violations of 
fundamental rights of its members’.73 Buchanan further argues, that the violated 
rights are essential individual human rights. However, he does not exclude the 
possibility that a violation of the collective group rights may activate a remedial right 
to secede. In fact, he provides two circumstances of where a right to secede may be 
relied on, due to a collective group right being violated.74 The firstly is where the 
dominant state provided the group (peoples) with autonomous status or particular 
rights and defaults on such a declaration. The other circumstance would be, where a 
disputed territory exists that was unjustly annexed, but was previously the 
independent territory of the group claiming the right.75 In these circumstances 
secession serves to correct the injustice perpetrated against the group.76 Both 
instances of either collective or individual rights activating the right to secede are 
reconcilable with the Remedial Right Only Theory.  
 
The Primary Right Theory presents a more fundamentalist argument for a right to 
secede, compared to the Remedial Right Only Theory. This theory rejects the 
existence of an abhorrent injustice to access secession. The theory premises itself 
on the centrality of a primary right providing access to the secession. Buchanan 
concludes that there are two manifestations of this theory. He identifies them as the 
Plebiscitary Right Theory and the Ascriptive Right Theory.77 
 
The Plebiscitary Right Theory holds that a right to secede is unilaterally available 
whenever a majority of people within a region or territory wishes to secede. This form 
of the Primary Right Theory has its critics and supporters. Views favouring the 
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Plebiscitary Rights Theory, finds justification in ‘the democratic value that 
government needs to be by consent and (...) that such a theory gives direct effect to 
the implications of the right to freedom of association’.78 Buchanan criticises 
proponents of this theory as hiding behind appeals to the value of liberty and 
democracy.79 The arguments forwarded by Buchanan, to substantiate the legitimacy 
of the Plebiscitary Right Theory, can neither be located as principles of democracy, 
nor can it be said that the discourse of democracy makes provision for it. 
 
The second form of the Primary Right Theory is the Ascriptive Right Theory. This 
theory reserves a unilateral right to secede for peoples based on their common 
ascriptive characteristic. Ascriptive groups can be ‘variously referred to as peoples, 
distinct peoples, encompassing cultures, or more commonly, nations’.80 This theory 
is also commonly termed the nationalist theory.81 The problem and criticism of this 
theory, is the question - what constitutes a nation? The philosophical theorists 
Avashai and Raz provide a cogent definition of this in that:  
A nation is a group united by an ‘encompassing’ common culture, 
membership in which is chiefly a matter of belonging, rather than 
achievement, where the group in question feels an attachment to a 
particular area (understood as a homeland), and where the group (or a 
substantial portion of its members) aspire for some form of political 
organization (though not necessarily full independent statehood).82  
 
Groarke challenges the theories presented by Buchanan with his own. He focuses 
on a distinction between political and legal conceptualization on the legitimacy of 
secession. Groarke argues for the existence of two theories; the first is premised on 
the right to self-determination and the second is based on the notion of a just 
cause.83 In relation to the first theory, Groarke argues that this right might appear to 
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be a group right, however, the right to self-determination and any corresponding right 
to secede can be traced back to being an individual right. Although Groarke does not 
elaborate on these individual rights, it could be assumed that it is rights that promote 
access to the right to self-determination. He admits a theory based on the right to 
self-determination is similar to Buchanan’s Primary Rights Theory. In addition, he 
concludes that it would lead to a general or inherent right to secede.84 However, 
Groarke follows a progressive approach by distinguishing between legal and political 
theories. Political discourse provides for the right, but its viability and application lies 
within legal theory. Buchanan does not make this distinction.  
 
In proposing a legal theory of secession, Groarke suggests that three requirements 
need to be satisfied. Firstly, a legal theory should provide the means of determining 
when a right to secede would arise. Secondly, it should be pragmatic and provide the 
mechanism needed to exercise such a right and thirdly it should be able to identify 
the law that will provide the criteria needed to apply the right.85 This approach  
potentially provides a test to analyse the normative characteristic of the right to 
secede. Groarke proposes, that there should be a legal presumption in favour of 
territorial integrity of existing states and that secession in this context should be a 
remedy rather than a substantive cause of action.86 In this, Groarke tilts towards 
Buchanan’s Remedial Right Only Theory. In his reliance on respect for territorial 
integrity, the influence of the tacit principle of stability is possibly an influence. There 
are similarities between Buchanan’s Remedial Right Only Theory and Groarke’s Just 
Cause Theory. Although these theories do not facilitate the establishment of a 
general theory of secession, they do create a platform towards defining secession. 
Consequently, it becomes vital to see how these theories assist in the formulation of 
a working definition on secession. 
 
2 3 3 A Definition of Secession 
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Although no generally accepted definition of secession exists, multiple scholars have 
worked on a definition. Radan for instance defines secession as ‘the creation of a 
new State upon territory previously forming part of, or being a colonial entity of, an 
existing State’.87 With this general definition Radan aims to set a broad platform to 
further categorise secession into five different types. Through this process,  he 
attempts to accommodate a range of situations relating to secession.88 His first type 
is colonial secession,89 this is cases where colonial entities attain statehood. Radan 
provides for this type within his general definition. Secondly, he argues for unilateral 
secession, which he describes as a situation where ‘notwithstanding the continued 
opposition of the host State, part of that State becomes a new State and the host 
State continues its existence’.90 The next type is devolutionary secession. These are 
‘cases where, irrespective of whether or not it initially opposed the creation of a new 
State, the host State consented to the creation of a new State at the time of the 
latter’s creation and the host State continues its existence’.91 This type of secession 
seems to involve post facto consent. This needs to be distinguished from Radan’s 
consensual secession that involves mutual consent. He argues that consensual 
secession involves ‘cases where, the demand for the creation of a new State leads 
to the host State being dissolved by consent, leading to the creation of a new State 
or States’.92 Finally, he suggests 'dissolving secession’ which are ‘cases where, the 
demand for the creation of a new State leads to the factual dissolution of the host 
State, leading to the creation of a new State or States’.93 This type of secession 
seems to be a bit confusing with his consensual and devolutionary secession. 
However, possible Radan seeks to accommodate situations where external states 
forces the factual secession of a part of the state. Bangladesh’s secession from 
Pakistan would be an example of such a type of secession, primarily because of 
India’s involvement there.    
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These different forms of secession presented by Radan seem to be extremely similar 
and closely related. The last four forms can be distinguished based on consent or 
unilateral conduct and are not truly distinct in any other regard. There remains 
controversy over whether the formation of a new state from under the cloak of 
colonial rule is truly secession. Higgins criticise the view that the process of 
decolonisation can be accommodative of the concept of secession. She 
unequivocally states that in her opinion: 
This is a singular use of the term ‘secession’. ‘Secession’ implies leaving 
something behind. De-colonization (regardless of whether of jus cogens or 
not) implied that nothing should be left behind (...) Secession was not in 
issue in this context.94  
 
Crawford goes on to define secession as ‘the process by which a particular group 
seeks to separate itself from the state to which it belongs, and to create a new state 
on part of the territory of that state’.95 He emphasises that according to international 
practice no unilateral right to secede is recognised.96 However, Crawford treads 
cautiously in limiting his statement to prevailing international practice and not 
international law. He bases his opinion on the respect of the principle of territorial 
integrity and the legitimacy of the political systems of the state.97 Unlike Radan, 
Crawford includes the continued existence of the host state in his definition. 
 
In contrast, in writing on self-determination and human rights in Taiwan, Ando states 
that ‘Secession means the separation of part of the territory of an existing state to 
form a new state or accede to another existing state’.98 This is a new approach to 
defining secession, in that it seems to suggest that accession can form part of the 
process of secession. Accession in the context that Ando presents it could be 
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comprehended as entering into a free association with another state or even by 
integration with an independent state. Following Ando’s definition would allow for 
more flexibility in a people’s expression of their will to secede; a position that is not 
totally out of accord with international law. According to the provisions of UNGA 
Resolution 1541,99 the process of exercising self-determination could produce three 
different outcomes for non-self-governing territories. Firstly, and judging from UN 
practice the most preferred option, is for a territory to become independent. 
Secondly, the territory can enter into a free association with an independent state; 
and lastly peoples can opt to integrate with an independent state.100 
 
In summary, the theories and definitions of secession can be distinguished with 
regard to conservative and liberal views. Higgins suggest that secession implies 
leaving something behind. However, detaching the process of decolonisation from 
the term secession is only based on a pragmatic view of the concept of statehood. If 
a legal approach to the concept of statehood is followed, it cannot be denied that 
colonial entities formed integrated territories that formed part of the colonising 
dominant state. The theories forwarded on secession, above, are indicative of the 
cardinal point that secession is a process. Crawford includes this in his definition, 
which seems an apt inclusion to follow in determining a right of secession and its 
normative character 
 
Higgins presents an extremely conservative view of a definition of secession. She 
refutes the potential of the colonial context having produce situations of secession. 
Ando represents the other extreme, which is a liberal view of secession. Ando’s 
insertion of accession carries legal merit; it is an argument that is best illustrated 
within the contexts of the right to self-determination. There remains the general 
inclination that a definition needs to state that territory needs to be left behind. A right 
to secede would have to authorise an entitlement to part of a territory. There is an 
uneasiness with a definition which allows for taking all of a state’s territory.  
                                                 
99
 Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to 
transmit the information called for under Article 73e of the Charter (adopted 15 December 1960) GA 
res. 1541 (XV). 
100
 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12,para 57 and 58. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
33 
 
 
A workable definition of secession cannot be void of the theoretical foundation of 
secession. It is within this theoretical analysis explored above, that the moral 
justification for secession is presented. If Bartkus’ view is considered,101 that every 
case of secession possesses its own internal justification, than a pursuit of a 
definition of secession is possibly rendered null. The difficulty in determining 
consensus amongst scholars is that each one focuses their definition on a particular 
incident of secession. None attempts to find a general definition. However, even 
where Radan’s approach is followed, to formulate an all-encompassing definition, the 
failure of such an approach is apparent, in that it ends up with different types of 
secession rather than a clear definition. Bartkus’ position is possibly best suited to 
inform a conceptual understanding of secession. The theoretical outline above could 
help inform a comprehension of the moral justification of secession. This approach 
will be followed in the subsequent inquiry into nationalism as part of an analysis of 
the conceptual framework of secession. 
 
2 4 Nationalism and Secession 
2 4 1 National Identity and Territory 
The right to self-determination is frequently upheld as the central justification of 
secessionist movements. The developed legal concept of the right to self-
determination has its origins in ideologies such as nationalism and democracy.102 
Contemporary understanding of public international law is heavily predicated on the 
notion of the nation state.103 The ideological foundations on which the move towards 
statehood and nationalism rest are the subscription to doctrines of unity.104 These 
concepts form a platform for understanding state, territory and identity, they inform 
the prescriptive nature of a right to secede. To better understand secession,  there is 
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a need to comprehend nationalism. Buchanan best describes the importance of an 
inquiry into nationalism, where he states: 
[T]he distinction between federal and non-federal systems, the morality 
or immorality of nationalism – all of these issues and more are 
inescapable once we undertake to develop a normative theory of 
secession.105   
 
Under colonial regimes, cultural identities of indigenous and minority groups were 
suppressed. The process of decolonisation saw diverse and formerly oppressed 
peoples thrown together under the flag of the nation-state. This process led to the 
creation of artificial forms of national identity, not linked to irredential characteristics. 
In addition, post-colonial instabilities and conflicts in especially Africa and South-
America became indicative of the failure of this project. This could be as a result of 
former colonial peoples’ rejection of this artificial national identity. This project 
consequently failed at its primary objective of forging a new national consciousness 
and the unity of former colonial peoples. However, with the retention of the colonial 
administrative borders to dictate the parameters of sovereignty and statehood under 
the principle of uti possidetis, the right to self-determination was also rendered 
largely artificial. The use and rationale of the uti possidetis principle was largely 
premised on the maintenance of international stability.106 Subsequently, indigenous 
and minority ethnic-culturally diverse peoples were forcefully inducted into new 
states.  
 
Castellino remarks that, after emancipation from colonial rule several governments 
depended on doctrines of unity to fight secessionism. These were doctrines such as 
statehood, nationality, and especially nation building. The latter was believed to 
provide a basis for the sustainability of the international order, akin to the 
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Westphalian model. Castellino defines the doctrine of nation building to postulate 
that ‘narrow cleavages between peoples, whether ethnic, racial, cultural or religious 
should not be permitted to impede the development of the sovereign state’.107 It is 
essential to acknowledge these doctrines of unity and their role within the system of 
public international law. The Western Sahara case provides an example of how 
nomadic existence challenged the legitimacy of nationalism within a predetermined 
territory. The court stated that: 
 At the time, the Saharan desert was still the frontierless sea of sand used 
by the caravans as convoys use an ocean, for the purposes of a well-
known trade; the desert was a way of access to markets on its periphery. 
The relation between the territory and human beings was effected by 
these aspects (...) If the desert is a separate world, it is an autonomous 
world in the conception of its relationships with those who have a different 
way of life.108 
 
Gans describes the role of history as ‘an inherent part of the essence of national 
groups and of nationalist ideologies’.109 It is this historical justification and attachment 
to a territory that informs a claim to secede. Nationalist theory tables two arguments 
to highlight the centrality of history in the construction of the formative notions which 
follows nationalist claims. These arguments are based firstly on identity and 
secondly on settlement. The identity argument is premised on the claim that the 
territory is central to the formation of the identity of peoples. This side of nationalist 
theory provides the reasoning for recognising peoples’ collective rights over the 
territory.110 Situations where momentous historical events, relating to the group 
occurred on the specific territory or where their cultural practices and folk-tales 
integrally link peoples to a territory, serves as examples. Peoples’ collective rights 
over a territory are then established via their link to the territory; this is manifested 
through their desire to govern themselves on that territory.  
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The second argument of nationalist theory - the settlement argument demands 
physical presence on the territory as a basic principle. According to Miller this 
argument, requires the establishment of physical infrastructure on the territory that 
remodels the landscape.111 It is in the employment of national labour and the 
establishment of nationally significant infrastructure that peoples acquire collective 
rights over a territory.112 One can reconcile these arguments with the definition of 
indigenous peoples found in the International Labour Organisation Convention No. 
169113. Article 1(1)(b) defines indigenous peoples as: 
Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on 
account of their descent from populations which inhabited the country, or a 
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest 
or colonization or the establishment of present states boundaries and who, 
irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, 
economic, cultural and political institutions. 
 
Essentially, what nationalist theory argues is that peoples employ their formative 
connections to a territory as the basis of exercising a right of exclusive jurisdiction 
over a territory. It consequently becomes evident, that the notion of nationalism 
drives the process of asserting that collective exclusive right, even a right to secede. 
This is thus not merely irredentism at play. It is necessary to note that law forms part 
of the social science and influences relationships such as national identity and 
territory.  
  
2 4 2 The Multi-national and Ethno-culturally Diverse State 
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It is evident from history and contemporary conflicts that much of the unrest 
especially within developing states are as a consequence of uncertainties with 
regard to national borders.114 The persuasive pragmatism of a right to secede would 
be found in its ability to accommodate multi-national and ethnic-culturally diverse 
peoples within its normative definition. The aspirations of peoples within a territory to 
secede as an expression of their national and ethnic-cultural identity demands a 
subscription to the same notion of statehood that they are trying to diminish. This 
creates a paradox. It can be illustrated through the relationship between the 
resistance to secession and the object of what secessionist aims to achieve. The 
report to the League of Nations on the Äland Islands Question stated that: 
To concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any fractions 
of a population the right of withdrawing from the community to which they 
belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure, would be to destroy 
order and stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in international 
life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the 
state as a territorial and political unity.115 
 
A position that was upheld by the committee of jurist on the Äland Islands Question, 
who stated in their report that: 
Positive international law does not recognize the right of national groups, 
as such, to separate themselves from the state of which they form part by 
the simple expression of a wish, any more than it recognizes the rights of 
other states to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or 
the refusal of such a right to a portion of its population of determining its 
own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method, is exclusively an 
attribute of the sovereignty of every state which is definitely constituted.116 
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The prevailing idea being that secession is a matter for domestic settlement. A 
practical example of the difficulties of secession, especially in a multi-national and 
ethnic-culturally diverse context – is the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Eritrea 
struggled for more than 30 years to gain their independence from Ethiopia. This 
dispute was settled in 1993, based on an agreement reached through arbitration.117 
Even after the dispute was settled the parties still could not agree on the 
demarcation of their borders. Ethiopia,118 which is governed under a federal system, 
also provides an example of the co-existence of multi-national and ethnic-culturally 
diverse peoples under one state. The constitution of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia starts with the words, ‘We, the Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples of Ethiopia’.119 This is a direct attempt to institutionalise the diversity of the 
people of Ethiopia. Chapter 2 of the constitution enshrines the constitutional principle 
that ‘all sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of 
Ethiopia’. Eritrea initially formed part of the Ethiopian federation of states but left 
before the proclamation of the new Constitution. Article 39 of the Ethiopian 
constitution is ground-breaking in that it provides for a constitutional right to secede, 
as will be further discussed below in chapter 3. Importantly the constitution sets out 
the substantive and procedural requirements for separation from the state.120 Such a 
bold step in reforming the law is not without controversy. Pham concludes that ‘To 
say that the introduction of this model aroused misgivings considerably understates 
the reaction to this novel approach to challenges of ethnicity’.121 He goes further to 
quote an Ethiopian scholar who reiterates some of these misgivings in stating that 
‘recognition of the rights, obligations and respect for the language, culture and 
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identity of nations are the first difficulty but unavoidable step toward non-ethnic 
politicisation and a multiparty system’.122 
 
Similarly, in South Africa where there is also a multitude of different ethnic-culturally 
diverse peoples the constitution provides for constitutional development that would 
be able to accommodate a right to secession. Political and constitutional 
entrenchment of a right to secede could be justified under section 235 of the South 
African Constitution123 that states: 
The right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination, as 
manifested in this Constitution, does not preclude, within the framework 
of this right, recognition of the notion of self-determination of any 
community sharing a common cultural and language heritages, within a 
territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by 
national legislation. 
 
Interpretation of these provisions will be critical in mapping the normative character 
of a right of secession within especially the African multi-national and ethnic-
culturally diverse context. Regional African jurisprudence has already shown that 
traditional international legal principles are central to its reasoning. In Katangese 
Peoples’ Congress v Zaire (hereinafter the Katanga case)124 the African Commission 
for Human and Peoples Rights declared that there was an obligation on Katanga to 
exercise a form of the right to self-determination, that was not in conflict, but 
compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of former Zaire (Now known 
as the Democratic Republic of Congo). This conclusion is reconcilable with the views 
expressed above that international law and statehood is premised on the principle of 
stability and the Westphalian model. It cannot be excluded that secession can also 
be a catalyst for peace and stability. However, a right to secede needs to incorporate 
the values of the rule of law as well as legal certainty. 
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2 5 Concluding Remarks 
History has shown that even though a right to secede does not enjoy outright 
recognition, this has not prevented secession from taking place. Where international 
law provides a legal basis for the legitimacy of secession this would increase legal 
certainty surrounding the concept. Even though, the inquiry into a definition of 
secession did not deliver clear and concise characteristics of the elements of 
secession, it is within the different perspectives of the theories discussed that a 
definite image of the nature of secession emerges. It is clear that a general theory of 
secession is extremely difficult to establish and that currently it is non-existent under 
contemporary international law. However, the conceptual framework offered in this 
chapter will guide the further inquiry into the prescriptive nature and character of a 
right to secede. 
 
The development of the right to self-determination has been contentious outside of 
the colonial context. However, this still seems to be the most viable path to follow in 
establishing a legitimate right to secede. In both the South West Africa case and the 
Western Sahara case, the court respectfully overlooked opportunities to further 
entrench self-determination as a peoples’ right in international law. This was a step 
back from the court's conclusion in the Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v 
Australia) (hereinafter East Timor case), where the ICJ held that: 
In the Court's view, Portugal's assertion that the right of peoples to self-
determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations 
practice, has an erga omnes character, is irreproachable.125 
 
Even with this judgment, the principle of stability governed the court's conclusion in a 
bid to maintain the status quo. The ICJ, as the appropriate international forum to 
resolve territorial disputes needs to reform its position in upholding this vague 
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principle of stability. Retaining the status quo only makes rational and logical sense 
where there is no immediate or future threat of violence against the civilian 
population.  
 
Franck makes the example that, while international law approved a formal right to 
secede to Croatia, from the former SFRY, the peoples in the Serb regions of Croatia 
were not afforded the same right.126 Franck states that, ‘The present normative 
uncertainty, if not disarray, has generated a remarkable gaggle of paradoxes. The 
law has almost unlimited tolerance for paradox; but not for blatant unfairness’.127 A 
similar example seems to have emerged from the historical thread running through 
secession and its conceptual framework. Seshagiri also points us to another 
inconsistency in international law. With colonial emancipation, a right to self-
determination was allowed, but limited by the perpetuation of colonial administrative 
border via the adherence to the doctrine of uti possidetis.128 Two of the obstacles in 
the formation of a normative framework for the exercise of a right to secede seems 
to be these paradoxes and an ever sense of unfairness129 in the application of 
international law.  
 
In this regard, Groarke moves from the position that the true premise of international 
law is agreement. He finds that this is rather a political standard than a legal one. He 
concludes by affirming that agreement is a poor substitute for morality, but concedes 
that it is the law that is the provider of this deficiency.130 This was also the position in 
the Quebec case131 where the court ruled that negotiations needs to follow a 
referendum where a clear majority is in favour of secession. The court also stated 
that such a referendum needs to have a clearly posed question. The following 
chapter continues from consensus and agreement to investigate the domestication 
of secession. Where different jurisdictions have incorporated a right to secede into 
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their constitutions, the denial of a right to secede becomes moot. The problem is that 
the municipal inclusion of the right might prevent it from being enforceable on the 
international plain. Below this argument is advance through investigating the 
interplay between municipal and international law within the context of a process of 
secession. 
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3 The Normative Character of a Codified Right to Secede 
 
3 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 outlined the historical context of secession, with a focus on the conceptual 
framework relating to secession. It further aimed at establishing a viable definition of 
secession following the traditional path of the moral justification of secession. This 
chapter seeks to build on the previous chapter and investigate the potential of a 
departure from the traditional moral focus of secession. This process is initiated by 
focussing on the prescriptive character of the codified right to secede. This will serve 
as the backdrop to chapter 4, which analyse the relationship between secessions 
and self-determination as a norm of international law.  
 
This chapter approaches the issue of the domestic entrenchment of a right to secede 
from a constitutional angle still maintaining the international perspective. The 
discussion is centred on how a right to secede can be domestically entrenched in a 
manner that is reconcilable with international law. This seemingly removes the right 
from the scope of international law, but the consequence of exercising the right 
brings with it direct implications on an international level. The primary consequence 
is the creation of a new state, which serves as a subject under international law. 
Consequently, the application of domestic law entrenching the right to secede has a 
direct impact on the formation and recognition of legal personality under international 
law. The traditional view of legal personality as explained by Shaw, where he 
suggests that: 
Within the body of international law, the concept and consequences of 
statehood clearly play a crucial role. The State is the primary, although not 
the sole, subject of international law and the law cannot therefore remain 
indifferent to the circumstances of its coming into existence.132 
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One of the central questions that this chapter seeks to address is whether a right to 
secede is better served within the realm of domestic law or that of international law. 
An investigation is undertaken to establish how a domestically entrenched right to 
secede positions itself in relation to both international and domestic legal systems. 
Further, it analyses the relationship between constitutionalism and secession. The 
chapter presents the questions, whether the primary objectives of these two 
concepts are not fundamentally contradictory. Does the one not aim at political unity 
and the other disintegration? How does constitutional entrenchment of the right 
reconcile this potential anomaly? Ultimately, it is hoped that the answers to these 
questions will be critical in discerning the normative character of a right to secede as 
a primary objective. 
 
Furthermore, this chapter seeks to shed light on the methodical weaknesses and 
strengths that are present within codified versions of the right to secede. Historical 
examples of the inclusion of the right into constitutions have served as political 
compromises, which presents a potential weakness. This chapter highlights the 
common traits of the constitutional right. This is achieved through focussing on the 
substantive merit and the procedural legitimacy of the right.  
 
3 2 The Rational of Codifying the Right to Secede 
3 2 1 Introduction 
Where the right to secede is recognised within a municipal constitution, in general 
international law becomes secondary in the application of the right.  All perspective 
of the right consequently needs to be cognisant of the presence of  legal dualism in 
such a situation. In discussing the legal dualism of constitutionalism and international 
law, as well as the reasons there to, Michelman states that: 
A very striking feature of constitutionalist legal dualism is that it channels 
demands for direct justification to the higher-law scheme of constitutional 
essentials; it allows ordinary political acts to be justified indirectly – to 
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inherit justification from above – by showing how they issued from an 
accepted or acceptable higher law.133 
 
Following this rationale, it can be argued that where the right to secede is presented 
within a constitution, secession finds justification under those constitutional 
essentials. These constitutional essentials are commonly understood for being the 
founding constitutional principles. Michelman argues that the purpose of this 
approach is to preserve the core of society, be it the substantive or procedural 
values of its social condition. Thus, the rationale of constitutional or domestic 
inclusion of the right to secede is not only to establish legitimacy, but also to promote 
societal values. Constitutional inclusion of the right to secede still needs to operate  
within the framework allowed by international law in its interplay with municipal law. 
 
Buchanan highlights the need for a constitutional theory on secession.134 He argues 
that ‘This is far from being a merely academic exercise. All indications are that we 
are entering an era of extraordinary constitutional activity’.135 In hindsight, his 
prediction carries merit, the world has moved towards  proliferation of constitutional 
dispensations. In cases where the right to secede was codified within certain 
jurisdictions,136 it has always been beset with controversy over its legal effectiveness 
and utility. Ironically, it has been these controversies over legal effectiveness and 
utility that has managed to keep the debate on secession contemporary. The 
practical examples and theorisation over the recognition and existence of the right 
have informed not only the moral justification of secession, but also its legal status in 
both international and domestic law. The constitutional codification of the right to 
secede, through inclusion into domestic law, presents a strong argument for legal 
certainty. However, legal theory demands that the right features both the substantive 
and procedural characteristics that will underpin its legal nature. Buchanan furthers 
the debate by proposing two pairs of what he calls ideal type models for a 
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constitutional right to secede.137 He indicates that ‘The purpose of these models is 
simply to help structure the options for developing frameworks within which a 
constitutional right to secede might be formulated’.138 Consequently, Buchanan 
proposes models which provides boundaries, within which a normative character for 
a codified right to secede can be developed.  
 
Buchanan names his first ‘ideal type model’, the substantive model. This model 
proposes a direct link between the moral justification of secession and the codified 
right. Following this reasoning, the formulation of the right needs to set out all the 
individual moral justifications for secession. These individual moral justifications 
present themselves in the form of substantive conditions for when peoples can 
secede. In order to access the right, peoples need to demonstrate that their situation 
is comparable with one of the substantive justifications comprising the right. Where 
peoples’ right to their cultural identity and link to a specific territory are consistently 
grossly violated and/or denied by the state or a majority (in case of individuals), 
serves as an example. Consequently, peoples could only employ the right to secede 
where such injustice is a specifically mentioned as a ground for secession. Meaning 
it forms part of the substantive justification to secede. 
 
The other of Buchanan’s models that are akin to the substantive model is the fault 
model. The fault model proposes that the legitimacy of secession must be 
conditional to exclusive blame on the part of the state. Buchanan argues that ‘This 
approach is a special version of the substantive model’139 and forms part of the first 
pair of his ideal type models. The moral justification proposed by Buchanan’s 
Remedial Right Only Theory, as discussed in chapter 2, finds close correlation under 
this model. Buchanan presents the examples that ‘The need to preserve cultural 
identity as such would not count as a legitimate justification for secession, nor would 
a group’s desire to found an autonomous small-scale democratic community’.140 The 
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fault model places the state at the centre of peoples’ secessionist aspiration, by 
making the execution of the right conditional to state liability. 
 
Buchanan’s third ideal type model is the procedural model. This model forms part of 
his second pair of models. Under this model, the need to prove the substantive 
(moral) justification for secession becomes secondary, ‘Instead, only various 
constitutionally specified procedural requirements must be satisfied’.141 With this 
model, the right to secede is formulated within the constitution, to set out only the 
procedural requirements to secede. An illustration would be where the constitution 
stipulates that a referendum needs to be held, and a two-thirds majority will be the 
minimum number of votes necessary to approve a motion to secede. Buchanan 
suggests that this model is less conservative than the substantive model. His 
argument being that the substantive model inherently demands justifications for 
secession. This justification needs to be captured within the framework of the final 
formulation of the right. The procedural model departs from the presumption that 
secession is legitimate in principle and that procedural requirements needs to be met 
first. The morality of secession and with it the substantive requirements; will still have 
to be complied with, these are however secondary considerations after the 
procedural ones. Buchanan’s fourth model - the no-fault model continues with the 
importance of procedural compliance. 
 
The fourth model that Buchanan suggests is the no-fault model. This could be 
described as the extreme one amongst the presented models. With this model, no 
allegation or proof of a violation of rights by the state or a majority is necessary. The 
model is akin to the procedural model to the extent that it requires no substantive 
justification to secede. Although premised on the procedural model, the fundamental 
difference is that secessionist can proceed through a strict adherence to the 
procedural criteria required by the codified right. Consequently, the model allows for 
secession with a disregard for the moral or substantive justifications. Secession 
would still be possible under the no-fault model where the constitution recognises the 
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right to secede, but does not provide for substantive or procedural requirement. 
These would be situations where only the right to secede is recognised without any 
procedural conditions being attached. This would be where the constitution 
recognises the right to secede, without prescribing the substantive or procedural 
requirements for secession. 
 
Buchanan’s models above, focuses on the moral justification for secession and 
fundamentally informs the views under chapter 2. The models do not stand in 
opposition to each other. Buchanan suggests that they only represent diverging 
extremes and that hybrids of these models could ultimately inform the right which is 
drafted into legislation. When reflecting on the relationship between a purely 
substantive approach and a purely procedural approach Buchanan argues that: 
Although a purely procedural approach is morally permissible, it might be 
thought that including a requirement of substantive justification is morally 
preferable because it more directly mirrors the moral facts about 
secession.142 
 
There are pros and cons for following either one of the models presented. However, 
to simplify the discussion, the cores of these models follow one of two essentials. 
Either secession based on substantive justification or procedural justification. The 
relationship between substantive and procedural requirements is not without 
controversy. It would be much easier to prove a procedural defect than a substantive 
one. A pronouncement on a substantive requirement is potentially more informed by 
subjective aspects, where a procedural judgement is more objectively predictable. 
Moral facts are not linked to how to secede, but tackles more the issues dealing with 
why one would secede, – the substantive moral justifications. Whichever model 
followed the right to secede needs to be legally justifiable.  
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The purpose of any secessionist movement is the establishment of an independent 
territorial entity. This new entity needs to be politically and territorially separate from 
the dominant state under whose sovereignty the contiguous territory fell. The 
discussion in the previous chapter highlights that a common characteristic in defining 
secession was the creation of a new state. The operation of the right to secede 
under a legal theory needs to give rise to substantively and procedurally legitimacy. 
This in turn, needs to be directed towards establishing legal personality under 
international law. Whether one considers a right to secede as an individual right, only 
executable by a concerted group effort143 or a collective group right,144 the 
establishment of a new state entity remains central. Even where peoples do not 
choose to form a new sovereign state, but opts for integration or free association, a 
new legally recognised entity under international law still comes into existence. This 
perspective moves away from the moral issues of secession and enters the 
normative considerations of a right to secede.  
 
Roach argues that a need for a shift in perspectives is necessary to ‘an over focus 
on the moral justification of the right in literature tuned towards ethnic conflict 
resolution’.145 The disadvantage of this approach is that ‘it fails to take adequate 
stock of the strategic and legitimizing function of this right and the issue of how this 
function might further qualify the moral justification of the right to secede’.146 This 
begs the question, how would the strategic and legitimising function qualify the 
right’s moral justification?147 The debate on secession needs to develop away from 
the moral grounds of its justification to incorporate a process of secession. Such a 
departure should ultimately enhance the moral rationale for secession. Even if no 
moral justification for secession is drafted into a codified right, its morality can still be 
located within the rationale for incorporating the right in the constitution. 
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Miller argues that ‘the conditions justifying secession would need to be stated in a 
form that a judicial body could apply, and this immediately slants the discussion in 
favour of certain criteria and against others’.148 The right to secede needs to become 
effectively and legally operational to find legitimacy through compliance with the 
norms and the rule of law under international law. A clear understanding and 
distinction of the substantive and procedural nature of a legal right to secede is 
critical for international legal theory. It is only via subscription to legal theory that a 
court can promote legal certainty and properly apply the law against the normative 
background of the right to secede.  
 
In commenting on the Quebec case,149 Shaw concludes that ‘The situation of 
secession is probably best dealt with in international law within the framework of a 
process of claim, effective control and international recognition’.150 This proposal 
seems to be an appropriate path to follow to establish the normative character of a 
codified right to secede. The proposition advanced by Shaw consequently forms a 
premise for further investigation into the normative nature of a codified right to 
secede. This will in turn advance the legitimacy of accessing and executing the right. 
 
3 2 2 Claim 
The substantive nature of the right to secede cannot be definitively separated from 
the procedural character of the right. In summary, the ‘why’ question overlaps with 
the ‘how’ question. This follows the reasoning of Buchanan above, in that the 
substantive question of a right to secede is linked to the moral justification to 
secession. The inclusion of a procedural inquiry does not dilute the established 
substantive importance of the right. This approach serves to inform international 
legal theory and substantiates Roach’s conclusion that it would further qualify the 
moral justification of secession.151 In following Shaw’s proposition on a framework for 
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the process of secession, the logical point of departure in initiating a secession 
movement is the establishment of a claim to secede. 
 
A claim to secede would be based on a subjective or objective notion of an 
entitlement over a territory. In cases where there is a recognised right to secede, 
both the substantive and procedural character of the right would have to address 
this. Where there is only a perceived (subjective) entitlement, the only basis for the 
substantive nature of the claim would be its moral justification. This view 
substantiates Buchanan’s fault model discussed above. No claim could be framed 
outside the parameters of either legislative recognition or moral ratification in order 
for it to be successful. The claim for secession needs to proceed based on an 
averment, that a legal claim is present over a determined territory; by peoples 
present on the territory. Roth puts this in perspective with reference to the 
requirements of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 
(hereinafter the Montevideo Convention)152 by stating that: 
As independent criteria for statehood ‘permanent population’ and ‘defined 
territory’ merely begs the question, since virtually all statehood claims, 
whether or not accepted in the international legal order, characteristically 
include sufficiently precise claims on behalf of a permanent population to a 
defined territory.153 
 
A claim to secede finds at its opposing end a claim to authority from the dominant 
state. With secession the claim would always be directed at a portion of a territory, 
an opposing claim to authority naturally originates from the dominant state. The 
claim cannot be without an appeal for the withdrawal of territory. This can be 
reconciled with the prevailing definitions of secession above, as well as the 
requirements for statehood set out in the Montevideo Convention. Webb also follows 
this reasoning in his description of secession, he states that ‘It is a bid for 
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independence from the state through the appropriation of the state’s territory’.154 
Consequently, in the description of a right to secede, the substance of the claim 
needs to be linked to a determined territory. A court then has to adjudicate on these 
two opposing interest, a claim to territory and a claim to authority.155 The procedural 
character of the claim needs direct legal expression. Such requirements can 
practically only become legally relevant via specific reference within a statute. As 
such, any procedural conditions would have to be drafted into the legislation 
recognising the right to secede. 
 
Once a claim to secede has been legally established, the next question is whether 
peoples are or would be able to exercise effective control that territory. This requires 
a shift in perspective from the moral justification, predominantly presently with the 
claim, to observable factual situations. This legal justification would be reflected 
through the peoples’ physical presence on the territory. The claim would be assisted 
through bring it from the territory that is under dispute. This will strengthen a 
presumption of their control over the territory. However, effective control needs to 
promote the legitimacy of the right. The doctrine of effective control is not without 
controversy in international law. Below the doctrine would be tested as a potential 
element within the process of secession.  
 
3 2 3 Effective Control 
The traditional view of the elements which constitutes statehood is supported under 
the Montevideo Convention. One of the elements required under this convention for 
constituting a state is effective control over a territory.156 As discussed in chapter 2, 
international law is premised on the principle of stability. Consequently, by bringing a 
right to secede in line with the rule of law under international law it will be 
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reconcilable with principles of international law, such as stability, peace and security 
as employed by international tribunals such as the ICJ.157 The process as set forth 
by Shaw has the potential to promote stability and a peaceful transition to 
independence. However, it would need to interpret the principle of effective control 
with enough constraint.  
 
The rational of assessing effective control as part of the process of secession is 
because it forms an essential requirement of statehood. In addition,  it relates directly 
to the doctrine of effectiveness in international law. This specifically relates to state 
formation, acquisition of territory and in recognising a government regime. Shaw 
considers effectiveness valuable as a creator of legal results, primarily due to the 
nature of international law, as a legal system that is decentralised and horizontally 
structured.158 More specifically, he regards it essential in the acquisition of territorial 
sovereignty.159 He suggests ‘that one may regard the principle of effectiveness as 
the basic applicable doctrine regarding the acquisition of territory’.160 Within the 
process of secession, a successful secession will obviously yield the acquisition of 
territory, this makes Shaw’s contention even more relevant. The doctrine of 
effectiveness consequently underwrites a comprehension of effective control. 
 
In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v United 
States of America) (hereinafter the Nicaragua case),161 the court drew attention to 
the principle in Article 3(d) of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance162 
that states that:  
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The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought 
through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of 
the effective exercise of representative democracy.163  
 
The ICJ looked at effective control as more than mere physical control over a 
territory. The court interpreted the document progressively to include the recognition 
of democratic principles in the forging of unity amongst American states. The result 
being that the effectiveness of state control is consequently informed by the 
representative democracy that legitimises the regime of the day. In determining 
effective control, the position of the state losing territory should not be forgotten. In 
the Islands of Palmas case,164 the arbitrator, Judge Huber, furthermore begs the 
question whether: 
The growing insistence with which international law, ever since the middle 
of the 18th century, has demanded that the occupation shall be effective 
would be inconceivable, if effectiveness were required only for the act of 
acquisition and not equally for the maintenance of the right.165 
 
He argues that, effectiveness will still be present where there is peaceful and 
continued display of state power over a territory. Proponents of secession would 
argue that effectiveness should be a continuous requirement for state 
legitimacy. Consequently, where a sovereign state cannot prove the 
effectiveness of their continued occupation over a territory, a dominant majority 
with effective control should be free to secede. Although the reasoning in the 
Nicaragua case relates to military intervention and in the Island of Palmas case 
to acquisition of territory, both cases reflect on perspectives of effective control 
under international law. The Nicaragua case indicates that effective control can 
extend beyond the traditional paradigm of pure law and impact on political 
norms such as democracy. It is clear from the Islands of Palmas case that 
effective control under international law should not only be the basis for the 
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establishment of rights to territory, but should also be a requirement for the 
maintenance of such rights. 
 
The substantive nature of effective control in the context of a codified right to secede 
will have to relate to the manner of territorial acquisition. Effective control over a 
territory would strengthen the moral justification for wanting to secede. However, the 
inclusion of effective control as a procedural requirement with the right to secede, 
could threaten the principle of stability and the nature of a constitutional democratic 
dispensation. It might find realistic application within a federal system, where free 
entry and exit from the federation is possible. Effective control cannot serve the 
international law principles of stability, peace and security where it dictates the 
procedural conditions of exercising a municipal right to secede. However, this might 
be interpreted to legitimise the use of force to establish effective control over a 
territory. 
 
The doctrine of effective control is also not without critics. Roth argues, in postulating 
the decline of the doctrine of effective control, that: 
Demands that local conflicts be resolved in accordance with existing 
domestic constitutional norms may seem to befit an international rule of 
law, but these demands misleadingly portray international and domestic 
legality as a seamless web.166 
  
The interplay between international law and domestic law is divided between the 
monist and dualist approach. The monist doctrine ‘holds that international law is part 
of the domestic law automatically without the necessity for interposition of a 
constitutional ratification procedure’.167 The dualist doctrine holds the contrary, it is 
premised on the distinct separation of the two systems. Accordingly, international law 
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can only have effect on municipal law once it has been transformed into local 
legislation. Shaw explains that:  
This is because of the fundamental different nature of inter-state and intra-
state relations and the different legal structure employed on the one hand 
by the state and on the other hand as between states.168 
 
On the other side of the argument, Arangio-Ruiz describes the monist position. He 
describes it as: 
[A]ll the broadly expanding presentations of international law as a public, 
constitutional (if not supra-constitutional) systems over standing the legal 
systems of States in a way essentially comparable to the manner in which 
the fundamental norms of a federal State over stand the member State’s 
(dependent) systems.169  
 
In the use of the word ‘over stand’, which seems to be Arangio-Ruiz’s own creation, 
he refers to the superiority of international law and federal law respectively. 
However, the impact of the constitutional entrenchment of a right to secede cannot 
escape the rule of law. It is not the domestic law that endows a new territorial entity 
with legal personality; this is derived from international law. International law also 
provides the legal framework within which the new territorial entity will be 
operational. Although effective control is observed domestically, it also affects the 
international sphere. Effective control seems to be at odds with international law 
principles, such as stability, peace and security. Consequently, it cannot be an 
imperative part of the process of secession. Effective control should be the result of 
secession. Then it will serve to enforce the maintenance of the right. Substantively it 
would enhance the moral justification of the right, but procedurally it can only form 
part of the right once it is an already objectively observable reality. Once effective 
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control has been established, a legitimate case can be made towards state 
recognition. 
 
3 2 4 Recognition 
Since it is the primary objective of secession to form a new territorial entity, the focus 
on state recognition is a rational and logical progress to the process. The issue of 
state recognition under international law is a difficult one. Not only are there a 
number of considerations and viewpoints on the matter, but the position of 
international law on the topic has remained fragmented. This fragmentation has been 
caused mainly by the strong interplay with political issues.170 International law 
subscribes to two basic theories of recognition, the constitutive and declaratory 
theory.171 The constitutive theory holds that it is the act of recognition by existing 
states that allow legal personality to attach to a new territorial entity. While 
declaratory theorists believe that it is the existing, factual circumstances which 
endows an entity with legal personality, regardless of any acts of recognition from 
external states. Crawford reflects on the declaratory theory in stating that ‘An entity is 
not a state because it is recognised, it is recognised because it is a state’.172  
 
Where the issue of secession departs from the scene of international law and 
entrenches itself within the contexts of domestic law, the different perspectives on 
the relationship between municipal and international law become critical. Musgrave 
reflects on the Plebiscitary Rights Only theory, which he calls the ‘internal theory’ in 
stating:  
Secession on the basis of ethnic criteria could be justified by the ‘internal 
theory’, which maintains that secession is not a matter of international law 
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at all, but solely of domestic concern. The theory is based on the well 
establish principle of non-interference’.173 
 
Musgrave further relates his argument to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter that 
precludes the UN from intervening in matters falling exclusively within the domestic 
jurisdiction of a state. The ICJ dealt at pains with this principle in the Nicaragua 
case.174 The principle of non-intervention is also present within the prelude of the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations. The rational of this prohibition is the protection of 
the principle of territorial integrity. 
 
If Musgrave’s reasoning is followed, the entrenchment of a right to secede within the 
contexts of domestic legislation, excludes international law from the process of 
secession. However, Musgrave further suggests that ‘It follows that secession is 
neither legal nor illegal in international law, but is a legally neutral act, the 
consequences of which are, or may be regulated internationally’.175 If secession is a 
legally neutral act under international law, then surely this is a contradiction on his 
earlier assertion that the principle of non-intervention makes secession a matter of 
domestic concern. Further, the primary objective of the process of secession is the 
creation of a legal subject as defined by international law. Even if, a right to secede 
is entrenched within the framework of municipal law, the legal consequences spill 
over onto international law. Recognition as a step in the process of secession is of 
domestic concern, but relies on international law to determine its status. 
 
The conclusion reached suggests an inherent contradiction with the incorporation of 
a right to secede within the realm of a constitutional document. A constitution 
traditionally contains, within its founding principles, a declaration on its territorial and 
political unity and in most cases affirms the sovereignty of the state. No right of 
secession can be entrenched in a constitution where such a right is irreconcilable 
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with the spirit of the constitution and its constitutional principles. The recognition of 
the right to secede becomes engulfed with the eventual recognition of the newly 
created legal entity. Whatever the political motive is for constitutional inclusion, 
recognition can serve to limit the right or promote it. Norman makes it clear in the 
following statement: 
I have argued that an appropriately qualified right to secession would often 
make sense within the framework of the deliberative constitutionalism that 
Sunstein advocates: it could provide a better disincentive for secessionist 
politics than would constitutional silence on the issue.176 
 
Both the monist and dualist perspectives on state recognition seem to be affected by 
the constitutional inclusion of the right to secede. Similarly, none of the theories on 
state recognition seem to affect the process of secession in any practical way. 
However, state recognition is critical in understanding the aims to be achieved with 
secession and consequently remains the appropriate element to conclude the 
process of secession. The legitimacy of this suggested approach, needs to be tested 
against practical examples of constitutional inclusions of the right to secede. The 
process of secession needs to have real world application to enjoy legal application, 
this is what is endeavoured below. 
 
3 3 A Temporal Reflection on the Municipal Entrenchment of a Right to Secede 
3 3 1 Introduction 
The objective of an investigation into the practical examples of the right to secede 
serves to address two questions. Firstly, does the domestic statutory or constitutional 
entrenchment of a right to secede in general provide for a genuine right, capable of 
execution or enforcement? Secondly, does the constitutional right to secede factor in 
the process of secession as explored above, being that of claim, effective control 
and recognition? Through the examples below the historical conditions for exercising 
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the right to secede, both procedurally as well as substantively will be analysed. The 
interest in finding answers to these questions serves to contribute to a new 
perspective on legal personality in international law.  
 
The examples below address in general, the research objective to highlight the 
normative characteristics of a right to secede. However, these examples deal with 
the topic of secession only from a domestic legal perspective. This does not render 
the results of such an inquiry irrelevant to international law. Further, such a 
constitutionally entrenched right still relates to the field of international law through its 
impact on legal personality in international law.  
 
3 3 2 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
Unger paraphrased Stalin in naming the USSR ‘the “dictatorship of the proletariat” or 
the “dictatorship of the working class”’.177 During both Lenin as well as Stalin’s rule, 
this idea of a dictatorship of the majority was the propaganda of the time. It was 
argued to be more democratic than that of liberal states, because it was a not 
founded on a bourgeois minority ruling. Before the establishment of the USSR, the 
1918 October Revolution178 Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet 
Republic (hereinafter the 1918 constitution) was enacted.179 In Article 6 of the 1918 
constitution, the independence of Finland and Persia and the proclamation of the 
right of self-determination for Armenia, was expressly proclaimed.180 Article 2 of the 
1918 constitution stated that ‘The Russian Soviet Republic is established on the 
basis of a free union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national republics’.181 
This substantiates the argument that the drafters of the 1918 constitution intrinsically 
recognised the independence of the different constituting republics. Musgrave 
explains that ‘Lenin believed, by voluntary agreement: forced union would not 
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endure, whereas voluntary union were much more likely to last’.182 This might have 
been the official statement; however, history proved the contrary to be true.  
 
Following the 1918 constitution, the formation of the Soviet Union produced three 
constitutions. The first was the 1924 constitution, which was the first to recognise a 
right to secede. Article 4 of the 1924 constitution read ‘Every union republic shall 
retain the right of free secession from the union’.183 The thinking of the time was that 
the right to secede was ‘the very hallmark of what they described as the 
“sovereignty” of the member republics’.184 However, the right was included more as a 
political pawn than a legally realisable right. The right’s inclusion was to demonstrate 
political freedom rather than represent the possibility of leaving the union. 
 
The following USSR constitution came into force in 1936. This constitution employed 
the same wording as the 1924 constitution in recognising the right to secede in 
article 17 of that document. This provision was as with Article 4 of the 1924 
constitution, void of any substantive or procedural substance. Chkhikvadze best 
describes the position of the right within USSR constitutional jurisprudence; he 
explains the perception that ‘the right to self-determination consist both of the right to 
secede and the right not to secede’.185 He furthermore illuminates the logic of the 
USSR by showing that the belief of the time was that experience ‘has shown that 
where nations have the right to self-determination, including the right to secession, 
they will freely associate’.186 This is a conclusion that Musgrave also came to in 
assessing the rhetoric of Lenin.187  
 
In 1977, the third USSR Constitution was adopted. This union of nations was 
premised on the ideology stipulated in article 70 of the constitution. It stated that: 
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The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be a single union 
multinational state formed on the basis of the principle of socialist 
federalism as a result of the free self-determination of nations and the 
voluntary association of equal Soviet socialist republics.188 
 
This provision went further to set out the purpose of uniting nations and nationalities 
as the joint construction of communism. This is the legal context within which article 
72 has to be read. Article 72 was a carbon copy of the previous two constitutional 
provisions. This article stated that ‘Every union republic shall retain the right of free 
secession from the USSR’. Unger makes the point that the recognition of a right to 
secede was:  
Never very meaningful in practical terms, its theoretical status as the 
principal touchstone of union republic “sovereignty” is now further eroded 
by the new constitution’s emphasis on the “unity” of the Soviet state and 
people.189  
 
Although the 1977 constitution recognised a right to secede, the socio-political 
agenda; the joint construction of communism and an over emphasis within the 
constitution of the unity of the Soviet republics;  inevitably countered the utility and 
effectiveness of the right. Separatist movements were further constitutionally 
suppressed, by provisions such as article 81 that stated, ‘The sovereign rights of the 
union republics shall be protected by the USSR’.190 The argument was that by 
incorporation within the USSR, union republics did not lose their sovereignty. 
However, it was the constitutional duty of the USSR to protect the sovereignty of the 
union republics. The effect of this position was that republics had to prove that the 
USSR neglected the duty to protect their sovereignty as a requirement to secede. 
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The provision recognising the right to secede under the 1977 constitution is 
straightforward and without procedural detail. The fact that throughout the three 
constitutions,  this right never developed into a more substantive right serves as 
evidence that the USSR government never intended this right to be exercised. 
Buchanan draws attention to the shortcoming of the 1977 constitution in that it: 
[H]as long included a right to secede, until the current rash of secessionist 
activity it contained no provision whatsoever as to how, for what reasons, 
or under what conditions secession might be under taken.191 
 
Buchanan directly refers to the substantive and procedural shortfalls of the 
constitutional provisions. This makes the realisation of the proposed process of 
secession above even more unlikely. Webb concludes on a similar result from the 
1977 constitutional provision as Chkhikvadze with the 1924 constitution. Webb 
states that:  
It seems that, while in the West we tend to think that ‘all that is not 
forbidden is allowed’, the Soviet view is the reverse. ‘All that is not allowed 
is forbidden’ is a fairly accurate characterization of the Soviet approach.192 
 
He argues that because the constitutions of the USSR did not spell out the 
mechanisms for secession, the right never existed within the constitution.193 
However, it cannot be conclusively accepted that the absences of substantive and 
procedural mechanism nullifies the right. It does make its execution within a process 
of claim, effective control and recognition more difficult, but not null or void. The 
rational as discussed above of a codified right to secede, also argues for a right 
which can still be executable even with procedural and substantive defects or 
omissions. Buchanan’s no-fault model would be applicable in this regard.  
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A more moderate reasoning would be that the right did not have legal force because 
it lacked procedural mechanisms. After the fall of the USSR, the Russian 
government promulgated the statute ‘On the Procedures for Resolving Questions 
Related to the Secession of Union Republics from the USSR’ on the 3th of April 
1990. The procedure set out by this piece of legislation provides the right to secede 
to specific geographically autonomously republics. This followed the Lithuanian 
secession attempt, and allowed for republics independently to decide their legal 
status. The process involved the holding of a referendum. Based on the successful 
outcome of the referendum, state parties would then enter into negotiations to 
determine the transitional arrangements. This is a clear indicator of the USSR giving 
substance to the right to secede. The right to secede was brought in line with the 
process of secession, even though the collapse of the union precipitated the 
promulgation of this legislation. Silverstein refers to three conditions for free 
secession under the Soviet Constitution. Firstly that it had to be a borderland, 
meaning not encircled in total by the USSR. Secondly, that there needed to be a 
concentrated majority, and finally that the population needed to be more than one 
million.194 The proclamation of these conditions coincided with the disintegration of 
the USSR. It does however contribute to the development of an understanding of the 
procedural aspects of the normative character attached to the right to secede. 
 
3 3 3 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 
The Yugoslavian aspirations of self-determination and secession were represented 
in both the 1946 and the 1963 Constitutions of the SFRY. These provisions were 
promulgated under the constitutions’ Basic Principles and in article 1, which 
proclaimed Yugoslavia as: 
[A] community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of the right to 
self-determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their 
will to live together in a federative state.  
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Under the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY,  the proclamation was made under Basic 
Principle I that: 
The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to 
self-determination, including the right to secession, on the basis of their 
will freely expressed in the common struggle of all nations and nationalities 
in the National Liberation War and Socialist Revolution.195 
 
This provision was contradicted by Article 5 of the 1974 constitution that stated that 
the boundaries and frontiers of the republics could not be altered, without SFRY 
consent. This is reconcilable with the principle of territorial integrity under 
international law. A principle enshrined in the Declaration on Friendly Relations. A 
more accepted perspective is that there was never any political will to allow any 
group to utilise the provision to express their independence. With the passing on of 
Josip Broz Tito196 in 1980, the disintegration of the federation commenced. This 
event was the instigator for the first withdrawals from the union by Croatia and 
Slovenia.  
 
Disagreement exist amongst international law scholars, as to what happened to the 
former SFRY. Some scholars argue that the SFRY was dissolved, i.e. the state 
seized to exist. Under these circumstances, recognition is not required for any of the 
new entities. However, others argue that secession did occur. Under such a 
situation, it is only the seceding states that require international recognition.197 As 
Musgrave notes, ‘The facts surrounding the declarations of independence of four 
constituent Republics indicate that their actions conform much more closely to 
secession than to dissolution’.198 However, Opinion 1 of the Conference on 
Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission (hereinafter the Banditer Commission)199 differs 
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with this conclusion. In Opinion 1, the Banditer Commission had to conclude on one 
of two positions regarding SFRY. The first was whether the republics200 of the SFRY 
were in the process of secession, in which case the SFRY would have continued to 
exist. The second position is that the SFRY was in the process of dissolution. If this 
scenario prevails, then the republics will be equal successor governments to the 
SFRY. The SFRY would then have ceased to exist only after all the constituting 
republics attained sovereignty. The Commission concluded that according to 
international law and the European Community Declaration on Yugoslavia and on 
the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States (hereinafter EC Recognition 
Guidelines)201, the republics were not in the process of seceding, but that the 
SFRY’s essential government organs had become powerless. Consequently, it was 
agreed that the SFRY was in the process of being dissolved.  
 
Based on Shaw’s proposition above, a claim to secede could be framed based on 
the codified right in the SFRY constitution, but no such claim was ever formally made 
by any of the republics. The lack in substantive and procedural conditions meant that 
the right could be enjoyed under the no-fault model, which proposes to be an 
extreme model. The decline of the doctrine of effective control is also clear within the 
contexts of the SFRY. Roth articulates this point quite clearly, where he states that:  
[T]he international community’s rejection of local efforts to maintain by 
force the territorial integrity of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(‘SFRY’), in the face of clear majorities for independence within the 
constitutionally established territorial sub-unit, is of a piece with the 
international community’s newfound reluctance to recognise 
unconstitutional seizure of power from democratically elected 
authorities.202  
 
3 3 4 1947 Constitution of the Union of Burma (Myanmar) 
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Burma was for the greater part of the beginning of the twentieth century under British 
colonial rule. On January 4th, 1948 Burma attained independence. The Union of 
Burma consisted of the states of Kachin, Karenni, Shan and Kayah. After 
independence,  the process of constitutional drafting started. This process led to the 
adoption of the 1947 constitution and the formation of the Union of Burma. 
 
Under chapter X of the 1947 Constitution of the Union of Burma,203 the right to 
secede was recognised. The right declared four conditions under which secession 
could be achieved. Firstly, the right could only be exercised ten years after the 
adoption of the constitution.204 Secondly, the ‘State Council’ could approve a 
resolution to secede from the Union with a two-thirds majority vote.205 Subsequent to 
this, when such a resolution was passed the head of state would inform the union 
president of the passing of such a resolution and its result.206 The president could 
then order a plebiscite in the relevant state to assert the will of the people.207 As part 
of this constitutional mandate, the president could appoint a commission composed 
equally of members from the Union and the seceding state.208 The fourth 
requirement revealed that only states that were not barred from access to the right 
might exercise it. In this regard only, the Shan and Kayah states had access to this 
right.  
 
The right as promulgated within the 1947 Constitution consists only of procedural 
conditions and can be equated with Buchanan’s procedural or no-fault models. 
There are no requirements to provide for a moral justification to exercise the right. 
Consequently the substantive character of the right is not articulated. Article 206  
proclaims that ‘Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, all matter relating to the 
exercise of the right of secession shall be regulated by law’. This means that the only 
manner by which complete secession would be achieved was for the Burmese 
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parliament to legislate on the matter. This could provide an opportunity for the 
inclusion of substantive justification for the exercise of the right. However, the 
parliament could also use this power to bar access to the right. Silverstein concludes 
on these conditions that:  
[T]he framers provided a means for each Parliament to review the right 
and decide whether or not it wants to make the right exercisable by 
making the franchise and the necessary majority either easy or difficult to 
obtain.209 
 
Practically within Burma, there were also external realities that made secession 
highly unlikely for the states that had access to the right. All of them are 
underdeveloped economies, and they would have suffered economically due to lack 
of resources. This leads to the conclusion that the right, might again, have been just 
an incentive to induce integration and protect the stability of the Union, rather than a 
genuine enforceable right.  
 
The constitution of the heterogeneous populace of Burma was a document brought 
about by concessions and agreements. Key amongst these concessions was the 
shifting of vast amounts of economic and political power from the local tradition 
leaders and state level towards the federal union government. Silverstein explains 
that: 
The formal language of the Constitution does not give evidence of all the 
concessions and agreements which the Burmese and the frontier areas 
people made both prior to and during the drafting of the Constitution.210 
 
In the aftermath of the constitution, these concessions brought about internal 
instabilities and sometimes even violent conflicts. The struggle for political power and 
the inherent deficiencies of the constitution led to the adoption of the 1974 
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constitution. This constitution was aimed at establishing ‘The Socialist Republic of 
the Union of Burma’. The ‘Revolutionary Council’ with their socialist agenda excluded 
the secession clause from the constitution. The constitution was structured based on 
unity as the primary constitutional principle. Moscotti interprets Article 4211 of the 
1974 Constitution in that ‘It signifies that sovereignty does not belong to one 
particular nationality; that it belongs to all nationalities of the land; and that it cannot 
be fragmented’.212 Consequently, the right to secede was removed from the 
constitution, because it could never be exercised. The reasoning was that it did not 
belong to any one group, but to all. This constitution did not resolve the internal 
problems of Burma and this led to the drafting and adoption of yet another 
constitution in 2008.  
 
In May 2008 after a referendum213 was held, the new constitution of the Republic of 
the Union of Myanmar214 was adopted. Article 10 explicitly state that ‘No part of the 
territory constituted in the Union such as Regions, States, Union Territories and Self-
Administered Areas shall ever secede from the Union’. This provision serves to 
revoke the right to secede, present in the previous constitution. This prohibition 
follows the spirit of the preamble that reads that ‘non-disintegration of the Union, 
non-disintegration of national solidarity, and perpetuation of sovereignty;’ are the 
basic principles of the constitution. It cannot be conclusively concluded whether, the 
current constitution has been strengthened or weaken by its position on secession. 
The status of political discourse and the gross violation of human right do not provide 
the people of Burma with an option of external political expression. Silverstein puts 
the right to secede in perspective under the 1947 Constitution in stating that: 
The right of secession must be viewed as an unrealized and vague power 
which is more useful as a potential than as a reality (…) So long as it 
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remains a potential right, it will be useful to the people of the Shan State 
as a bargaining weapon because the leaders of the Union are determined 
to establish the rule of law and respect for the Constitution.215 
 
What is significant about Burma as an example is that although the right to secede 
existed initially, it had no political value. Firstly, for the limited groups who could 
exercise the right it was never a real option, due to the geographical and economic 
realities of the region and state. Consequently, no claim to secede could realistically 
be made. Secondly, even though the right never posed a real threat of disintegration 
it has been progressively discredited through Burmese constitutional development. 
The constitutional process carried with it a shift in political power to the union 
government via power concessions. This reduced the peoples' ability to retain 
effective control over their territories, which in turn made them heavily dependent on 
the union. However, Burma is distinguishable from the USSR and SFRY. In the 
Burmese example, the right was open to provinces, which did not consider 
themselves as republics within the union. The USSR and the SFRY were unions 
providing the right to secede to their republics. The Burmese example of the right 
was also more developed than just a mere affirmation on the existence of the right. 
The Burmese constitution entrenched purely procedural conditions to exercise the 
right. This is akin to Buchanan’s procedural model of a constitutional right to secede.  
 
3 3 5 Ethiopia 
In 1994, Ethiopia adopted a new constitution. It provides us with, both the most 
recent constitutional right to secede and with an African example. What makes a 
study of the Ethiopian situation even more intriguing is the fact that the recognition of 
a right to secede was established independent from the process of decolonisation. 
Thus, the presence of the right within the constitution is not because of a history of 
oppressive colonial rule. This is because Ethiopia was never colonised.216 Ethiopia is 
a federal state with a multi-ethnic populace where different ethnical groups are 
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territorially grouped. The two weighty issues that face Ethiopian society are class 
divides and ethnical differences.217 Van Der Beken explains that:  
The historical experience of many Ethiopian peoples and the ethnic 
program of the principal political organisations had created a situation in 
which only a radical, ethnic restructuring of the Ethiopian state could 
guarantee its continued existence.218 
 
The inclusion of the right to secede by the Ethiopian was both unique and 
controversial within their federal system. Habtu reiterates Van Der Beken’s view that 
with the decision to form a federal state ‘The main purpose was to achieve ethnic 
and regional autonomy, while maintaining the state of Ethiopia as a political unit’.219  
This decision was necessary to avert both political and civil unrest in the wake of the 
fall of military rule in Ethiopia.  
 
The preamble of the Ethiopian constitution starts with the words ‘We, the Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia’.220 This statement affirms the flexible multi-
nationalist approach of the constitution and confirms Ethiopia’s recognition of its 
multi-ethnicity. Article 39 specifically voices the right of the peoples of Ethiopia to 
secede. Article 39(5) declares; what constitutes peoples, by giving direct expression 
to what a nation, nationality and peoples are. The article stipulates that:  
A ‘Nation, Nationality or People for the purpose of this Constitutions, is a 
group of people who have or share large measure of a common culture or 
similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or 
related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an 
identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory.221 
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What is compelling in this definition is firstly that it is limited to constitutional 
purposes only. Meaning that what constitutes peoples serves to inform the purpose 
of the constitution only and the drafters did not want to provide a general definition. 
Secondly, the definition links the existence of a nation, nationality or people to 
territory. This definition would exclude irredentist claims to the territory, because the 
peoples would have to inhabit the territory currently, thus no right of secession would 
be possible without being present on the contiguous territory. Thus, the first 
substantive condition that needs to be satisfied before the right would be available is 
that of being a nation, holding nationality or being peoples with a direct link to the 
territory. 
 
Article 39(1) entrenches the right to secede by stating that ‘Every Nation, Nationality 
and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the 
right to secession’. This provision does not follow the presumption of many scholars 
that the right to self-determination is synonymous with the right to secede.222 It is 
possibly a manifestation of the no-fault model, in that access to both rights are 
deemed to be ‘unconditional’. Article 39 (2) is a general reflection of Buchanan’s 
Primary Right Theory and specifically the Ascriptive Rights Theory.223 This article 
reflects the drafters of the constitutions’ sensitivity to the diverse ethnic situation 
within Ethiopia. The right to secede serves to safeguard the protection of peoples’ 
rights to the history, development, promotion, preservation and expression of their 
culture. The inclusion of this article serves to provide the right to secede with a 
substantive character that in turn enhances the exercising of the unconditional right 
to secede. 
 
The five procedural conditions needed to affect the exercise of both rights are set out 
in article 39(4). These conditions seem to be quite similar to those, which were 
present under the Burmese constitution.224 They can be summaries as follows:   
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(a) the legislative council of the group concerned needs to approve the 
demand for secession by two-thirds majority;  
(b) the federal government then needs to hold a referendum within three 
years of receipt of the result of the council;  
(c) a majority vote is necessary from the referendum held;  
(d) the federal government then has to transfer power over to the groups 
legislative council and;  
(e) legislation needs to be enacted to divide asset between the federal 
government and the seceding group.  
 
The critical difference between the procedural conditions within the Ethiopian 
constitution and that in the Burmese constitution; is that the Burmese provision 
stipulates that the whole process of secession be subjected to the enactment of 
legislation. In the Ethiopian case, it is only the division of assets that are subjected to 
the promulgation of legislation. Subsequently, the legislator is exclusively limited to 
pronounce on issues relating to succession. As an element of a process of 
secession, the claim needs to be followed by a two-thirds majority vote to succeed.  
The constitution also provides for the establishment of the element of effective 
control via referendum, for which a majority vote is the requirement. Recognition as a 
requirement is satisfied by the federal government itself, by handing over power to 
the seceding entity. This also legitimises the establishment of the new entity under 
international law. The process of recognition by other states is also simplified.   
 
Habtu makes two fundamental distinctions between the examples of the USSR, the 
SFRY and Ethiopia. Firstly, he points out that the collapse of the federations of the 
USSR and SFRY can be attributed far more to the collapse of communism than the 
recognition of the right to secede.225 His second point is that the Communist Party 
controlled the ethnic autonomy of these two federations. Within the Ethiopian 
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context, the ruling politically party - the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic 
Front would not be able to execute such power. The party is a multi-party coalition of 
different ethnic groups and not a monolithic party such was the case within the 
USSR and SFRY. Habtu also suggests that political plurality is central to Ethiopian 
politics, with seventy-two registered political parties226, unlike the situation in the 
USSR and SFRY. The right to secede has not been tested under Ethiopian 
jurisprudence, however the constitutional positioning and progressive drafting of the 
right as well as the peaceful withdrawal of Eritrea227 leaves room for optimism.  
 
3 4 The Quebec Proposition 
Within a democratic constitutional dispensation, any secessionist aspiration aims at 
constitutional change. Where secession succeeds, it impacts the constitutional 
account of a state’s sovereignty and territory profoundly. A brief synopsis of the 
Quebec case will give context to this argument. In this case,  the Canadian Supreme 
Court dealt with secession within a constitutional context. After the 1995 referendum 
relating to the question of the province of Quebec’s political and economic secession 
from the federal state of Canada, several issues arose. These mainly related to 
disagreement over how the questions for the referendum needed to be phrased. 
Consequently, after the secessionists claim failed in the referendum, the Governor 
Council submitted three questions to the Canadian Supreme Court. The court was 
approached to exercise its power to give an advisory opinion pursuant to section 53 
of the Canadian Supreme Court Act.228 The three questions which were posed to the 
court where:  
1. Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature 
or government of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada 
unilaterally? 
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2. Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature or 
government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from 
Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is there a right to self-determination 
under international law that would give the National Assembly, legislature 
or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec 
from Canada unilaterally? 
3. In the event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the 
right of the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec to 
effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally, which would 
take precedence in Canada?229 
 
The court answered the first two questions in the negative, although in particular 
detail. Further the court concluded that there was no need to entertain the third 
question considering that the answer to the first two questions were negative. In the 
formulation of its arguments the court grounded itself in Canada’s four fundamental 
organising constitutional principles, these are federalism, democracy, 
constitutionalism and the rule of law.230 However, the court indicated that this is not 
an exhaustive list, but only the constitutional principles relevant to answer the 
questions before it.  
 
Based on the reasoning of the Supreme Court, the court seems to suggest a derived 
constitutional duty to negotiate in a functional democracy, such as Canada. This lead 
to a conclusion that a general principle of law has developed under Canadian 
constitutional jurisprudence. This duty to negotiate stems from the constitutional 
principles and the origin of the state. As a source of international law ‘general 
principles of law recognised by civilized nations’,231 is positive law. Shaw describes 
general principles of law as: 
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[W]here the court in considering a case before it realises that there is no 
law covering exactly that point, neither parliamentary statute nor judicial 
precedent. In such instances the judge will proceed to deduce a rule that 
will be relevant, by analogy from already existing rules or directly from 
general principles that guide the legal system, whether they be emanating 
from justice, equity or consideration of public policy.232    
 
The court in the Quebec case was faced with such a dilemma and consequently 
followed the proffered approach. Firstly, the court could not draw from statute or 
judicial precedent as to how to approach the secession issue in the context of the 
three questions before it. The reasoning of the court is in its understanding of the 
formation of the federal state, the constitutional principles and the political 
democratic order. These factors according to the court, originate from negotiations, 
this negates to a duty to negotiate. The court found this duty to rest primarily on the 
majority. The court stated that, ‘At both the federal and provincial level, by its very 
nature, the need to build majorities necessitates compromise, negotiation, and 
deliberation’.233 The court declared that the Constitution Act of 1982, acknowledges 
a right of each of the parties within the Canadian federation to initiate constitutional 
change or amendments.  It is via this right that a coinciding duty to negotiate 
exists.234 The court proclaimed this duty inherent to the constitutional principle of a 
federal party to initiate changes to the constitution.235 This duty informs the 
substantive character of the right to initiate constitutional amendments. Buchanan 
perfectly summarises the logic of the argument being raised in this regard. He states 
that:  
[S]ecession is a profound constitutional change, not a matter to be 
decided by a simple majority vote in the seceding region, and that as such 
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it must be achieved by constitutional amendment through a process of 
negotiation.236 
 
If this logic is followed, even if a constitution does not possess a right to secede, any 
constitutionally organised democratic state remains open to the potential of 
secession. This is what I term the Quebec proposition. Inherent to constitutional rule 
is the enduring spirit of the constitution and a duty to negotiate would inform that 
spirit. Consequently, if such negotiations results in disintegration, it would follow that 
the right to secede is potentially inherently present within all constitutions. The right 
then follows this duty to negotiate within constitutional states. A broad view would 
then be that international law would have to recognise the right to secede as a 
general principle inherent in democratic constitutional states. 
 
Returning to the process of secession, the court in the Quebec case extensively 
dealt with the issue of the principle of effectiveness. In commenting on the principle 
of effectiveness, Crawford concludes that ‘The question of the eventual effectiveness 
of an attempted secession is quite different from the question whether an entity has 
a right to independence’.237 Effective control over a territory still needs the legitimacy 
of a right to justify secession. Under the Quebec proposition, the right can still be 
established if effective control is proven within a constitutional dispensation. This 
leads to another vexing question, whether the domestic court did not usurp the 
jurisdiction of an international tribunal, like the ICJ or an arbitration tribunal by ruling 
on this matter. 
 
Where a municipal constitution does guarantee a constitutional right to secede, can it 
be concluded that the domestic courts are the most appropriate forums to address 
secession? Can it be justifiably argued that a domestic court can sanction the 
disintegration of a state? This seems problematic, both when the court bases it on a 
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direct constitutional right to secede or a derived (negotiated) right to secede. If the 
power to legitimise disintegration is granted to an unelected sphere of government, 
like the courts, this could hold problems for both municipal and international law. 
None of the examples above, where a codified constitutional right to secede existed 
referred to judicial intervention. Mutual to all of the examples was the attempts to 
gain procedural legitimacy through an appeal to the populace via referendum. This 
seems like a more viable and equitable direction to follow.  
 
The judgement in the Quebec case is significant for constitutional theory and more 
so for international law, in that it brings a new dimension to the potential of 
secession. Proposing to bring a right to secede within a constitutional dispensation 
demands an interrogation of the impact and relation of such a right with the 
constitution as the supreme law. In the Quebec case, the court explored this 
relationship in the context of the Canadian constitution and proposed a minimum 
standard for the realisation of a right to secede. This minimum standard is reflected 
in a constitutional duty to negotiate when faced with secessionist claims. This 
minimum standard becomes a general principle of law and herein lies its relevance 
for international law.  
 
Under the Quebec proposition, the legality of secession is moot and still needs to be 
determined after negotiations. However, the process of negotiation provides the 
legitimacy to entertain the matter. The court reflected that in their ‘constitutional 
tradition, legality and legitimacy are linked’.238 The legality of the conduct of the 
majority government is based on their respect for the rule of law and the application 
of the constitutional principles. In terms of the process of secession and the element 
of recognition, the court stated: 
Thus, a failure of the duty to undertake negotiations and pursue them 
according to constitutional principles may undermine that government's 
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claim to legitimacy which is generally a precondition for recognition by the 
international community.239 
 
The court correctly links the legitimacy of the majority population, to their respect for 
the constitutional duty to negotiate. The value here for comparative constitutionalism 
is that a duty to negotiate would always be a constitutional tool for resolving national 
disputes in accordance with the rule of law. No democratic constitutional order is the 
fruit of a dictatorial or fascist system and thus this duty should manifest itself 
throughout constitutional jurisprudence. The value of this approach for international 
law is that a general principle amongst constitutional states could develop which will 
find application under international law. 
 
This approach by the Canadian Supreme Court of a duty to negotiate is reconcilable 
with international law. Consequently, the court’s reasoning can be applied to 
establish that international law supports the entrenchment of a right to secede within 
the municipal jurisdiction. Article 33 (1) of the UN Charter states that:  
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek 
a solution by negotiation (…) or other peaceful means of their own choice. 
 
According to Article 33 (2) of the UN Charter the UN Security Council is also under a 
legal duty to call upon states to use negotiations as one of other means to settle 
disputes. This point links to the argument that ran through the previous chapter, that 
international law favours the principle of stability. Further, the central logic of a duty to 
negotiate under international law is the maintenance of international peace and 
security, which is the main purpose of the UN.240 
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In the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 case241 the ICJ reiterated this approach, by 
reminding the parties of their duty under Article 33(1) that there was an obligation on 
both India and Pakistan to resolve their international dispute by peaceful means. 
Negotiations were cited as one such express peaceful means.242 Further, in the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case,243 it was the majority order of the court that 
‘Hungary and Slovakia must negotiate in good faith in the light of the prevailing 
situation’244 A practical example of this duty to negotiate flows from the South African 
liberation movement. In this example, the international community applauded the 
formation of a new dispensation exercising this duty to negotiate. Botha describes 
this process as follows: 
South Africa’s political transition thus belongs to that contemporary breed 
of transitions described by Arato as ‘negotiated revolutions’. It also 
qualifies as ‘legal’ or ‘Rechtsstaatliche’ revolution in the sense that, far 
from representing a total break in legality, it was adopted in accordance 
with procedural – and substantive requirements contained in an interim 
Constitution245 
 
Botha’s reflections on what he calls the ‘constitutional-making experiment’246 links 
well with this approach of a constitutional duty to negotiate enunciated by the court in 
the Quebec case. However, for the achievement of legal certainty that would not in 
Botha's words, represent a break in legality, a clearly drafted and defined right to 
secede is still favoured.  
 
With reference to the Canadian Supreme court’s decision in the Quebec case, the 
court proposes a procedure that seems to simulate a form of constitutionalising of 
the secession process. The court moves from the premise that secession cannot be 
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decided by a simple majority vote, but that it needs to be decided by a process of 
constitutional amendment and negotiation. The court does not outline the substance 
or form that these amendments need to have. However, it could be argued that it is 
not necessary because it would in any case form part of the negotiation process. The 
Canadian Supreme Court concludes that: 
The notion that what is not explicitly prohibited is implicitly permitted has 
little relevance where (as here) international law refers the legality of 
secession to the domestic law of the seceding state and the law of that 
state holds unilateral secession to be unconstitutional.247 
 
3 5 Concluding Remarks 
The need for a shift in perspective on the process of secession, which Roach248 
argues for, seems to hold some merit. A move away from an over fixation on the 
moral justification of secession does not seem to discredit the substantive grounds 
for secession, but could be observed to enhance it. There is a need to develop the 
procedural legitimacy of the right to secede. Just including the right in a constitution 
does not solve the problem of the legal effectiveness of the right. Developing the 
normative procedural character of the right not only promotes legal certainty, but also 
the guiding principles of international law of stability as well as peace and security. 
 
It is acknowledged that constitutionalism is a product of the regime in place and the 
will of the peoples is predicated on the notions of popular and state sovereignty. 
Roth points out that: 
While constitutionalism – a commitment to establish, maintain, and respect 
a broadly acknowledged framework for the legitimate exercise of power – 
is undoubtedly a crucial political virtue, the same cannot automatically be 
said for adherence to any particular constitutional norm or even the whole 
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constitution. Existing constitutions are artefacts of past power struggles 
and negotiated settlements.249 
 
What is proposed in the Quebec proposition, is that a codified right to secede must 
be born from a negotiated settlement. The duty to negotiate is the path that 
international law should be favouring in establishing any form of a constitutional right 
to secede. Peaceful negotiated solutions to the incidence of secession are favoured 
and this would also bring secession closer the tacit principle of stability. It is clear 
that domestic entrenchment of the right makes it vulnerable to political manipulation. 
The examples of the former Soviet Union, Burma and the former Yugoslavia provide 
evidence of how the municipal inclusion of the right served to pacify it. By altering the 
framework suggested by Shaw above, from a process of claim, effective control and 
recognition to a process of claim, negotiation, effective control and recognition, the 
strategic and legitimising function of secession will be enhanced. Secession is 
consequently also easier to harmonise within the ambit of international law and the 
rule of law. 
 
From all of the constitutional examples of a codified right to secede, Ethiopia 
presents the best example. The right is comprehensively drafted to harmonise with 
legal theory. It is judicially applicable to the extent it includes both substantive and 
procedural legal characteristics. These results will serve to inform the debate relating 
to the relationship between secession and the right to self-determination. The right to 
secede and self-determination are often used inter-changeably. The normative 
nature of the right to self-determination is well developed under international law, to 
the extent of being an erga omnes250 norm of international law. An understanding of 
the challenges and successes of the right to self-determination under international 
law will serve to inform the development of the right to secede. The following chapter 
will conduct an in depth analysis of this relationship.  
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4 Self-determination and Secession 
 
4 1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the relationship between the rights to secede and self-
determination. The principle of self-determination seems to not contradict the right to 
secede, but rather potentially enhance the right. The right to secede exist both 
separate and integral to the right to self-determination. Consequently, self-
determination informs the central objective of that which secession aims to achieve – 
the creation of a new territorial entity under international law. The research 
demonstrates that the right to self-determination has historically been the inherent 
justification for the establishment of all states. Further, the chapter discusses the 
different forms of the right to self-determination – this being internal and external 
self-determination. 
 
The nature of the right to self-determination remains complex. In the Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
case (hereinafter the Palestinian Wall case),251 the ICJ had another opportunity to 
either develop or clarify the boundaries of the right to self-determination. This case 
was loaded with both political and humanitarian issues and this probably impeded 
the court’s focus in dealing with the particular legal issues. Consequently, the court 
in its opinion limited itself to the particular legal question before it.252 This case 
serves as contemporary evidence of the complexity that still engulfs the right to self-
determination. 
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The rationale for the inquiry into the right to self-determination as part of the study of 
the right to secede, is two-fold. Firstly, self-determination allows for the potential of 
secession when a peoples’ will is directed toward state formation. As a consequence 
of the total depletion of terra nullius, this direction will inevitable always take the 
format of secession. Secession or a positive entitlement to secede is reconcilable 
with external self-determination. Consequently, the reference to secession in the 
contexts of self-determination is limited to this form. Secondly, the right to self-
determination historically faced similar challenges and opposition as the right to 
secede endures. The process of development that the right to self-determination 
undertook could potentially be of value to the right to secede. Both rights share a 
normative character that is much closer than other concepts of international law.  
 
The results in this chapter brings to the fore the core argument which inform the 
normative character of the right to secede. The chapter builds on the previous 
chapter in retaining the position of a shift in the perspective on the process of 
secession. This is undertaken through the departure from the traditional approach253 
of secession towards a more normative approach.254 An approach which reflects 
more than the moral legitimacy of secession. Jovanović highlights a similar approach 
in stating that: 
From the 1980's onward, political philosophers have offered a more 
rigorous treatment of the phenomenon of secession, concentrating largely 
on moral justifications of the unilateral right to secession.' In doing so, they 
have been more interested in justifying a moral claim-right to secede, 
which implies 'a correlative obligation on the part of others not to interfere 
with the attempted secession', than in grounding a moral liberty-right or a 
mere permission to secede.255 
 
                                                 
253
 In what I phrased the ‘tradition approach’, the right to secede is predominantly considered based 
on its moral justification. This has left the right stagnant and has contributed to the under development 
of the right to secede in the face of multiple secessions around the world.  
254
 The normative approach which is again my own phrase, considers a right to secede based on its 
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paradigm and an observation is entered into on it legal substantive and procedural nature. 
255
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It is suggested in this chapter that the development of the right to self-
determination’s from legal anomaly, to principle, to right is of some utility. It is 
submitted that it is precisely this subscription to an unstable concept such as 
morality, which is primarily responsible for the opposition to the right to secede. The 
historical development of the doctrine of self-determination is briefly touched on in 
order to weave together its essential characteristics. The interplay between self-
determination and territorial integrity is then interrogated. The doctrine of respect for 
territorial integrity as a norm of international law is directly challenged by the 
existence of a right to secede. However, it is suggested that it is a passive principle 
that serves only as a defence to the disruption of a state’s territory. This is contrary 
to the dominant view on this relationship. Summers argues in terms of secession, 
self-determination and territorial integrity that: 
The self-determination of groups within states can be divided in three 
areas: secession, autonomy and internal self-determination, and remedial 
secession. The legal position of the first of these, secession should be 
straightforward. The principle purpose in balancing self-determination with 
territorial integrity has been to restrict the possibility of secession.256 
 
This proposition assumes that the right to self-determination includes the 
consequence of secession automatically. It ignores the fact that the right to secede 
potentially can exist independently from the right to self-determination. Further, it 
does not consider that a right to self-determination can broadly be present outside 
the link to a particular territory. However, a right to secede cannot be evoked without 
a link to a specific territory.  
 
The chapter proceeds to discuss the doctrine of uti possidetis and its impact on self-
determination. Uti possidetis is a norm of international law based on consent and 
agreement. It is submitted that uti possidetis is an inferior concept to self-
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determination. Consequently, it cannot legitimately bar the operation of a right to 
self-determination as an erga omnes norm of international law.257 
 
The chapter is concluded by introducing the concept of constitutional self-
determination. Chapter 2 focused on the right to secede and its incorporation into 
domestic constitutions. The aims were, to track whether this endowed the right with 
increased legitimacy and, whether the right could be reconciled with a progressive 
approach as suggested by Shaw above.258 A similar logic follows the inquiry below 
into constitutional self-determination. However, the inquiry is more theoretical in 
order to engage with the different manifestations of constitutional self-determination.  
 
4 2 The Moral Authority of Self-determination 
4 2 1 Classical Self-determination 
It is prudent to engage in a discussion on the classical perspectives of the right to 
self-determination. This serves to create a better understanding of the developing 
character of the norm. There has been consistent resistance on the part of state 
parties to the full recognition of self-determination as a right.259 This can primarily be 
attributed to the classical perspective on self-determination. Danspeckgruber 
explains that:  
[S]elf-determination in its classical form, that is, the search for 
independence, new boundaries, and statehood (and hence traditional 
nationalism) played a powerful role in the destruction of Europe’s empires 
in the twentieth century.260 
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Brownlie suggests that ‘Until recently the majority of Western jurist assumed or 
asserted that the principle had no legal content, being an ill-defined concept of policy 
and morality’.261 This position was held even though the principle of self-
determination resonated in both international and regional legal instruments. In the 
Kosovo Opinion,262 the court stated that, ‘one of the major developments of 
international law during the second half of the twentieth century has been the 
evolution of the right of self-determination’.263 
Under Articles 1(2)264 and 55 of the UN Charter, the right is entrenched as a 
mechanism to affect the UN objectives of friendly relations amongst states and 
universal peace. Jurisprudence on self-determination developed by the ICJ with 
especially the Western Sahara case265 and the South West Africa case266 
respectively provided legal content to the principle. Further the common articles 1 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR)267 and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter 
ICESCR)268 expressly recognises the right to self-determination. Under these 
treaties, the right became increasingly entrenched as a people’s right and an erga 
omnes norm of international law. 
 
A conclusive example of the international community’s commitment to the right to 
self-determination was captured in the UNGA’s Declaration on the Occasion of the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nation which pronounced that member states: 
[C]ontinue to reaffirm the right of self-determination of all peoples, taking 
into account the particular situation of people under colonial or other forms 
of alien domination or foreign occupation, and recognise the right of 
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peoples to take legitimate action in accordance with the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations to realize their inalienable right of self-
determination.269 
 
This confirmation of the right to self-determination came without the stipulation of 
respect for territorial integrity. The UN General Assembly again wanted to emphasis 
the point that the recognition of the right to self-determination should not be 
construed as giving a people access to secession. The declaration explicitly stated 
that: 
This shall not be construed as authorising or encouraging any action that 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or 
political unity of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves 
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole of 
the people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind.270 
 
Regionally, both in Africa and Europe the right to self-determination found 
recognition. Perhaps more emphatic is the formulation in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter ACHPR) which provides under Article 20 (1) 
that:  
All peoples (…) shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-
determination, to freely determine their political status and shall pursue 
their economic and social development according to the policy they have 
freely chosen. 
 
                                                 
269
 United Nations General Assembly’s Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
United Nation (adopted 9 November 1995) GA res. 50/6. 
270
 ibid. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
89 
 
In African Legal Aid v The Gambia271 the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter the African Commission) denounce the military coup 
d’état as ‘not through the will of the people’ and ‘therefore a grave violation of the 
right of Gambian people to freely choose their government as entrenched in Article 
20(1) of the Charter’.272  
 
Within the European context, the right to self-determination is recognised in the Final 
Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (hereinafter the 
Helsinki Final Act),273 where it comprehensively states:  
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their 
right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the 
relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial 
integrity of States.274 
 
Developments in the classic view of self-determination brought about the distinction 
between two types of the right to self-determination, being internal and external self-
determination.275 The Helsinki Final Act gives recognition to internal self-
determination as being: 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and 
as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external 
interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social 
and cultural development.276 
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External self-determination seeks to use the right to self-determination in order to 
remove territory from a sovereign state. Secession finds logical application under the 
expression of the right to external self-determination. This would only be the case 
where the expression of the people’s will is directed towards the creation of a new 
state. Peoples also have the option of integration or association as alternative 
expressions of the right to external self-determination. 
 
In the context of the UN Charter, it is generally presumed that self-determination as 
expressed in the instrument, relates to a peoples’ right. Most commentators argue 
comfortably that self-determination as a developing norm is a collective peoples’ 
right present within the above-mentioned articles of the UN Charter.277 Higgins 
vigorously opposes such views. She argues that ‘We cannot ignore the coupling of 
“self-determination” with “equal rights” – and it was equal rights of states which were 
being provided for, not of individuals’.278 Higgins does not support the view that the 
developed right to self-determination is supported by these articles in the UN 
Charter. Higgins further emphasises that ‘self-determination is not provided for by 
the text of the UN Charter – at least not in the sense that it is generally used’.279 
  
Musgrave presents a counter argument that ‘No definitive demarcation between self- 
determination as a political concept and self-determination as a legal right can be 
found in the Charter of the United Nations’.280 He argues that herein, lies the 
controversy as to the scope and content of the right. The pertinent question that 
arises is, what is the difference between self-determination as a political concept and 
a legal right. Brownlie’s point that the right is ill defined, seems to have relevance 
because of such diverging views. 
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The history of self-determination cannot be detached from the moral grounds, which 
informed its development. The morality of self-determination is couched in the 
unassailable right of peoples to be in control of their political status and free from 
foreign domination. This moral position also informed the use of self-determination 
as the leading rationale to guide the process of decolonisation. The moral 
justification for self-determination has consequently contributed to its development 
into a right and norm of international law. However, these same aspects of morality 
are loaded with political motives. The moral justification for self-determination is 
clouded in political reasoning and this makes it vulnerable to political intrusion. 
Crawford expresses caution when he remarks that ‘Lawyers should not make 
political judgements; they should make legal judgements’.281 Crawford with reference 
to the South West Africa case, argues that ‘For the court to decide that the 
application of apartheid to South West Africa was (or was not) inconsistent with the 
mandate would involve a political judgement’.282 Consequently, the difference 
between self-determination as a political concept and a legal concept lies in its 
morality. The morality of self-determination drives it politically, however morality is 
also responsible for it substantive legal existence. 
 
The presence of self-determination is not foreign to the process of state-formation. 
Aspirations for self-determination, although not specifically defined, had an 
application in early nationalist movements that was aimed at state creation. This was 
evident before the decolonisation process of the early twentieth century. 
Koskenniemi brings a clear understanding of self-determination in this context where 
he argues that: 
This idea of national self-determination as a patriotic concept, a 
justification of statehood, has not always been apparent. Much of the 
classical positivist writing has simply accepted States as the factual 
foundation of international law.283 
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Koskenniemi uses the 1920 opinion of the International Commission of Jurists on the 
Äland Islands as evidence of this view that self-determination serves as justification 
for existence of all states. He postulates that self-determination is ordinarily dormant, 
restricted by sovereignty and that ‘During periods of political transformation, 
however, when the existence of States becomes uncertain, self-determination 
becomes applicable to reconstitute the political normality of statehood’.284 Thus, self-
determination is not only the driving force behind the establishment of the state, but it 
is also one of the core requirements for the maintenance of state legitimacy. This 
represents the patriotic side of self-determination. 
 
Koskenniemi furthermore presents the side of self-determination that challenges 
statehood and its patriotic side. This is the perspective of self-determination that 
places communal interest or a peoples’ desire to be associated and grouped as one, 
central to the expression of self-determination. He argues that this is the position of 
self-determination that opinions such as the Äland Islands have tried to downgrade 
as not legal but political and a danger to sovereignty as well as the principle of 
stability in international law. More specifically Koskenniemi argues that ‘Following the 
Äland Island Opinion, jurist have attempted to contain this (secessionist) sense of 
self-determination by limiting its application to the particular contexts of 
decolonisation’.285 However, the patriotic perspective of self-determination clearly 
indicates the rights existence outside of the realm of colonial rule.286 
 
This dual perspective of self-determination also presents inherent contradictions. 
Under the colonial context, the right to self-determination has presented itself as a 
fundamental right of international law. The extent of the right’s entrenchment as a 
norm under international law is generally accepted as being elevated to jus cogens. 
International lawyers frequently disagree as to the scope and application of the 
principle. However, whether dealing with internal or external self-determination a few 
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certainties have been established to serve as departure points. Cassese summaries 
them in stating that: 
Self-determination appears firmly entrenched in the corpus of international 
law in only three areas: as an anti-colonialist standard, as a ban on foreign 
military occupation, and as a requirement that all racial groups be given 
full access to government.287  
 
4 2 2 Scope of Self-determination 
A brief discussion of the scope of self-determination serves to broaden the 
conceptual analysis and comprehension of self-determination. This also provides 
clarity on the status of the scope of self-determination. As stated above, there are 
two different forms of self-determination. At the conservative end of self-
determination lies internal self-determination and on its extreme side external self-
determination. As indicated above secession only concerns itself with external self-
determination. This form of self-determination is the only one that possesses the 
potential to include secession. These different forms of the right to self-determination 
emerge from the authority of the Declaration on Friendly Relations. The declaration 
discourages external influence in the expression of a form of self-determination. 
Reflecting back on Higgins’ argument above that self-determination as presented 
within the context of the UN Charter is a right of states and not people, this clearly 
also contradicts such a narrow reading of self-determination in the instrument. 
Instrument such as the Declaration on Friendly Relations serves to provide for a 
broader interpretation of self-determination within especially the ambit of the UN 
Charter. The declaration clearly states that: 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations all peoples have the right 
freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and 
to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State 
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has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the 
Charter.288 
 
External self-determination, according to the declaration, can be express via ‘the 
establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or 
integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political 
status’.289 Consequently, secession is not the default effect of an expression of the 
right to external self-determination. Internal self-determination finds greater 
relevance within the protection of minority and indigenous rights. In the Quebec 
case, the court held that internal self-determination is ‘a people’s pursuit of its 
political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an 
existing state’.290 Internal self-determination forms the departing point for the 
expression of the right to self-determination. Access to external self-determination is 
subjected to the denial of internal self-determination. 
 
Another vexing question under international law is who has access to self-
determination. In its preamble, the Declaration on Friendly Relations pronounces the 
progressive development and codification of ‘the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples’.291 It is generally accepted that self-determination is a 
peoples’ right, but what constitutes peoples remains unanswered under international 
law. The research conducted here is not aimed at answering this question. The focus 
is with the question, what constitutes a peoples’ will?  
 
4 2 3 A Peoples’ Will 
The traditional approach to the right to secede postulates that the justification for the 
existence of the right to be based on its moral value. The right to self-determination 
also follows a path that commenced within its morality. From the pronouncement of 
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American president Woodrow Wilson’s292 ‘Fourteen Points’, self-determination 
developed from a concept to a principle, to a doctrine into a right, which now serves 
as a norm of international law.293 However, the application of the right has been ad 
hoc rather than meticulously planned under international law. In the East Timor case, 
the right was elevated and confirmed as having an erga omnes character. The 
judgement stated that ‘In the Court's view, Portugal's assertion that the right of 
peoples to self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations 
practice, has an erga omnes character, is irreproachable’.294 In contrast, the ICJ 
avoided making a pronouncement on the right’s status for the peoples of Kosovo in 
the Kosovo Opinion. This seems to point to a contradiction under international law on 
the comprehension of the right. In what Crawford terms the ‘Lex Lata, Lex Obscura’ 
he argues the above point by suggesting that ‘we have the paradox that the 
international law of self-determination both exists and is obscure’.295  
 
In the Western Sahara case, the court found that ‘the application of the right of self-
determination requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples 
concerned’.296 This reasoning was also followed in the South West Africa case. In 
response to South Africa’s submission that the people of Namibia wanted to be 
incorporated into South Africa, the court ruled that ‘South Africa would have 
vindicated itself in the eyes of the world and in the estimation of the peoples of South 
West Africa, whose freely expressed wishes must be supreme’.297 These two 
decisions highlight two central aspects of the normative character of the right to self-
determination. Firstly, that self-determination is the free and genuine expression of 
the will of peoples and secondly, that such expression is supreme (erga omnes).298 
 
The moral value of the principle of self-determination, is captured in the question, 
why a right to self-determination? The morality of a right to self-determination leads 
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to two conceptual ends; the holder’s moral authority to access the right and the 
moral obligation of others, to respect its existence and exercise. Buchanan 
expresses it more clearly that ‘To have a moral right to something is to have an 
especially strong moral power or moral authority’.299 He further argues that ‘the 
implication being that the obligation of others not to interfere with one’s (…) right is a 
very weighty obligation’.300 The right to self-determination should be a supreme, 
genuine and free expression of will, as a peremptory norm of international law. The 
moral authority of the right falls with peoples who qualifies for the right. International 
law has elevated the rest of the world’s moral obligation to respect the right into 
statute and judicial precedence.  
 
The exercise of peoples’ will consequently attaches legal legitimacy to the right to 
self-determination. The expression of the right can be towards different ends. State 
creation is just one option of the exercise of the right. Principle VI of UN General 
Assembly Declaration 1541 (XV)301 provides that some of the options for the 
exercise of the right is integration, free association or political independence. The 
right to secede seeks to move further and premises its morality squarely on a similar 
but specific right to political independence. Koskenniemi contemplates this point to 
be that: 
The secessionist sense of self-determination builds upon a romantic or a 
rousseauesque approach. It tries to look deeper into nationhood as 
something more basic, more fundamental than mere decision-processes. 
For this view, the crucial question is less how popular will is exercised; 
more to what end it is exercised.302 
 
Thus, it is submitted that the expression of will is one side of the coin. However, 
secession concerns itself with the other side of this coin – begging the question, to 
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what end is the will expressed. The critical element is the presence of secession 
within self-determination and its singular aspiration for political independence. As 
argued above self-determination is inherent in the process of state creation. 
Johnston broadens this argument by stating that post secession, ‘The nationalism of 
the state thus reinforces and reproduces the collective sense of identity of its 
citizens’.303 The African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights also confirmed 
this position in the Katangese case.304 The Commission found additional options 
towards the expression of a peoples' will. This indicates that the exercise of self-
determination is not based on a closed list of options, but that it follows the 
development in the needs of peoples. The Commission concluded that: 
[S]elf-determination may be exercised in any of the following ways – 
independence, self-government, local government, federalism, 
confederalism, unitarism or any other form of relations that accords with 
the wishes of the people.305  
 
This indicates that secession is one of many options in a peoples’ expression of their 
will under the right to self-determination. These complexities and variations in the 
exercise of the right are also present in its scope of meaning. Weller affirms that it is:  
True, self-determination has numerous layers of meaning, which include a 
right to democratic participation for individuals, certain human rights 
entitlements for minorities and additional benefits for indigenous 
peoples.306 
 
The correlation with secession however, concentrates the objective of self-
determination to one ideal only – state formation. Weller criticises the relationship 
between self-determination and secession in that ‘at the sharp end, where opposed 
unilateral secession is concerned, the doctrine in its simplicity has exacerbated 
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conflict, rather than helping to resolve it’.307 To whichever end self-determination is 
expressed, primary to its application is the recognition of the will of the peoples. 
Buchanan concurs with the approach in stating: 
[I]nternational law must be transformed by the recognition that self-
determination admits of degrees and, consequently, that the exercise of a 
right to self-determination may take many forms, with secession to form a 
fully independent, sovereign state being only the most extreme.308  
 
The incorporation of the right to self-determination into international legal instruments 
has been accompanied by respect for the principle of territorial integrity.309 In chapter 
2, the rational of this was linked to international law’s adherence to the principle of 
stability and maintenance of the status quo. It was concluded in chapter 2 that all the 
definitions of secession propose a disruption of a states’ territorial integrity. The 
statutory qualifications on the absolute exercise of the right to self-determination by 
the international community, in general could be ascribed to the potential disruptive 
consequence of secession on territorial integrity. However, the legitimacy of self-
determination cannot be detached from the lawful aspirations of a peoples’ will. With 
the exercise of external self-determination, disintegration cannot be excluded as a 
possible outcome. Consequently, the question remains whether the recognition of 
the principle of respect for territorial integrity under international law serves as an 
absolute bar against self-determination. This theme is further explored below.  
 
4 3 Territorial Integrity 
Recognition of the principle of territorial integrity is found in Article 2 (4) of the UN 
Charter. The Article prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of a state by other states. Territorial integrity underpins the 
legal obligation which international law generates for every state, to refrain from 
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conduct that intrudes on another state’s territory. In the Nicaragua case310 the ICJ 
confirmed that the principle, as phrased in the Declaration on Friendly Relations, 
‘reflects customary international law’.311 The Declaration on Friendly Relations 
articulated territorial integrity to be ‘The principle that States shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any State’. Territorial integrity works directly towards 
affirming a state’s sovereignty as protected in Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter. 
 
The principle also enjoys regional recognition. In Article IV of the Helsinki Final 
Act,312 it is stated that ‘the participating States will respect the territorial integrity of 
each of the participating States’. Further, Article II of the African Charter also reflects 
recognition for the principle. Within the EC Guidelines on Recognition313 it stipulates 
that the ‘respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by 
peaceful means and by common agreement’.314 The Montevideo Convention under 
article 11 also states that, ‘The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the 
object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another 
state’.315 The right to secede with its primary objective of division of territory stands in 
contrast to the principle of territorial integrity. In principle, self-determination is 
accommodative of territorial integrity. However, external self-determination directly 
challenges the principle.  
 
The principle of territorial integrity has also been realised within various constitutions, 
in different forms. Consequently, its domestic presence relates to a balancing act 
with self-determination. Just recently, the inclusion of the right to self-determination 
within article 1(a) of the Falkland Islands constitution316 provides an interesting 
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example of how this right could be understood in a domestic context. Article 1(b) 
states that ‘the realisation of the right of self-determination must be promoted and 
respected in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations’.317 
The UN Charter in Article 2 (4) proclaims the principle of territorial integrity. This is 
an indirect attempt to include respect for territorial integrity as a consideration in the 
exercise of the right to self-determination. 
 
The primacy of the principle of respect for territorial integrity over other principles in 
international law is evident from the restriction that it places on self-determination. 
However, territorial integrity could serve as a standard for the responsible exercise of 
the right to self-determination. Territorial integrity protects the legal personality of 
existing states as subjects of international law. However, it neglects the potential of 
new states being formed because of the will of peoples. The principle can be 
observed as a right of states rather than that of peoples. Its approach to statehood is 
reflective of the maintenance of the Westphalian model. The continuance of the 
Westphalian model, the adherence to the principle of stability and retention of the 
status quo is perpetuated through the constraints it places on self-determination. 
Summers argues that: 
These provisions shift the issue of self-determination away from the 
existence of people as such towards the representativeness of political 
institutions. More broadly they can also be seen as an attempt to contain 
the right by substituting liberalism for nationalism.318 
 
Summers’ conclusion can be rephrased to state that the attempt to contain the right 
to self-determination is effected by ‘confusing’ liberalism with nationalism. In the 
discussion in chapter 2, on nationalist theory, it became clear that nationalism is 
constructed on the link between identity and territory.319 Nationalism is characterised 
by the promotion of common features of a society to artificially construct a national 
identity, except in the case of a nation-state. Lesotho and Israel serves as examples 
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of what a nation-state is, where ascriptive features are central to citizenship.  
National identity becomes the salient link to the territory. Considerations relating to 
the will of the populace become secondary to the unification of the territory along 
these nationalist constructs of identity. Liberalism, pragmatically, is open to 
accommodating popular sentiments related to the territory and the will of peoples. 
This view is reconcilable with an understanding of self-determination, as being an 
expression of a peoples’ own choice or will. Nationalism seems to be more focussed 
on the will of a government than that of peoples. In the Western Sahara case, the 
ICJ relied on Mauritania’s submission where they argued that: 
[T]hat the principle of self-determination cannot be dissociated from that of 
respect for national unity and territorial integrity; that the General 
Assembly examines each question in the context of the situations to be 
regulated; in several instances, it has been induced to give priority to 
territorial integrity, particularly in situations where the territory had been 
created by a colonizing Power to the detriment of a State or country to 
which the territory belonged.320 
 
However, national unity based on nationalist ideology is a precarious approach. Just 
as nationalism is employed to strengthen national unity, it can be the fuel to ignite 
internal nationalism sentiments from other groups. Cassese warns that: 
It is common knowledge that we are currently witnessing a dangerous 
resurgence of nationalism in the world community. The wave of 
nationalistic and ethnocentric feelings that has recently swept Europe, but 
can also be discerned in Latin America, North America, and some African 
and Asian countries, is undermining consolidated State structures and 
triggering secessionist movements. 321  
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A problematic paradox is revealed. Nationalism as a mechanism that states employ 
to foster unity, has become the menace that threatens national unity. As a tool that 
protected territorial integrity, nationalism could be identified as part of the cause of 
the disruption of territorial integrity. The difficulty with nationalism and territorial 
integrity is found within the ascriptive features that aim to string a nationalist identity 
together. Where the composition of a state is inherently diverse, national identity 
excludes minorities, primarily because majority trades naturally dominate the national 
political agenda. Nationalism can then become a threat to ethnically diverse states 
and can fuel secessionist sentiments. Cassese suggests that:  
One is left with the impression that the traditional multi-ethnic State, that 
has for centuries constituted the mainstay of the world community, has 
become effete and probably doomed to demise.322 
 
Cassese’s warning reflects the dominant reasoning that influences the restriction of 
the right to self-determination. The utility of nationalism as a mechanism to enforce 
respect for territorial integrity has failed. Rather the effect has been the opposite, in 
that it has fuelled secessionist movements. A position can be taken that respect for 
territorial integrity is not an absolute right of states. In the Quebec case, internal self-
determination is defined as ‘a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and 
cultural development within the framework of an existing state’.323 The same court 
further explained that: 
A state whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples 
resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without 
discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determination in its 
internal arrangements, is entitled to maintain its territorial integrity under 
international law and to have that territorial integrity recognized by other 
states.324 
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The Canadian Supreme Court found that access to territorial integrity has to be 
conditional to the state’s respect for its peoples. This places a qualification on a 
state’s reliance for respect of territorial integrity. The applicability of the principle is 
subject to a legitimate government who recognises the principles of internal self-
determination. A circular argument seems to emerge here. The exercise of self-
determination is subjected to respect for a sovereign state’s territorial integrity. 
However, the proper functioning of the principle of territorial integrity is subjected to 
a legitimate government who respects a people’s right to internal self-determination. 
Johanson concurs in suggesting that ‘the concept of territorial integrity cannot be 
understood as guaranteeing the territorial inviolability of states’.325 The reasoning 
behind this is that article 2 (4) of the UN Charter only declares that the unauthorised 
threat or use of force illegally against a state constitutes a violation of its territorial 
integrity. Further evidence that international law does not unconditionally guarantee 
respect for territorial integrity is reflected elsewhere in the UN Charter. Under Article 
42 of the Charter, the UN Security Council can use force to maintain or restore 
international peace and security where measures under Article 41 are inadequate. 
In addition to this Article 51 of the Charter declares self-defence as an inherent right 
of all states. Thus, a state would be able to use force against the territorial integrity 
of another state in order to defend itself. 
 
At the core of the relationship between self-determination and territorial integrity is 
the exclusion of secession as a possible effect of self-determination. In Katangese 
case, the African Commission concluded: 
In the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the 
point that the territorial integrity of Zaire should be called into question and 
in the absence of evidence that the people of Katanga are denied the right 
to participate in government (…) the Commission holds the view that 
Katanga is obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination that is 
compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire.326  
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The African Commission concluded that the peoples of Katanga needed to exercise 
internal self-determination. This seems to point towards remedial secession as a 
ground for justifying the infringement of a state’s territorial integrity. This argument is 
limited to cases where internal self-determination is excluded. The basis of this 
conclusion is the commission’s reasoning that the legitimacy of the state would come 
into question where human rights violations occurred. The judicial test would then be 
an inquiry into whether there exist a fundamental denial of the exercise and 
enjoyment of internal self-determination. 
 
Self-determination can only have a legitimate secessionist effect if a balance could 
be struck with territorial integrity. The Quebec and the Katanga cases present us 
with two possibilities. Summers suggests a further solution by stating that ‘If states 
have not been willing to endorse a right of minorities to secede, then perhaps they 
could accept autonomy within a state’.327 This solution relates to a broad 
interpretation of the concept of internal self-determination. Summers elaborates 
‘Autonomy can be presented as part of the “internal” aspect of self-determination’.328 
An example of the exercising of autonomy within the scope of another state would be 
Taiwan. However, this solution raises serious concerns relating to the extent of the 
autonomous power. Further, would the presence of autonomous enclaves not 
threaten the stability of the dominant state?329  
 
In conclusion, the principle of territorial integrity cannot be understood as a norm of 
international law that is unburdened by responsibility and obligation. This would be a 
dangerous approach, possible also open to abuse. State sovereignty together with 
respect for territorial integrity, needs to be subjected to state legitimacy. This 
legitimacy is strengthened by a state’s conduct in recognising and respecting 
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peoples’ right to internal self-determination. The essence of a state’s legitimacy is 
provided by the will of the people and the state’s conduct towards the most 
vulnerable within that society. Brewer’s comments on the dissenting voices in the 
Kosovo Opinion, provides further context on the relationship between self-
determination and territorial integrity. He argues that: 
Territorial integrity should not be able to provide impunity to states 
committing human rights abuses, as states possess fundamental 
obligations to respect the rights of different peoples within their borders. A 
state that abuses a people within its borders should lose its legitimacy as a 
state with respect to that group. The modern era of international human 
rights law must not permit massive violations of its order under the fig leaf 
of territorial integrity.330 
 
Territorial integrity that is heavily premised on state sovereignty cannot outweigh the 
protection of human lives. This is in line with what Weller argues to be ‘Changing 
Perceptions of Sovereignty’.331 He argues that international actors have taken a 
position that the plights of international populations who face immediate danger need 
to trump concepts like state sovereignty and non-intervention. Weller concludes by 
affirming that ‘there definitely emerged an environment where the terms of the 
debate about sovereignty shifted, away from the abstraction of state towards a sense 
of empowerment and protection of populations’.332 It is submitted that territorial 
integrity does not serve as an absolute bar to self-determination. Consequently, due 
to the integrated relation between secession and self-determination, territorial 
integrity cannot pose an absolute obstruction to the right to secede.  
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However, territorial integrity is not the sole principle that serves to protect the 
disruption of state borders, recognised by international law. It also recognises the 
doctrine of uti possidetis. This principle has been applied predominantly to states 
emerging from colonial rule and other forms of foreign occupation. Below, follows a 
discussion on whether uti possidetis effectively bars self-determination and the 
possible effects this may have on the right to secede. 
 
4 4 Uti Possidetis 
It is crucial to note that the principles of territorial integrity and uti possidetis are not 
synonymous. These terms cannot be used interchangeably. Territorial integrity 
relates to respect for existing boundaries, whereas uti possidetis functions more as a 
tool for dispute settlement. Johanson describes this distinction in the following 
manner: 
While territorial integrity relates to illegal force used against already 
established state territory and prohibits inter-state aggression, uti 
possidetis is a method of settling claims to territory or boundaries which is 
based on the consent of the parties for a peaceful solution.333  
 
The engagement of international law with the issue of state boundaries cannot be 
detracted from the debate over self-determination and secession. These latter two 
concepts have significantly affected the world map and have been historically 
responsible for the redrawing of international borders. At the start of the nineteenth 
century in Latin America, the move for colonial territories to become sovereign was 
accompanied by the retention of the colonial administrative borders as the new 
states’ borders. This practice was followed by the Roman dictum ‘uti possidetis jure’ 
meaning 'as you possess in law'. The adoption of the doctrine was ‘aimed at averting 
endless territorial claims and clashes’.334 The reality has however been the eruption 
of serious border disputes of which there are still examples today. In the Latin 
American context, these disputes have taken place between Argentina and Peru, 
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Ecuador and Peru as well as Brazil, just to mention a few.335 At present, the ICJ is 
deliberating on the pending case between Nicaragua and Colombia over a related 
territorial dispute.336 
 
Uti possidetis is premised on consent and agreement. Cassese explains that the 
doctrine ‘took shape in a host of bilateral treaties, as well as the national 
constitutions of some newly independent Latin American countries’.337 A relevant 
question is, whether the principle of uti possidetis makes international borders 
sacrosanct. Conversely, does uti possidetis limit the rights to secede and self-
determination and to what extent? 
 
Although the origin of the principle is most commonly attributed to the decolonisation 
processes of Latin America, the African context provides some legal clarity on the 
doctrine. Uti possidetis was accepted as the best course to follow in Africa’s 
decolonisation project. In 1964, at the first session of the ‘Conference of African 
Heads of State and Government’ in Cairo, resolution AGH/16(I)338 was adopted. In 
this resolution, African heads of states committed themselves to the principle of uti 
possidetis. The resolution expressly stated ‘that the borders of African States, on the 
day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality’.339 The Case Concerning the 
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali)340 enunciated this resolution as 
members of the Organisation of African Union pledging: 
[T]hemselves to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of 
national independence, inasmuch as, in the preamble to their Special 
Agreement, they stated that the settlement of the dispute by the Chamber 
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must be based in particular on respect for the principle of the intangibility 
of frontiers inherited from colonization.341 
 
In the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute the court remarked that ‘The principle of 
uti possidetis freezes the territorial title’342 from the time of independence. This is to 
create what the court called the ‘colonial heritage’.343 Consequently, it becomes 
difficult to apply peoples’ will to rule themselves on a determined territory, because 
uti possidetis is inflexible towards altering territorial titles.  
 
In the Yugoslavian context, the Banditer Commission used the principle of uti 
possidetis to confirm the retention of the borders of the former Yugoslavian republics 
after the collapse of the Federation.344 Opinion 2 stated that ‘The right to self-
determination is not well-defined under international law; as it stands, the right 
cannot affect the location of boundaries (uti possidetis juris)’. Further, in Opinion 3 
the Commission presented the governing principles for the dissolution of the SFRY 
as being: 
According to the principles of (1) respect for the territorial status quo and 
(2) uti possidetis, the former internal boundaries become external 
boundaries, protected under international law, unless otherwise agreed; 
also, art. 5 of the SFRY Constitution provides that the republics' 
boundaries cannot be changed without their consent.345 
 
This was in particular in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The principle of 
uti possidetis was given a regional character and was extended to have internal 
territorial application. Cassese remarks that, the Banditer Commission ‘relating to 
Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina, applied the doctrine as having a universal and not 
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only a regional purport’.346 Consequently, the doctrine possesses a fluidity that stems 
from its character based on consent and agreement. The commission approached 
the right to self-determination as an unclear concept. Consent as a constitutional 
requirement for the alteration of the SFRY borders was then utilised to indicate 
common purpose to introduce the doctrine of uti possidetis. 
 
The principle of self-determination initially seems to contradict the general purpose of 
uti possidetis. Self-determination is a composite of the rights to internal and external 
self-determination. The judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court in the Quebec 
case ruled that the right to external self-determination is only activated once there is 
a denial of internal self-determination.347 Wallace reflects this position in her 
summary on the Quebec case by concluding that:  
It was also noted that no right of external self-determination would be 
recognised when full participation in civil and political life is available, 
namely internal self-determination, which may be interpreted as the right of 
a minority to pursue political, economic, social, and cultural development, 
within the framework of an existing State.348 
 
If this reasoning on self-determination is followed then uti possidetis is reconcilable 
with internal self-determination. This is because internal self-determination does not 
relate to the disruption of state boundaries. However, external self-determination 
would contradict uti possidetis. Ratner reminds us that ‘When a new state is formed, 
its territory ought not to be irretrievably predetermined but should form an element of 
the goal of maximal internal self-determination’.349 In contrast to this Johanson 
argues that uti possidetis does not constitute a rule or principle of international law 
and as such, ‘it cannot legally be understood to limit the principle of self-
determination or reduce its effect to nothing’.350 Even the ICJ, in the Case 
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Concerning the Frontier Dispute, felt that it was not necessary to ‘show that this is a 
firmly established principle of international law where decolonisation is concerned’.351 
The ICJ re-affirmed that the uti possidetis’ application on the African continent should 
not been seen as the emergence of a practice establishing a rule under customary 
international law.352 The court found that the adoption of the principle to respect 
colonial administrative boundaries as the new state boundaries was latent in many 
African declarations. This affirms the character of uti possidetis as a legal 
phenomenon based on consent and agreement.   
 
The right to secede stands in stark contrast to uti possidetis. Uti possidetis is 
directed towards the retention of the territorial status quo and maintenance of peace 
and security. The right to secede could consequently be perceived as a threat to the 
purpose of uti possidetis. Ratner however argues that, ‘uti possidetis is agnostic on 
whether or not secessions or breakups should occur and is not simply the legal 
embodiment of a policy condemning them’.353 It appears that the doctrine would still 
have consequences for the enjoyment of a right to secede. 
 
Ratner further argues, that ‘By hiding behind inflated notions of uti possidetis, state 
leaders avoid engaging the issue of territorial adjustments – even minor ones – 
which is central to the process of self-determination’.354 The doctrine of uti possidetis 
primarily contemplates the retention of colonial borders after emancipation from 
colonial rule, but does not factor in the on the ground realities of a territory. Ironically, 
the right to self-determination has the decolonisation process to thank for its 
development into an erga omnes norm of international law. The application of the 
doctrine can be said to be limited to the decolonisation period. It is in the application 
of the doctrine to the dissolution of Yugoslavia  where problems is encountered. 
Firstly, the borders that were in dispute were internal federal boundaries. Secondly, 
the application of uti possidetis, alone, cannot be said to create international legal 
personality. The application of the doctrine to internal federal borders was based on 
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a presumption that these federal states would become independent. The reasoning 
behind this presumption lies in the fact that the Yugoslavian federation broke down 
before it dissolved. Slovenia and Croatia declaring their independence at the time, 
serves as evidence of this.  
 
Further, uti possidetis is based on the maintenance of the status quo, and the 
creation of new states is beyond its operation. Buchanan persuasively remarks that 
‘There is nothing in international legal doctrine or practice, and certainly nothing in 
the concept of a federation, that imputes a presumptive right to independence to 
federal units’.355 This said the doctrine remains based on consent and agreement. 
Although its application to Yugoslavia seems novel, consent and agreement still 
governed its adoption. In the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute, the ICJ alluded 
to the inherent contradictions between uti possidetis and other international norms – 
such as self-determination. The court remarked: 
Thus the principle of uti possidetis has kept its place among the most 
important legal principles, despite the apparent contradiction which 
explained its coexistence alongside the new norms implied. 
 
The ICJ stressed that the operation of the doctrine in Africa was a ‘deliberate 
choice’.356 Further, the court suggested that uti possidetis ‘has induced African 
States judiciously to consent to the respecting of colonial frontiers, and to take 
account of it in the interpretation of the principle of self-determination of peoples’.357 
This highlights the character of the doctrine of consent and agreement.  
 
Consequently, international law needs to adopt an interpretation of self-
determination that is cognisant of uti possidetis. The doctrine might be argued to be 
dormant or not to have survived the decolonisation period. However, its relevance to 
the process of secession and the manifestation of self-determination is clear. The 
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contradictions between uti possidetis, self-determination, and secession are 
noticeable. The solution to these contradictions is twofold. The first is present within 
the character of consent and agreement. If the doctrine finds application via consent 
and agreement, then its results can also be altered through the same process. 
However, within the contexts of a secessionist movement, the contracting parties 
would most likely not be the secessionist. The second is the approach suggested by 
the ICJ in the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. In the interpretation of the 
rights to self-determination and secession, the doctrine needs to be considered. Just 
as the right to secede has been adopted into national constitutions so has the right to 
self-determination. Below the nature of self-determination and its potential for a right 
to secede is investigated from this domestic perspective. 
 
4 5 A Constitutional Right to Self-determination 
In the previous chapter, the manifestation of the right to secede was analysed within 
the context of constitutional dispensations.358 Similarly, the focus in this section is on 
the constitutional inclusion of the right to self-determination. As was highlighted 
above, that the right to secede forms an integrated part of the right to self-
determination. Where the right to self-determination has a constitutional presence, 
the potential of secession cannot be excluded in principle. If the will of peoples is 
expressed in the form of external self-determination, a legitimate right to secede 
could potentially be activated. In the preceding chapter, it was equally found that 
domestic recognition of the right to secede enhanced the normative character of the 
right. The domestic recognition of the right in turn endows it with legal functionality. 
The test utilised to identify legal functionality, consisted of a search for the 
substantive and procedural nature of the right. Although not all of the examples of a 
constitutional right to secede presented a substantive and/or procedural character, 
they still contributed in promoting its legal functionality. In support of such an 
approach, Weller suggests the concept of ‘Constitutional Self-determination’.359 
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Weller contrasts constitutional self-determination with colonial self-determination in 
his exposition of the concept. He argues that the fundamental differences between 
these concepts are that with colonial self-determination ‘the right to secession is 
based directly in international law’.360 Colonial self-determination is premised on the 
argument that the right to self-determination is limited to the decolonisation project. 
In addition, colonial self-determination has been argued to be the only form of the 
right to self-determination. Constitutional inclusion of the right to self-determination 
provides for a de facto recognition of the right outside the decolonisation process. 
However, the application of the right would be limited to the domestic jurisdiction. 
With constitutional self-determination, ‘the claim for self-determination is derived 
from a constitutional arrangement that establishes a separate legal personality for 
component parts of the overall state’.361  
 
Constitutional recognition of the right to self-determination is not foreign. The South 
African constitution362 for example, in section 235 expressly gives recognition to the 
peoples’ right of self-determination.363 Although the South African Constitutional 
Court limited the interpretation of self-determination to the formation of organs of civil 
society,364 the right is still subjected to the constitution’s international law rule, 
present under section 233. Read together with this provision is section 39 (1) (b) 
which places the courts under an obligation to consider international law when 
interpreting the constitution. This position was confirmed in Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom (hereinafter the Grootboom case)365 which 
confirmed the approach towards international law that was established in S v 
Makwanyane (hereinafter the Makwanyane case).366 In the Makwanyane case the 
court concluded that the provision which was to become section 39 (1) (b) found 
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international law to include binding and non-binding international law.367 In the 
Grootboom case, the court confirmed the principle laid down in the Makwanyane 
case, but a proviso was attached. The honourable Constitutional Court Judge 
Yacoob stated although international law is a tool of interpretation the weight to be 
attached to each principle of international law will vary.368, 
 
Section 233 of the South African constitution places a legal duty on the courts to 
interpret any legislation including the constitution to be consistent with international 
law. In Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa369 judgment, the South 
African Constitutional Court concluded that all legislation, including the constitution 
together with its bill of rights needs to be interpreted in accordance with section 233. 
The court’s deliberate move to exclude the employment of the right for secessionist 
aspiration is reflected where it states that:  
The concept ‘self-determination’ is circumscribed both by what is stated to 
be the object of self-determination, namely, ‘forming, joining and 
maintaining organs of civil society’ as well as by Constitutional Principle I 
which requires the state for which the Constitution has to provide, to be 
‘one sovereign state’. In this context ‘self-determination’ does not embody 
any notion of political independence or separateness.370 
 
In the South African context some conflicting ideas exists with regard to the right to 
self-determination. The South African Constitutional Court limited the interpretation 
of the right to exclude the potential of secession. International law does not expressly 
prohibit secession as an outcome of the expression of the right to external self-
determination. On the contrary, it could be argued that international law recognises 
the right to external self-determination and potentially the right to secede. The South 
African constitution places a constitutional duty on the courts to follow a reasonable 
interpretation of any legislation, which in this case would be the constitution self, ‘that 
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is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is 
inconsistent with international law’ under section 233 of the South African 
Constitution. Important distinctions are however present within the South African 
constitutional dispensation. In Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa, 
the Constitutional Court elaborated on these distinctions eloquently in that firstly, 
section 233 is only limited to the interpretation of legislation; secondly, that section 
39(1)(b) places an obligation on South African courts to consider international law 
strictly in the interpretation of the Bill of Right only and thirdly that section 37(4)(b)(i) 
requires that legislation which is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights be consistent with 
South Africa’s international obligations during states of emergency.371 The right to 
self-determination, as such, has not been tested by the South African courts yet. A 
further exploration of examples of constitutional rights to self-determination will serve 
to inform the concept. 
 
Weller suggests the existence of three different types of constitutional self-
determination. These are ‘express self-determination status’; ‘effective dissolution of 
a federal-type state’ and ‘implied self-determination status’.372 Under express self-
determination status, the right to self-determination or secession is a specifically 
mentioned right within the constitution. The South African example, discussed 
above, serves as an example of this. Weller states that ‘Ordinarily, constitutional self-
determination will assign a right of secession only to federal-type territorial units (…) 
that are clearly defined in terms of territory’.373 Thus, the possibility that the 
constitutional right to self-determination could give rise to a right to secede would 
only exist within a federal system. Examples of this form of constitutional self-
determination are present in the constitutions of the former USSR, SFRY and 
Ethiopia as discussed in chapter 3.374 
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Interestingly Weller also proposes a sub-category of express self-determination or 
‘conditional self-determination’.375 Under conditional self-determination, an express 
provision of a constitution provides for self-determination under specific conditions. 
An example of such a provision is the constitutional conditions for the potential 
division of the Republic of Moldova. The relevant provision is accommodated in the 
‘The Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia’; in article 1(1) it is stated that: 
In case of a change of status of the Republic of Moldova as an 
independent state, the people of Gagauzia shall have the right to external 
self-determination.376 
 
Weller argues that the ‘The change that is being contemplated is a possible division 
of Moldova, with its larger segment potentially joining Romania’.377 The activation of 
the right to secede is delayed pending the fulfilment of the constitutional condition. 
However, in reality the Moldovan government does not have a positive record of 
accomplishment in supporting external self-determination, as the above provisions 
would indicate.378 Conditional self-determination seems to be a more preferred 
manner for the right to secede to find constitutional application. Secession becomes 
a direct possibility where the condition is fulfilled.  
 
The second type of constitutional self-determination proposed is effective dissolution 
of a federal-type state. The former SFRY and USSR also serves as examples in this 
regard. It is vital to distinguish between a single state within the federation employing 
the right to secede (express self-determination) and all the member states using it 
because of the dissolution of the federation. The relevant issue is whether the 
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inclusion of a right to self-determination in the federal constitution gave rise to a right 
to secede automatically upon dissolution of the federation. If the constituting states 
were the holders of original sovereignty, then a strong argument could be made that 
secession was not at play. 
 
In order to imply self-determination, according to Weller requires three aspects, 
firstly, a distinct people or nation; secondly, constitutional muteness on the right to 
self-determination and a thirdly, a defined constitutional territory. The issue of 
secession under the banner of self-determination would then be subjected to 
government consent or cooperation as well as a process of referendum. Weller 
explains that: 
Where the central government consents to the holding of a referendum on 
the issue of secession, or where such provision exists according to the 
constitution in the absence of an express reference to self-determination, 
there is an expectation that such a referendum would need to be 
respected by the central authorities.379 
 
According to Weller,380 Quebec serves as an example of this. Quebec has distinct 
peoples, the territory enjoys constitutional recognition as part of the federal state, 
and the Canadian constitution is mute on the issue of self-determination. The 
Canadian Supreme Court acknowledged that a referendum would provide for 
democratic legitimacy as to the will of the people to secede or not.381 However, the 
court found a referendum to determine disintegration not to be sufficient and 
‘superficially persuasive’.382 The Canadian Supreme Court suggested that something 
more is required and that the original constitution making process provides this 
answer. The court presents two possibilities, firstly that the Quebec authorities 
initiate a constitutional amendment at the federal level to provide for their 
                                                 
379
 Weller (n 357) 39. 
380
 Weller also suggests that Scotland would serve as an example for implied self-determination 
status. However, the UK does not have a drafted down constitution. The concept of implied self-
determination as a sub-division of constitutional self-determination cannot find application within the 
context of Scotland.   
381
 Quebec case (n 25) 87. 
382
 ibid. 75. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
118 
 
secession.383 The second is that a constitutional obligation to negotiate exists and 
accordingly this process should rather be followed.384 The court concluded that: 
Quebec could not, despite a clear referendum result, purport to invoke a 
right of self-determination to dictate the terms of a proposed secession to 
the other parties to the federation.385  
 
Weller submits that the process of a referendum would lend international legitimacy 
to independence if the outcome were independence.386 In relation to the legitimacy 
of the referendum, the court concluded that ‘At issue is not the legality of the first 
step but the legality of the final act of purported unilateral secession’.387 Implied self-
determination status seems to be premised on establishing a right to self-
determination that is inherent within all constitutions. However, constitutions remain 
creatures of their authors and not popular will. The suggestion that the outcome of a 
referendum tacitly incorporates the right to self-determination into a constitution 
carries little legal weight.  
 
4 6 Concluding Remarks 
The continued resistance against an operative right to secede is found to be based 
on two primary assumptions. Firstly, legal scholars and political commentators alike, 
assume that the recognition of a complete right to secede under international law 
would lead to the proliferation of new smaller states. Ratner comments that ‘First, I 
assume that the proliferation of states, each smaller and more ethnically based than 
that from which it emerged, is not desirable’.388 The second assumption is that the 
rights of minorities within the seceding territory would be relentlessly denied. 
Horowitz follows this reasoning in that ‘The more circumscribed the asserted right to 
secede, ironically enough, the more dangerous conditions may become for minorities 
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in the secessionist region’.389 These pre-emptive assumptions make the alliance 
between the right to secede and self-determination even more imperative. These 
assumptions amount to mere generalisations and do not reflect a general 
consequence of the right to secede. The right to self-determination is populated by 
similar assumptions and generalisations. 
 
The classical perspective on self-determination has been that it leads to the 
destruction of statehood and fragmentation of nationalist aspiration. However, the 
development of the principle has transformed these views. The research presented 
above indicates that the relationship between the right self-determination and a right 
to secede is inherently integrated. The right to self-determination is a concept that 
has at its core the will of the people. These expressions inform the right to secede. 
The right to secede finds exclusive application within a people’s will to express 
external self-determination. However, the variations and interpretations under which 
the  right can be expressed are broad. Secession is but only one option amongst 
many. However, it can be conclusively concluded that the potential for the right to 
secede flowing from an expression of a peoples’ will to external self-determination is 
real. 
 
Within the context of the UN Charter, self-determination was entrenched seemingly 
as a right of states and governments. However, due to the development of the right a 
better legal understanding of the principle exists today. Self-determination should be 
interpreted progressively within the context of the UN Charter to include a peoples’ 
right. This is also, what the ICJ did in the Western Sahara case390 and the South 
West Africa case391 The ICJ did not allude to this expressly; however, the court 
presumed that the developed version of self-determination should be followed by 
implication. The right to self-determination, in this regard, provides the practical 
partnership that could strengthen a right to secede.  
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Further, it is concluded that territorial integrity is not an absolute bar to the exercise 
of external self-determination. The potential of exercising a right to secede could 
overcome the obstacle that the respect for territorial integrity poses. The research 
revealed two findings, which dictate the relationship between self-determination and 
territorial integrity. Firstly, national unity premised on the ideals of nationalism as the 
traditional justification for respect for territorial integrity, has failed. It is this 
justification that can also be held liable for the proliferation of secessionist 
entrepreneurs. Contrary, territorial integrity remains indispensable to the 
maintenance of peace and security. Importantly where self-determination reveals 
itself as a peoples’ right, the principle of territorial integrity protects that state’s 
interest. The role of territorial integrity as a custodian of the continuance of the 
Westphalian order is therefore threatened by the very notion that it aims to promote 
– nationalism.  
 
Secondly, international law has qualified the enjoyment of territorial integrity. The 
development of self-determination into an erga omnes norm of international law 
provides this qualification. For a state to have full control over its territorial integrity, it 
needs to possess a legitimate government. The legitimacy of the state is premised 
on its recognition of internal self-determination. This broadly means that the state 
gives effect to the internal civil, political, cultural and economic rights of peoples. 
Where a state commits gross human rights violations, the absolute integrity of its 
territory would be difficult to uphold. This provides a positive argument for the 
application of a right to remedial secession within this context. 
 
With the discussion above two themes became clear, with the operation of the 
doctrine of uti possidetis towards self-determination. Firstly, Uti possidetis does not 
contradict self-determination in general. Internal self-determination is reconcilable 
with the doctrine. External self-determination presents a challenge however. 
Secondly, although international law recognises the doctrine of uti possidetis it 
cannot be said to be a stronger norm of international law than self-determination. 
The doctrine finds application with consent and agreement. Norms of international 
law remain operational even where they are not consented. They develop through 
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statute, treaty and state practice. Self-determination has acquired this status under 
international law. Uti possidetis only finds application where consent is given. In the 
Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute, the ICJ explained that the adoption of the 
doctrine in Africa was deliberate. The Palestinian Wall case re-affirmed the erga 
omnes character of the right to self-determination as confirmed in the East Timor 
case.392 A legitimate argument that uti possidetis can limit the right to self-
determination under contemporary international law is contestable. 
  
Under the concept of constitutional self-determination, express self-determination will 
give effect to this position. Where the right is expressed, it lends itself to legal 
certainty. The development and operation of the right can also be limited by special 
conditions or enhanced through a constitutional amendment. The concept of 
Effective dissolution self-determination indicates that the end of every federation, 
automatically transform member states into independent sovereign states. The 
deficiency of this theory lies within its inability to explain the origins of the newly 
found sovereignty. This creates application problems. The examples of the breakups 
of the USSR and SFRY showed that the theory could not be consistently applied. 
The concept of implied self-determination can easily be dismissed because it 
purports to suggest that inherent in all constitutions is a right to self-determination. 
The theory omits the fact that constitutions are social contracts and without a guiding 
constitutional principle to this effect, the theory fails in this context. An inherent 
constitutional right to self-determination is admirable; however, the operation of self-
determination towards secession is best served under international law. 
Consequently, constitutional inclusion promotes internal self-determination, because 
the entrenched constitutional rights should inform it. However, external self-
determination finds a legitimate position under international law. 
 
The moral justification for self-determination is directly linked to the system of 
statehood, nationalism and national unity. A clearly defined legal right to secede 
cannot be declared non-existent, only based on it being inoperative under 
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international law. An approach that seeks to view secession as a competing right or 
a subsidiary right to self-determination, is premised on misconceptions. The 
continued passiveness of international law in dealing with secession has not 
altogether derailed the issue. Secession attempts are still on going around the world 
with active separatist movements. The only resort for a secessionist with a clearly 
defined general theory or positive entitlement to secede is unilateral conduct. The 
following chapter will seek to answer the question whether the normative character 
of a right to secede influences unilateralism. 
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5 Unilateral Secession 
 
5 1 Introduction 
The parameters of unilateralism as discussed in this chapter are limited to the 
context of unilateral secession. The issue of unilateral secession is analysed from 
the perspective of the Kosovo Opinion. The unilateral nature of the declaration for 
independence is investigated in light of the above decision. Of particular interest are 
the court’s reasons for avoiding the discussion on the right to secede and secession 
in general. This missed opportunity, to bring clarity to the existence and scope of the 
right to secede is critically evaluated. The chapter reviews the court's logic in taking a 
narrow approach to the interpretation of the legal question posed by the UNGA. 
Furthermore, the principle of self-determination intrinsically seems to suggest that 
singular action need to be central to initiating the right. Unilateral conduct thus 
cannot be excluded. 
 
This chapter completes the discussion on the prescriptive nature of the right to 
secede. In chapter 3, it was confirmed that secession is a process. In the same 
chapter, it was presented that the most effective path to secession would be claim, 
effective control and finally recognition. Through the element of recognition the 
secessionists seeks external legitimacy for their unilateralism. This also satisfies the 
final requirement for statehood as express under the Montevideo Convention – the 
ability to enter into external relations with other states. Whether secession is via 
mutual consent or unilateral, other states have to be informed of the formation of a 
new entity. A declaration of independence provides this vehicle. In the context of 
unilateral secession, the unilateral declaration of independence is the mechanism 
employed. This final chapter aims at contributing to a general understanding of 
unilateralism and secession, coupled with a specific inquiry into the unilateral 
declaration of independence and the right to secede.  
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The analysis furthermore aims to elucidate the effect and binding force of unilateral 
acts especially in the context of a right to secede. Cassese suggests that ‘Not all 
unilateral acts give rise to new binding rules providing for specific conduct, not 
predetermined in its content’.393 The consequence of this is that there is no principled 
rule governing unilateralism under international law and an ad hoc approach is 
followed. This chapter seeks to establish a unified position on the nature and effect 
of unilateralism and a right to secede. Unilateral acts cannot be ignored for the 
absence of consent or cooperation. Cassese remarks that ‘Indeed, most unilateral 
acts produce other legal effects’.394 This chapter exposes two imperative aspects of 
the unilateral declaration. Firstly, that the unilateral character of the declaration does 
not prohibit it from having legal effect. Secondly, that even though the declaration is 
politically charged, because it possesses legal effect it can be tested against 
international law by a competent judicial body like the ICJ.  
 
As discussed above, it is clear that a right to external self-determination is 
recognised by international law. Customary international law points to three different 
circumstances under which international law would condone unilateral conduct in 
pursuit of external self-determination. The general criteria would be where peoples 
are denied the possibility of internal self-determination. More specifically, a right to 
external self-determination would be open to peoples where there has been a 
persistent onslaught on them by a government, which has denied them their 
fundamental human rights. The process of disintegration of a part of the territory of 
the oppressive state would constitute remedial secession. Remedial secession then 
becomes the consequence of this expression of external self-determination. 
 
5 2 The Kosovo Opinion 
5 2 1 Background 
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Kosovo was recognised under the Yugoslavian Constitution as an autonomous 
member of the federation between 1974 and 1989. With the death of Tito,395 Serbian 
President Slobodan Milosevic ascended to power within the Yugoslavian federation. 
In the late 1980’s Milosevic incorporated Kosovo into the Serbian territory via 
amendments to the constitution, he effectively and unilaterally stripping the province 
of all autonomy. Under the SFRY constitution, Kosovo enjoyed full representative 
authority within the federal parliament similar to the constituent republics. Kosovo 
also had the capacity within the rotating collective presidency of the federation. 
Slovenia and Croatia feared the rising power of Serbia within the federation and 
moved to propose a new constitution, which was fiercely opposed by Serbia. The 
breakdown in negotiations between these mentioned states, led to Croatia and 
Slovenia declaring their independence respectively on the 25 and 26 of June 1991. 
Serbia responded to this by using armed force against the territories of the 
separatist. The international community responded with passivity and only 
denounced the conduct of Serbia under the flag of the federal forces. The continued 
attacks on Kosovo’s autonomy eventually led them to declare independence. This 
move led to an international crisis forcing North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(hereinafter NATO) to intervene in the form of aerial strikes against the territory of 
Serbia and the Kosovo regions.  
 
In the aftermath of the conflict, Kosovo was placed under temporary UN 
administration. UN Security Council (hereinafter UNSC) Resolution 1244396 was the 
legal authority used to place Kosovo under UN and NATO administration. Resolution 
1244 led to the establishment of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo 
(hereinafter UNMIK). UNMIK then setup a form of government named the 
Provisional Institutions for the Self-government of Kosovo.  
  
In reflection on the situation in Kosovo, Weller declared that, ‘Kosovo made manifest 
the discovery that states cannot claim rights and privileges that exceed or destroy 
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those of their constituents, the people’.397 He makes the point that state power is 
transferred to the state via the peoples’ will and that ‘If creating a state is an act of 
will of its constituents, then leaving the state on the basis of an act of will should also 
be possible’.398 This contention is reconcilable with the argument made in chapter 4 
that self-determination is inherent within all state formation. Further, that as a starting 
point the expression of self-determination needs to be based on the peoples’ will. 
This is the reasoning behind the second declaration of independence of Kosovo. On 
the 17th of February 2008, the unofficial government399 of Kosovo, unilaterally 
declared their independence from the Republic of Serbia. The situation in the UNSC 
was marred by suppressions in dealing with the situation, because of qualifying 
states exercising their veto rights. This eventually forced the UNGA to seek the 
opinion of the ICJ. The request for an advisory opinion by the ICJ was formulated 
under UNGA Resolution 63/3.400 The question to the ICJ by posed by the UNGA was 
phrased in the following manner: ‘Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with 
international law?’401  
 
The Kosovo situation provided the ICJ with an opportunity to develop the right to 
self-determination beyond the colonial context. The court could also have provided 
clarity with regard to the uncertainty over the exercise of a remedial right to secede. 
The people of Kosovo could have been considered an oppressed and marginalised 
minority within a state. The Serbian state’s conduct was a clear denial of the Kosovo 
peoples’ right to internal self-determination and a violation of their human rights. In 
the absence of the colonial context, the court could have brought clarity on the 
relationship between a right to secede and self-determination. More specifically, the 
development of the right to self-determination into an erga omnes norm of 
international law placed a duty on the court to address the legal status of the people 
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of Kosovo. In the Barcelona Traction case,402 the ICJ stated that obligations erga 
omnes are in essence ‘the concern of all States’.403 However, the court did not 
extend this obligation to itself. As discussed above the denial of internal self-
determination opens the door for the realisation of the right to external self-
determination under certain circumstances. Whether, external self-determination is 
expressed, as an aspiration for full independence is only one option of the many 
available under this norm. 
 
5 2 2 Scope of the Advisory Opinion 
The Provisional Institutions of Self-government of Kosovo submitted to the court that 
a narrow interpretation of the legal question was prudent. They argued that moving 
beyond the question whether the specific declaration breached international law was 
over-reaching on the part of the ICJ.404 Serbia and the states in support of the 
illegality of the declaration, argued for broad interpretation of the legal question. A 
broad interpretation of the legal question could have included how international law 
positions itself relative to the right to remedial secession, the legitimacy of unilateral 
declarations of independence and the related impact on the right to external self-
determination.  
 
It can be argued that the court’s judgment promotes secession. However, the ICJ 
expressly addressed the potential of such an interpretation of its reasoning and 
conclusion. The court held that a debate into the position of secession or even the 
right to self-determination was beyond the scope of the question posed by the 
UNGA.405 The ICJ found that, ‘the Court need only determine whether the 
declaration of independence violated either general international law or the lex 
specialis, created by UNSC Resolution 1244.406 The focus, in the court's opinion, 
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should be on whether either general international law or UNSC Resolution 1244 
prohibited the unilateral declaration of independence. 
 
The court stated that no evidence could be found that general international law 
prohibits unilateral declarations of independence.407 On the contrary, with reference 
to the ICJ case law on the right to self-determination408 the court mentions the 
development of a right to independence existing under international law.409 In the 
court’s own words, the development of the right to self-determination gave rise to the 
creation of ‘a right to independence for the people of non-self-governing territories 
and peoples subjected to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation’.410 The 
court’s interpretation of this right to independence seems to be limited to the colonial 
regimes. This would have exhausted the right to independence because no colonies 
exist anymore. Ryngaert agrees with this reasoning, when he argues that: 
According to the Court, there is a positive right to independence within the 
framework of the right to self-determination in a colonial context. Outside 
this scenario, international law would remain silent about the legality of 
unilateral declarations of independence (in the sense that international 
protest and condemnation did not ensue).411 
 
Some commentators has criticised this fundamental point, whether Kosovo can be 
regarded as a state, in addressing its unilateral conduct. The bases of these 
arguments are that international law is concerned with state conduct, as states are 
the primary subject under international law. As a proponent of this view, Ryngeart 
argues that: 
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Since in a process of secession, entities that are not (yet) constituted as 
states secede from an existing state (albeit with a view of state formation), 
such a process does not belong to the sphere of inter-state relations. 
Consequently, the principle of territorial integrity does not apply, and 
international law may not prohibit secession.412  
 
This reasoning seems to be flawed in that states are not the exclusive subjects of 
international law. Recent times have seen the proliferation of non-state actor on the 
international field. The respect for territorial integrity as pronounced within the UN 
charter and other international legal sources do not seem to suggest that it is 
exclusively a prohibition relating to inter-state relations. Consequently, the point is 
moot. In conclusion the scope of the advisory opinion was limited to the narrow legal 
question, whether the unilateral declaration was in violation of either general 
international law or UNSC Resolution 1244. However, other legal issues arose out of 
this position by the court further addressed below.  
 
5 2 3 Legal Issues 
From the first instance, the court in the Kosovo Opinion made it clear that the legal 
question was limited. The court opposed an interpretation of the question that 
favoured the inclusion on whether international law in general affords Kosovo a right 
to secede.413 This stated, the court however did mention that: 
Indeed, it is entirely possible for a particular act ⎯ such as a unilateral 
declaration of independence ⎯ not to be in violation of international law 
without necessarily constituting the exercise of a right conferred by it.414 
 
The court sought to separate the legality of a positive legal entitlement like a right to 
secede, from the specific act of declaring independence. Conversely, the court pre-
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emptively aimed at avoiding that the judgement be interpreted as a justification for 
the existence of a unilateral right to secede. However, the unilateral declaration of 
independence needs to be motivated by a legal norm that endows it with legal 
relevance.  
 
In the court’s conclusion, two aspects were highlighted, indicating that there is no 
general rule of international law that is directed at prohibiting a unilateral declaration 
of independence. Firstly, that there is a lack of uniformed state practice in dealing 
with past declarations of independence. This does not indicate the development of a 
rule prohibiting declarations of independence. This would be in accordance with 
Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ that recognises state practice as a source of 
international law. Secondly, from the status of previous denouncements of specific 
unilateral declarations of independence by the UNSC resolutions no general 
prohibition can be derived. The reasoning behind this, in the court's opinion was that 
those resolutions did not condemn the unilateral nature of the declarations, but the 
conduct that violated other fundamental rules of international law that was linked to 
the declarations. 
 
The issues of UN membership for states who came about via unilateral secession 
are an illustration of this. In particular, Bangladesh serves as a good example. 
Bangladesh was denied membership of the UN up until Pakistan recognised its 
sovereignty in 1974.415 The opposition to Bangladesh’s membership of the UN, after 
its assisted secession416 from Pakistan was mainly because of none compliance with 
UNGA Resolution 2793.417 This resolution called for Bangladesh to recall troops 
stationed at the borders with Pakistan. Efevwerhan makes the point that: 
Although, the UN is guided by the traditional requirements of statehood in 
admission of new members, many entities have been denied membership 
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due to their mode of creation rather than failure to meet the requirements 
of statehood.418 
 
The judgement is ambiguous in dealing with the real legal issues at play in Kosovo. 
The court’s avoidance in positively reflecting on the issue of unilateral secession led 
to both sides claiming victory from the judgement. The problem lies in the conclusion 
that although international law does not expressly prohibit unilateral declarations of 
independence, it also does not directly accommodate it.  
 
5 3 Unilateralism and Secession 
5 3 1 The Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
The Canadian politician Stephane Dion419 wrote an open letter to the Quebec Deputy 
Premier – Bernard Landry, in August of 1997 entitled ‘Chaos and dangers would 
follow a unilateral declaration’. The objective of the letter was to address three issues 
relating to Quebec’s proposed secession from Canada. These were; majority rule, 
the question of territory and the consequences of a unilateral declaration of 
independence. In dealing with the third issue, Dion stated the following: 
I noted the absence of any legal principle, international or otherwise, that 
would create a right to a unilateral declaration of independence in a 
democratic country such as Canada.420 
 
Dion concluded, ‘We believe that the position we are defending before the court is in 
accordance not only with international law, but also with international practice’.421 
This statement identifies a fundamental misperception underlining the relationship 
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between a unilateral declaration of independence, secession and the right to secede. 
Dion’s supposition is flawed in suggesting that a unilateral declaration of 
independence needs to be a right or that it is a right. Dion however, is correct in his 
concluding assertion that no legal authority exists to support the creation of a right to 
a unilateral declaration of independence. This is true because international law does 
not recognise a right to a unilateral declaration of independence. Another right must 
then give rise to the legitimate access to the declaration. 
 
The legitimacy of the declaration of independence cannot depend on an uncertain 
right to secede. Rather it should be because of the right that the statement carries 
legitimacy. In the absence of the right or bilateralism, secession can still be effected 
via unilateralism. In the Quebec case, the Canadian Supreme Court conceded to the 
possibility of unilateral secession being legitimate, however only subject to the denial 
of internal self-determination and recognition. The court declared that ‘It may be that 
a unilateral secession by Quebec would eventually be accorded legal status by 
Canada and other states, and thus give rise to legal consequences’.422  
 
Recognition is the final step in the process of secession. The declaration of 
independence becomes the mechanism, which the secession process employs to 
provide external expression of independence. Does the unilateral nature of the 
declaration then deprive it of legal consequence? The court, in the Kosovo case 
opinion expressly denounced the fact that it would be a right to secede that would 
the source of the unilateral secession. The court was cognisant of the point made in 
the beginning that a right must give rise to the declaration and not the other way 
round. In the wording of the court:  
[T]his does not support the more radical contention that subsequent 
recognition of a state of affairs brought about by a unilateral declaration of 
independence could be taken to mean that secession was achieved under 
colour of a legal right.423  
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In effect, with this statement the court identified the unilateral declaration of 
independence as the mechanism, which proclaims the process of secession. The 
Canadian Supreme Court prioritised recognition as a requirement in order for legal 
consequences to follow. The court however does not substantiate its position as to 
why independence cannot be achieved via a right to secede. One can follow an 
objective reading of the courts ultimate reasoning and conclude that it was based on 
constitutional incompatibility. In proposing a constitutional amendment or 
negotiation424 as the constitutional path for dealing with the secession issue, the 
court in effect excluded unilateralism. The unilateral declaration of independence 
would then have no domestic effect. Rather it could be argued, on a domestic level, 
that the issue is political and consequently a political negotiated settlement should be 
sought. Ironically, it can be concluded that it would be the legal right to secede that 
would give the domestic court jurisdiction over the matter. 
 
If the conclusion of the Canadian Supreme Court is followed, if not under a right then 
under which legal norm does secession manifest? The declaration is a legal 
expression to the external world and cannot be void of a legal consequence. A 
legally barren declaration would be akin to the Tennessee declaration of 
independence of 1861, described by Brandon as: 
It was a simple statement, as if for consumption from the inside. It 
contained no argument. It opened with a terse statement of the sources of 
its authority (‘we the people of the State of Tennessee’); it ‘abrogated and 
annulled’ all prior ‘laws and ordinances by which the State of Tennessee 
became a member of the Federal Union of the United States of America’; 
and it resumed all the rights, functions, and powers which (…) were 
conveyed to the Government of the United States.425 
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This statement speaks to two essential elements that are critical to the character of a 
unilateral declaration of independence. The first can be called the element of 
externality. The second, that legal norms need to be the underlining force legitimising 
the unilateral declaration. The element of externality relates to the statement being 
directed to the outside world. This reflects Brandon’s criticism of the declaration to be 
understated ‘as if for consumption from the inside’. In the Kosovo Opinion, the court 
also reflected on this element of externality. The court observed that: 
The declaration was written down on two sheets of papyrus and read out, 
voted upon and then signed by all representatives present. It was not 
transmitted to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and 
was not published in the Official Gazette of the Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government of Kosovo.426 
 
This is a clear indication that the court applied its mind to this element of externality. 
The primary rationale behind this element is the determination of whether the party 
making the statement wants to be legally bound by the statement. A legally binding 
statement to the outside world needs to be distinguished from a mere statement of 
opinion or symbolic gestures. Clause 12 of the translated Kosovo unilateral 
declaration, as present in the Kosovo Opinion reads, ‘We hereby affirm, clearly, 
specifically, and irrevocably, that Kosovo shall be legally bound to comply with the 
provisions contained in this Declaration’.427 The same clause confirms the assertion 
to be bound and it is linked to the element of externality in the following words, ‘We 
declare publicly that all states are entitled to rely upon this declaration’.428 The 
court’s inquiry into the identity of the authors of the declaration in the Kosovo 
Opinion, again serves as evidence to its observation of the element of externality. 
The unilateral nature of the declaration begs the question who wants to be bound. 
Consequently, an external, legally binding expression needs to be linked to the 
authority of the people making it. 
 
                                                 
426
 Kosovo case (n 4) para 76.  
427
 Ibid para 75. 
428
 ibid.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
135 
 
How does international law distinguish between a declaratory statement and a mere 
utterance? The relevance of this question lies in whether a state should be bound by 
a mere statement or not. This is important because a unilateral declaration seeks 
external legal consequences. Koskenniemi present this point in the following 
manner: 
Consequently, something else is needed than the establishment of what 
the State has willed to regard its statement as a binding unilateral 
declaration. What this ‘else’ is has been formulated in different ways. 
Common to these is the attempt to interpret a statement as a unilateral 
declaration only if it has been made publicly and/or so that other States 
have either relied or acted upon it or at least had the possibility of so 
doing. All this works to add an objective element in the interpretation of 
unilateral statements.429 
 
What can concluded from Koskenniemi’s statement is that objectivity in interpretation 
needs to be the result of such a unilateral statement for it to be binding. A test based 
on Koskenniemi’s reasoning for such objectivity would ask two questions. Firstly, 
was the unilateral statement made publicly and secondly did other states have the 
possibility to rely or act on it? The requirement that the statement be made publicly is 
again proof of the element of externality that follows the declaration. The possibility 
of reliance of other states on the declaration contributes to the decision on 
recognition. Moreover, it is recognition that the declaration aims at, to conclude the 
secession process. Recognition adds to the new entity’s character in attaining 
statehood. It satisfies the requirement of the ability to enter into relations with other 
states. The ‘something else’ that Koskenniemi refers to could be an underlining legal 
norm, but objectivity remains central to the character of the unilateral declaration. 
The subjected will of the declaring party, however needs to inform the objective 
interpretation of the party relying on the statement.  
 
                                                 
429
 M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The structure of international legal argument (Reissue 
with a new Epilogue, Cambridge University Press 2005) 348.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
136 
 
Above two elements, essential to the character of a unilateral declaration of 
independence were proposed. These are the elements of externality and the 
existence of an underlining legal norm. In reference to the second element, the use 
of the concept a legal norm is deliberate. It is not assumed that a right to secede is 
the only basis for effecting a legitimate declaration of independence. Outside a 
recognised right to secede, a unilateral declaration could still possess legal 
consequences. The South-Sudan unilateral declaration of independence was 
accompanied by six protocols dealing with various political and transitional issues. 
Although the protocols were based on prior agreements, they did not amount to an 
agreement to secede. The South-Sudan declaration of independence remained 
unilateral and the adoption of the protocols by the Republic of Sudan did not remove 
the unilateral nature of the declaration. Consequently, the unilateral declaration 
found its legitimacy in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement430 and ultimately a 
referendum that led to independence. In the Quebec case, the court also recognised 
this possibility of an effective unilateral declaration of independence outside of a right 
to secede. 431 The court stated:  
Although under the Constitution there is no right to pursue secession 
unilaterally, (…) this does not rule out the possibility of an unconstitutional 
declaration of secession leading to a de facto secession.432 
 
The initial observation should be that the court recognised that the unilateral 
declaration would be the mechanism bringing about the de facto secession. The 
Canadian Supreme court went further to conclude that ‘The ultimate success of a 
secession attempt would be dependent on effective control of a territory and 
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recognition by the international community’.433 These factors cannot serve to be the 
sole basis for legitimacy of the unilateral declaration of independence. However, they 
are reconcilable with the findings of the research so far in relation to the process of 
secession. The unilateral declaration seeks to make a statement of internal will and 
attach to it external expression in order for legal consequences to follow. A claim to 
secede would be naturally incorporated in such a unilateral statement. Effective 
control and recognition can only be contributory to the success of secession and only 
to the extent of establishing statehood, not the legitimacy of the declaration itself.  
 
Brownlie states that ‘In the enumeration contained in the Montevideo Convention, 
the concept of independence is represented by the requirement of capacity to enter 
into relations with other states’.434 This capacity needs to be free from outside 
interference. Dugard argues that, ‘If an entity is subjected to the authority of another 
state in the handling of its foreign affairs, it fails to meet this requirement and cannot 
be described as an independent state’.435 An example of such defective 
independence would be the Bantustans of apartheid South Africa. The international 
community collectively rejected the independence of these states that did not have 
the capacity to enter into relations with other states.436 This does not mean that 
interdependence between states always nullifies attempts for recognition. In 
comparison Liechtenstein, willingly transferred some of its independent capacity to 
Switzerland.437 In this situation the international community still accorded recognition 
to Liechtenstein due to the transparency of the relationship,. Even though it could be 
argued that, the unilateral character of the declaration burdens the potential of 
recognition. Contrary, an argument could hold that the unilateral nature of the 
declaration enhances the legitimacy of the new entity that seeks recognition.  
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How would the right to secede then find an application in the context of the unilateral 
declaration of independence? The right to secede is the positive legal entitlement 
that serves to justify the initiation of the process of unilateral secession. The 
unilateral declaration then becomes the mechanism via which use of the right is 
brought to the attention of the international community. The right would satisfy the 
second element of the proposition brought forward above – the underlining legal 
norm. The unilateral declaration of independence is consequently a form of external 
expression of the right to secede. The legitimacy of the right to secede cannot be 
detached from the legitimacy of the declaration; rather the right serves to enforce the 
declarations legal justification. An inquiry into the legality of the declaration 
consequently cannot be void from an inquiry into the right (legal norm). This general 
trend of criticism followed ICJ’s judgment in the Kosovo Opinion.438 Howse and Teitel 
reflect this view in their commentary on the dissenting judgement in the Kosovo 
Opinion by stating that: 
According to Simma, what the Court was really being challenged to do 
was to determine not simply whether such a declaration was prohibited or 
not under international law but rather the relevant international legal norms 
that should guide the conduct of the various actors in the wake of such a 
declaration. Simma’s approach is broadly consonant with the spirit of the 
Canadian Court’s decision: the concern that the process flowing from an 
expression of the will to secede by a particular group be guided by legal 
normativity.439 
 
This substantiates the earlier assertion that the second element of the declaration 
should be the presence of underlining legitimising legal norm. The right to secede 
seeks to be such a relevant international legal norm. The declaration of 
independence as an expression of the will to secede consequently needs to be 
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informed by the normative character of the right to secede. A recognised right to 
secede would then legally guide the execution of the aspiration for independence. 
The right to self-determination would then naturally also have the potential to be an 
appropriate norm. The right to internal self-determination will not be applicable to the 
declaration, because it contradicts the purpose of the declaration. The purpose of the 
declaration is expressing the will to be politically independent. The form, external 
self-determination, will however be applicable. Unilateral secession could then 
potential utilise a unilateral declaration based on the right to external self-
determination. It is unclear whether international law requires the norm to be 
included within the unilateral declaration. It is however accepted that a peoples’ will 
include their legal justification for unilateral secession within the wording of their 
declaration.   
 
In pursuing an understanding of the utility of the unilateral declaration of 
independence, it can be concluded that international law in general does not 
expressly prohibit or authorise a unilateral declaration. This was the conclusion of 
the ICJ also in the Kosovo Opinion.440 The court found that even in circumstances 
where declarations were declared unlawful by the UNSC, it was not because of their 
unilateral nature. Rather, the ICJ found the illegality of the declarations to stem: 
[F]rom the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the 
unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general 
international law, in particular those of a peremptory character.441 
 
One of the primary reasons for the non-recognition of a right to secede under 
international law resides in the potential of the right being exercised. Resorting to 
unilateralism consequently becomes inevitable. The potential for unilateralism is 
enhanced by the fact, that international law attaches legal consequences to such 
conduct. If a unilateral act such as a unilateral declaration of independence carries 
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legal consequences for other states, how does international law set the boundaries 
of those consequences?   
 
The unilateral nature of the declaration of independence does not prohibit the flow of 
legal consequences from such an expression. Consequently, the unilateral aspect of 
the declaration must not be equated with its legality. The ICJ stated in the Nuclear 
Test Case (Australia v France)442 that ‘It is well recognised that declarations made by 
way of unilateral acts concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of 
creating legal obligations’.443 This supports a proposition that where the declaration 
is pronounced on the bases of a perceived right to secede, legal consequences can 
still follow the act. Brownlie also makes this point by stating that ‘Acts and conduct of 
governments may not be directed towards the formation of agreements and yet are 
capable of creating effects in a great many ways’.444 In effect, all unilateral conduct 
potentially has legal impact. The unilateral nature of the act does not automatically 
nullify its legal legitimacy or the extent of its binding force on parties. Brownlie is 
more specific on this matter, suggesting that ‘The formation of customary rules and 
the law of recognition are two of the more prominent categories with the ‘unilateral’ 
acts of states’.445 A conclusion that provides evidence of that unilateral secession is 
not without legal effect. 
 
How then does unilateral conduct within  municipal jurisdiction find international law 
application? In the case of unilateral secession, a unilateral declaration needs to be 
affirmed over the territory where effective control is being exercised. This places the 
conduct within the domestic legal domain of the state that is losing territory. How can 
international law find applications over such a claim; the seceding territory is also not 
a recognised state yet? A similar question was argued before the ICJ in the Kosovo 
Opinion. The parties submitted that the unilateral declaration is without legal effect, 
but rather that there exists a domestic political issue. The court found that it did not 
have to engage constitutional law, because it would be beyond the scope of the legal 
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question before it. This contention would also fall beyond the course applicable 
sources. The court concluded that:   
In the present case, however, the Court has not been asked to give an 
opinion on whether the declaration of independence is in accordance with 
any rule of domestic law but only whether it is in accordance with 
international law.446 
 
The court judiciously found its way back to dealing with the unilateral declaration 
question, by arguing that it could apply international law to the issue without 
engaging domestic law. Specifically arguing that, ‘The Court can respond to that 
question by reference to international law without the need to enquire into any 
system of domestic law’.447 However, the unilateral conduct cannot so easily be 
severed from the domestic effect it will have. The court assumed that the domestic 
impact would be political in nature and did not regard this as a bar to tackle the legal 
question by applying international law. In fact, the court found it imperative that the 
political nature of the conduct should not impede its jurisdiction, where a clear legal 
question is present. The ICJ has previously pronounced on its approach to dealing 
with matters that have a political element to them. In the Advisory Opinion, 
Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal,448 the court declared that its capacity was prescribed by statute and not 
states. In the court’s own words, ‘The mere fact that it is not the rights of States 
which are in issue in the proceedings cannot suffice to deprive the Court of a 
competence expressly conferred on it by its Statute’.449 In the Kosovo Opinion, the 
court ruled that: 
Whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot refuse to respond to the 
legal elements of a question which invites it to discharge an essentially 
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judicial task, namely, in the present case, an assessment of an act by 
reference to international law.450 
 
Consequently, the boundaries which international law sets for the legal 
consequences that flow from a unilateral declaration are captured in the legal nature 
of the consequences themselves. This allows international law to have powers of 
adjudication over those legal consequences.  
 
Finally, two conclusions can be drawn from the perspective of international law on 
unilateral declarations of independence. Firstly, these are statements intended for 
external legal impact and from which binding legal consequences should flow. 
Secondly, these statements need to possess an element of externality and be based 
on an underlining legal norm. This norm can be based on a legal agreement or a 
positive legal entitlement. It is clear that a unilateral declaration of independence 
finds legal application under international law. It cannot be conclusively deduced that 
the right to secede will achieve legitimacy on the grounds of the legality of the 
unilateral declaration of independence. However, it does allow the right to have to be 
considered, where secessionist rely on it as the entitlement, giving rise to the 
declaration. Below this question is analysed from the perspective of the potential of a 
right to independence.   
 
5 3 2 A Right to Independence 
The declaration of independence as a legal phenomenon needs to be based on a 
legal norm. The declaration could be linked to the right to self-determination; 
however each instance needs to be evaluated separately. The more natural 
conclusion would be that the declaration is based on the right to independence. This 
consequently warrants an inquiry. The brief inquiry into a possible right to 
independence has two logical aspirations. The first is into the existence of such the 
right self. The second is, where it is found that the right has legal relevance naturally 
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it would serve as a potential legal norm to justify a unilateral declaration of 
independence.  
 
In the statement above by Dion, it was expressed that international law does not 
recognise a right to a unilateral declaration of independence.451 This contention was 
dismissed as being legally incorrect. Independence in this context relates to political 
independence. Political independence is normally a right that is for the benefit of 
states. An example contained is principle 1 of the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations452 which states that ‘Every State has the duty to refrain in its international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State’. The norm that needs to underline the unilateral 
declaration will have to be a norm that attaches to peoples and not states. The entity 
would not have attained statehood to claim state political independence. The correct 
question would be, does international law acknowledge a right to independence as a 
collective right of peoples. In the Kosovo Opinion, the court made the statement that: 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the international law of 
self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right to 
independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples 
subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.453 
 
The declaration by the court was made in the context of the decolonisation process. 
According to the court, the principle of self-determination was responsible for the 
creation of this right. The court highlighted state practice in recognising these new 
states. It concluded that ‘A great many new States have come into existence as a 
result of the exercise of this right’.454 It seems that the court sought to suggest that 
the right to independence was derived from the right to self-determination. 
Alternatively, that it developed from a people’s right to self-determination. However, 
the court is not clear as to whether the right could operate independently from the 
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right to self-determination. Further, it is also uncertain whether the right survived the 
decolonisation process.  
 
Where it can be argued that the right to independence possesses independent 
operational force, it would comfortably serve as an underlining legal norm for a 
unilateral declaration. A broad interpretation of the Declaration on Friendly Relations 
suggest the existence of a right to independence. The declarations states that: 
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives 
peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of their right to self-determination and freedom and 
independence.455 
 
The declaration is not clear on whether a direct right to independence is available 
under international law. What seems more probable is the presence of a derived 
right. A cursive reading of Declaration 2526 (XXV) would suggest that even if the 
right did exist independently, it would still operate under the principle self-
determination. The above-cited references to the right, is always in context with the 
right to self-determination. Through the operation of the right to self-determination, 
the right to independence then finds application. No authority exists for its 
independent operation under international law. However, the recognition of a right to 
independence would contribute significantly to the recognition of a right to secede 
under international law. 
 
5 3 3 Remedial Secession 
The process of seceding in order to correct an injustice perpetrated against peoples 
by definition demands unilateral conduct. The process of unilateral secession finds 
particular application under such circumstances. Practically as well as realistically, 
the cooperation of the oppressive state cannot be expected to induce secession. 
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This especially relevant when there is a denial of internal self-determination and 
oppression. The rationale is that the serious violation of rights serves to justify the 
unilateral conduct. This position can be equated with the ICJ’s conclusion in the 
South West Africa case on the paradox that is present where a legitimate authority 
abuses a power stemming from a mandated. The court stated that: 
It has been suggested that, even if the Council of the League had 
possessed the power of revocatiori of the Mandate in an extreme case, it 
could not have been exercised unilaterally but only in Co-operation with 
the mandatory Power. However, revocation could only result from a 
situation in which the Mandatory had committed a serious breach of the 
obligations it had undertaken.456  
 
The court acknowledges that no unilateral power to revoke the mandate could be 
executed by the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently, the revocation 
needed to happen together with the mandated state. One part of the paradox lies in 
the fact that the only ground for revocation would be consent of the offending state 
after a serious breach of the obligations under its mandate. South Africa committed 
this breach through, amongst other things, the implementation of its apartheid policy 
in Namibia. The other part of the paradox is that the consent and co-operation of the 
offending party is required in order to right the wrong via revocation of the mandate. 
The court concluded that:  
To contend, on the basis of the principle of unanimity which applied in the 
League of Nations, that in this case revocation could only take place with 
the concurrence of the Mandatory, would not only run contrary to the 
general principle of law governing termination on account of breach, but 
also postulate an impossibility. For obvious reasons, the consent of the 
wrongdoer to such a form of termination cannot be required.457 
 
                                                 
456
 South West Africa case (n 54) para 101. 
457
 ibid. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
146 
 
Gross denial or infringement of rights produces justification for unilateralism. This 
remains true even where the consent of the offender is legally required. The 
important aspect of the court’s conclusion relates to the impossibility of performance. 
This aspect is entrenched within the justification for unilateralism. Seeking the 
cooperation of the offending state reflects an impossibility that demands that a 
unilateral act be executed. This reasoning would also be applicable to the 
justification for unilateral conduct under a right to remedial secession. Crucial to this 
situation is that the unilateral act itself should not be unlawful. Where the execution 
of remedial secession is manifested via a unilateral declaration of independence for 
instance, the legitimacy of the declaration would lie in the impossibility of cooperation 
of the offending state. As long as the unilateral conduct is not unlawful, international 
law considers it legitimate. Zoller enunciates this presumption in a commentary on 
the Lotus case458 by stating that:  
It is on this assumption that the SS Lotus case came to be regarded by 
most states as general principle of international behaviour which reads as 
follows: “Everything which is not prohibited is allowed”.459  
 
Consequently, Unilateralism in general is not prohibited by international law. 
Secessionist movements would then have to resort to unilateralism to establish 
external self-determination. This form of secession has been termed remedial 
secession. Can this concept which is still part of the traditional approach460 to 
secession, be reconciled with a broader legal normative approach?461 Remedial 
secession is premised on the morality of secession. Where peoples are linked by 
some primordial trait, like language or culture and a state denies them the internal 
territorial expression of this commonality – they could resort to a claim for remedial 
secession. In this context, Neuberger comments that ‘The right of secession is seen 
as a variant of the right of self-defence – you defend yourself by seceding from an 
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oppressive system’.462 He premises this contention on the right to secede being 
derived from ‘democratic principles like the social contract, the consent of the 
governed, and the right of rebellion’.463 This contention is noble, but limited. 
Democratic principles do not by default provide for the protection of minorities and 
indigenous peoples and their rights. Weller clarifies this point in stating that ‘After all, 
the minority can in principle be consistently outvoted and disenfranchised within the 
democratic state’.464 
 
Remedial secession is premised on the moral justification as plotted by Buchanan 
with his Remedial Right Only Theory.465 In the discussion on theories of secession in 
chapter one, it was held that the Remedial Rights Only Theory proposes that a right 
to secede comes into existence, in order to provide a remedy of last resort in cases 
of grave injustices and continuous gross human rights violation. Ryngaert goes on to 
define remedial secession as ‘a secession that borrows its legitimacy from the 
repressive and illegitimate character of a state that fails to realize a people’s right to 
internal self-determination’.466 Under the Remedial Rights Only Theory, the 
abhorrent injustice requirement is the sole qualification for access to a right to 
secede. However, the theory only serves to assist the moral justification for the use 
of the rights and falls short of setting out the legal form of the right self. This 
perspective of remedial secession is representative of the traditional approach to 
secession. Seshagiri supports this view in stating ‘what makes Buchanan’s Remedial 
Right Only proposal attractive is that it tends to accord with global morality as 
expressed through the prohibitions on serious human rights violations’.467 Seshagiri 
also argues for a move away from the traditional approach to what could be argued 
to be a more normative approach to secession. He suggests that: 
It would seem, therefore, that what is required is an alternative method of 
conceptualizing self-determination and unilateral secession that accords 
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with the international legal community’s fundamental legal principles and 
ever evolving moral values.468  
 
In the Kosovo Opinion, the court briefly referred to a right of remedial secession.469 
The court expressed its view that entering into a debate over the right is beyond the 
question put to it.470 The ICJ highlighted the point, that it is not manifestly a 
concluded fact that remedial secession is reconcilable with self-determination. The 
court ruled that there exist differences under international law concerning not only 
the right to self-determination but also a right of remedial secession.471 Even though 
the court highlighted the fact that entering into the question of remedial secession is 
beyond the scope of the question put to it by the General Assembly, three legal 
questions can be derived from the courts objection. In comparing the principle of 
self-determination with remedial secession, the court observed that: 
Similar differences existed regarding whether international law provides for 
a right of ‘remedial secession’ and, if so, in what circumstances. There 
was also a sharp difference of views as to whether the circumstances 
which some participants maintained would give rise to a right of “remedial 
secession” were actually present in Kosovo.472 
 
The first question directly derived from the quoted objection would be, does 
international law provide for a right of remedial secession? The secondly, if 
international law does provide for a right of remedial secession, under what 
circumstances? The final question would be, were the circumstances that give rise to 
a right of remedial secession present in the particular case of Kosovo? These 
questions should have been formally present in the mind of the court. Avoiding a 
conclusion on them, while it was well within the court’s jurisdiction and powers was a 
missed opportunity for legal certainty.  
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As stated above, remedial secession relies heavily on the moral justification to 
secede. As indicated above, more than morality is needed for the process of 
secession to possess legitimacy. A positive right to secede would include a right of 
remedial secession. Unilateral expression of a right to remedial secession could only 
find legitimacy within the legal field, if it is a clearly defined right. 
 
5 3 4 Multilateralism 
The process of secession naturally involves two or more opposing parties. This begs 
the question whether the exercise of the right to secede is best served in a bi- or 
multilateral context. Conversely, is unilateralism an inevitable path for secession? In 
chapter 3, it is suggested that negotiation be considered as part of the process of 
secession.473 This reasoning flowed from the reasoning of the Canadian Supreme 
court on the presence of a duty to negotiate under their constitution. It was found that 
such a duty is reconcilable with international law, specifically Article 33 (2) of the UN 
Charter, which suggests and supports negotiation as a method of settling 
international disputes.   
 
The problem with negotiation as a solution to secessionist outbreaks is the complex 
political issues, which often accompanies it. Support for multilateralism needs to be 
premised on the reality of secession. Contrary to this the secessionists, need also be 
able to enter into negotiations with the openness to concede to an alternative 
solution. Parties need to be open to either a recommitment to internal self-
determination or the possibility of external self-determination. Orentlicher agrees with 
this submission in arguing that:  
A commitment to address disputes over separatist claims through 
negotiated agreements entails two corollary claims. The first is that 
negotiating partners must accept the possibility of secession as an 
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outcome of their negotiations. The second is that, in general, disputes over 
separatist claims should not be resolved solely by plebiscite.474  
 
Orentlicher ultimately argues for the right to secede. It should be borne in mind that 
even where a secessionist movement subscribes to bi- or multilateralism via a 
negotiated claim it only provides for legitimacy of the process. Multilateralism only 
relates to the process of secession; however, it does not legitimise the right to 
secede. Consequently, it serves rather to deprive international law of clarity on the 
boundaries of a right to external self-determination as founded in remedial 
secession.  
 
5 4 Conclusion 
It submitted that unilateralism in general is a normative character of the right to 
secede. Although multilateral conduct in achieving secession, is a more desired 
route. The preference lies in the assumption that it will promote peace and stability. 
This is however an attribute which promotes the recognition of the right to secede, 
especially in the context of the operation of the tacit principle of stability within 
international law. The unilateral declaration of independence presents itself as the 
most efficient and effective mechanism to express unilateral secession. The 
conclusion reached by the ICJ in the Kosovo Opinion is that international law in 
general does not prohibit such unilateral declarations of independence.475 However, 
it cannot be overlooked that this was a missed opportunity for the ICJ to bring about 
legal certainty relating to secession.  
 
Under international law, where unilateralism is chosen as a course for secession, 
intent needs to follow conduct. This relates to the fact that the nature of unilateral 
conduct should be specific and the declaration needs to intend to bind peoples to 
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such unilateral conduct. Cassese remarks, in a commentary on the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, that:  
[T]he ICJ stressed that the unilateral assumption ‘by conduct, by public 
statements and proclamations, and in other ways’, by a State not party to 
a convention, of the obligations laid down in the convention was ‘not lightly 
to be presumed’, because ‘a very definite, very consistent course of 
conduct’ was required.476 
 
The current position of the ICJ as presented in the Kosovo Opinion, draws 
unilateral secession to the fore. Secessionist could become inclined to follow 
the unilateral route rather than that of negotiating. The research clearly 
indicates that unilateral conduct is not without legal consequence. The purpose 
of the declaration of independence is to satisfy the element of recognition, 
within the process of secession. 
 
A brief inquiry was also undertaken into the potential of a right to secede. It is 
submitted that the right to secede would be best served within the context of 
multilateralism as an alternative to unilateralism. This approach is however not 
without obstacles. The distrust and competing interest of parties not only makes 
the process increasingly difficult, but complex political issues weigh heavily in 
on such legal proceedings.  
 
It is concluded that two principles mainly govern the unilateral declaration of 
independence; firstly, the element of externality and secondly the existence of 
an underlining legal norm. Three main conclusions can be drawn from the latter. 
Firstly, a legal right needs to form the basis of the declaration. This lends 
legitimacy to the declaration, especially in the contexts of the unilateral nature of 
the act. Secondly, the unilateral character of the declaration does not void it of 
legal consequences. Finally, because the act carries with it legal consequences, 
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international law finds application over it. The underlining legal norm that needs 
to follow a unilateral declaration of independence does not need to be the right 
to secede exclusively. However the legitimacy of the declaration in it unilateral 
form depends on this norm. 
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6 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
6 1 Introduction   
Even undefined and lacking in a concrete theory, secession remains a contentious 
issue within international law. The legitimacy of the right to secede is at the heart of 
the controversy. The ICJ in, the Kosovo Opinion, left the debate open. However, the 
decision made some valuable contributions to unilateral secession in international 
law. The conclusions of this study are aimed at bringing some clarity to the question 
of secession as well as the accompanying right. The ever present reality of the 
status quo of secession is that, the circumstances under which to successfully 
secede in international law remains largely undetermined.  
 
This research set out to conclude on two questions relevant to international law. The  
first, whether a legitimate right to state secession exist under contemporary 
international law and if so, to identify its normative character. The second question 
sought to establish the current position of the ICJ in the realisation of legal certainty 
on the right to secede and secession in general. This chapter aims to weave these 
findings together and provide concrete conclusions on the topics and theories 
discussed in this work. These two research question furthermore highlighted two 
approaches to secession. They are the traditional approach and the suggested 
normative approach, which follow below.  
 
6 2 A Traditional Approach 
One of the objectives of this study was to establish a normative premise from which 
to better comprehend secession. The prescriptive nature of a right to secede needs 
to be premised on a clear understanding of secession as the conceptual idea. As an 
example, the inclusion of the right to secede within the Ethiopian constitution is 
empirically observable; however the utility of the right will be problematic if a court 
cannot establish what secession actually entails. The presence of the right, without 
clarity as to the conceptual substance or processes makes it unviable. The traditional 
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approach to secession is reflective of this uncertainty. It considers secession as a 
single event, which constantly negates the development of the concept. This results 
in uncertainty and diverging theories of secession; none of which can either serve as 
a general theory or contribute substantially to the formulation of a working definition.  
 
This traditional approach is heavily premised on the morality of secession. It 
considers secession to be a subsidiary notion of international, that cannot challenge 
or contradict existing norms. The legitimacy of secession is also found within its 
morality and the ability not to infringe on existing legal concept of international law. 
The morality of secession then forms the basis for the substantive justification to 
secede. This is a view proffered by Buchanan.477 It has curtailed the theoretical 
development of secession and extinguished its development. The result is that no 
general theory of secession has been possible to put forward. Morality is a fickle 
concept, easily vulnerable to changing human sentiments. Inevitably, it will create 
problems of legal certainty to subject a legal concept or a rights’ legitimacy to the 
requirement of morality. International law needs more than morality to attach 
legitimacy to a concept. Especially in the context of the development of a concept or  
right.  
 
Further the traditional approach hampers secession through its perspective on legal 
personality in international law. The underlying argument throughout this thesis is 
that legal personality under international law is predominantly influenced by the 
theories developed within the Westphalian model. This model places the state at the 
centre of all international legal conduct. The Westphalian model does not allow for 
different, non-traditional forms of legal personality in international law. The 
international legal order and the operation of the principle of stability inhibit any 
development to accommodate new measures of acquiring subject status under 
international law. This remains the status quo, even in light of the exponential 
proliferation of non-state actors and even individuals in the field of international law. 
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A properly defined normative approach would challenge this traditional approach, but 
also develop it.  
 
6 3 A Normative Approach 
The catalyst to the normative approach is the comprehension that secession is a 
process and not a singular event. The process of secession, whether unilateral or 
not, is proposed by Shaw478 to be organised through the elements of a claim, 
effective control and recognition. Under a multilateral process of secession, 
negotiations can be accommodated within the process. This submission is based on 
the court’s reasoning in the Quebec case.479 The court concluded that negotiations 
were part of the origins of the federal constitution that brought about the state of 
Canada. Consequently, it developed into a constitutional principle indicating that a 
decision to alter sovereign border needs to be inclusive of negotiations. The 
research found that the element of negotiating to settle disputes is well entrenched 
under international law, most notably within the UN Charter.480  
 
The normative nature of a right to secede needs to inform the right’s functionality 
within a particular legal system. Consequently, the approach was to discuss the right 
from its practical application within international and municipal jurisprudence. The 
test, as carried out in chapter 3, concluded on the substantive and procedural nature 
of the right. In contrast to the traditional approach which focussed on the morality of 
the right; this informed its substantive character. However, this approach pays little 
attention to the procedural character of the right. The research utilised examples of 
the right’s entrenchment in municipal constitutions to guide the investigation into the 
extraction of a fully formed right and its contents. This led to the important 
conclusion, that if a right to secede is included in a constitutional setting this will 
provide direct access to the right.  
 
                                                 
478
 See sub-chapter 3 2 1 supra. 
479
 See sub-chapter 3 4 supra. 
480
 UN Charter, article 33 (2).  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
156 
 
A critical question which guided the research in this context was, whether a right to 
secede found better application within the field of international law or rather 
municipal law? It is submitted, that secession affects both municipal and international 
law. However, the new entity which secession establishes would consequently be 
endowed with right and obligations under international law. This consequence makes 
international law the most appropriate forum to deal with matters of secession. 
Where secession is perceived as a process, recognition is one of these elements. 
The legitimacy which relates to recognition cannot be achieved in the domestic 
arena only. In so far as international law provides the institutions to confirm the legal 
personality of states, recognition needs to occur at this level. As an example, Dugard 
contends that ‘Membership to the United Nations is limited to states only.’481 
Membership to the UN is according to Article 4 (which regulates UN membership) of 
the UN Charter predicated on the possession of legal personality under international 
law. The inclusion of the right to secede into a municipal constitution produced 
examples to test the right’s legal applicability.  
 
The normative approach presented here has proven to allow for an approach to 
secession which is more flexible than a pure morally centred approach. This in turn 
assisted in the harmonisation of the concept itself and the right to secede together 
with other principles of international law. The findings of this thesis develops two 
salient facts on the right to secede. Firstly, the right to secede is flexible enough to 
enjoy recognition alongside other doctrines and principles of international law. It 
concludes that the right will be not necessarily be void because of conflict with 
concepts such as territorial integrity, self-determination and uti possidetis. 
International law does not intend for these concepts to operate unqualified. For 
example, territorial integrity can only be enjoyed if both internal human right and the 
territorial integrity of other states’ are respected by a particular state. Secondly, the 
unilateral execution of the right to secede is not without legal consequence. The right 
to secede would have to form part of some adjacent rights, such as the rights to self-
determination and/or independence. A unilateral declaration of independence would 
then have to provide external expression to the right to secede.  
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6 2 Secession 
At the heart of secessionist aspirations lies a central paradox. This paradox was 
presented in chapter one. In order to move away from this paradox, secession needs 
to develop in a manner that does not place it in conflict with existing doctrines and 
principles of international law. The traditional approach to secession does not 
provide answers to this central paradox. A new approach to secession is 
consequently necessary for the development of the concept.  
 
The first research question, presented two challenges early on during the study. The 
first was that no general theory of secession existed under international law. The 
second was that secession was generally approached as a single event rather than 
viewed as a process. The current concept of secession struggles with  multiple and 
diverging theories which are incoherent in their conceptual arguments and 
conclusions. The only common agreement amongst theorists is that secession is 
characterised by the disruption of a state’s territorial integrity. A further problem 
follows the absence of a general theory, this is the absence of a workable definition 
of secession. The definition followed in this research is reliant on the salient 
commonalities within the different definitions on this topic.482 These commonalities 
represent aspects such as, loss of territory by the dominant state; the presence of 
the seceding peoples on the territory and the emergence of a new legal entity under 
international law. Importantly this new entity does not necessarily have to be a 
sovereign state.483 It is submitted that that each case of secession presents its own 
unique challenges, this necessitates an ad hoc approach. 
 
Even if a case by case approach is followed solutions still needs to be provided to 
the vexing difficulties of establishing a general theory or a common operative 
definition of secession. The traditional approach has been one of accepting that 
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secession is a singular event. Buchanan represent this approach, which have left the 
concept of secession unable to develop, primarily because it could not be 
harmonised within international law. On the opposite side, a normative approach was 
proposed in this study. This approach sees secession as a legal process. Shaw 
stands out as the main proponent of this approach. The right to secede then has to 
relate to the elements of this process of secession. The only attempt at identifying 
this process is the proposition of Shaw.484 Shaw’s proposition sets the process of 
secession to include a claim for territory, the establishment of effective control over 
the territory followed by the plea for recognition of the new entity. This has informed 
the application of the right to secede throughout the thesis. The traditional approach 
perceives secession as static rather than a fluid concept. Further, its predominant 
justification for secession is influenced by moral values rather than legal terms. This 
approach is prevalent within the reasoning of the theoretical models of secession.  
 
The normative approach perceives secession as a legal process, subjected to 
compliance with legal theory. In order to present the characteristics of a right, the 
concept to which that right relates to needs to be clear or at least ascertainable. The 
inquiry demands more than a mere description of the right, it seeks to conclude on 
the directives that the right propagates.. The boundaries of the right to secede needs 
to be framed within the parameters of what the concept of secession allows. The fact 
that no general theory of secession has been settled, on retards this inquiry.   
 
A distinction is emphasised in this thesis between the normative nature of secession 
and that of the right to secede. The defined process of secession informs the 
normative right to secede. The process clarifies the content of the right, and 
highlights its place within the legal system. However, it seems challenging to include 
secession as a process under the current international law system especially in 
relation to statehood. This system still reflects the traditional approach towards 
secession. Under this approach the old notions of statehood as reflected in the 
Westphalian model are inflexible and static, but remain entrenched in international 
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law. It is accepted that the old established norms, principles and doctrines of 
international law cannot just be abandoned. Consequently, the approach has to be 
one of harmonising the right to secede with these established concepts of 
international law.   
 
The research consequently favours a contemporary approach to secession. This 
would include respect for the traditional principles and norms of international law.  
Harmonising the concepts of self-determination and secession, proved to be a less 
complicated exercise. Self-determination has been elevated to an erga omnes norm 
of international law. Two forms, internal and external self-determination, exists It is 
submitted that only in the context of external self-determination can a right to secede 
succeed. However, access to external self-determination is qualified by initially 
having to prove the denial of internal self-determination.485 Not all commentators are 
in favour of the existence of the right to secede. Some, like Higgins, argue that 
secession did not survive the decolonisation process.486 Higgins suggests that ‘the 
concept of secession is irrelevant to the ongoing entitlement of peoples to self-
determination in the post-colonial era’.487 Many of the critics argue that secession is 
more a political issue than a legal one. Horowitz who is in strong opposition to a right 
to secede warns that: 
Most theorists of a right to secession have, in this caricatured sense, 
legal minds. They have generally not concerned themselves with the 
ethnic politics that produces secessionist claims and that will be 
affected by new rights to secede.488 
 
In chapter 3, the municipal manifestations of the right to secede within constitutions 
were investigated. Consequently, the research could investigate constitutional 
inclusions of the right to self-determination. The South African constitution served as 
one example. The South African constitutional court decided on an interpretation 
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which was different to that present in international law. It is argued that this approach  
contradicts the constitutional mandate present in the constitution to promote and 
develop international law.489 Crawford makes the point in arguing that: 
In principle, self-determination for peoples or groups within the State is to 
be achieved by participation in its constitutional system, and on the basis 
of respect for its territorial integrity.490 
 
Constitutional participation has to reflect international law, especially where it 
fundamentally impacts international law or its norms. The same is true for the 
principle of territorial integrity. The objectives of secession and territorial integrity, 
immediately leads one to the conclusions that they are incomparability. The research 
submits two conclusions in this regard. Firstly, the right to respect for territorial 
integrity is not an unqualified right. The right can be limited in two instances. Where a 
state does not afford the same right to another state and infringes that state’s right to 
territorial integrity, its own access to the right is suspended. Another instance would 
be where a state carries out continued and gross human rights violations against its 
population or a part thereof, then the UNSC has a duty to react. The UNSC must act 
through any means necessary to comply with its central mandate of maintaining 
international peace and security available under the UN-Charter. The second 
conclusion is that territorial integrity is a right available exclusively to states, whereas 
the right to secede is a peoples’ right. The right to secede is consequently much 
closer related to the protection of human right than the principle of territorial integrity.  
   
Considering the doctrine of uti possidetis, the main findings submitted here, is that 
this doctrine does not have automatic application in international law. One of the 
main requirements of uti possidetis is consent. 491 Where peoples utilise the right to 
secede to form a new entity, such an entity would not be impacted by the doctrine. 
The entity could not have been part of any past agreements to make the doctrine 
applicable. This renders the operation of the doctrine impossible against a 
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secessionist move, because uti possidetis is contractual and premised on agreement 
or consensus. It is the findings of this research that this concept is not absolute in 
their operations in international law. It, as with territorial integrity, is subjected to 
limitations and qualifications under international law. Consequently, the right to 
secede can be harmonised with these concepts and even find application to 
strengthen their utility. The uti possidetis doctrine fosters the idea of maintaining 
peace and stability, but its application has been superficial. The main idea behind uti 
possidetis was that ‘the application of the principle of uti possidetis resulted in 
administrative boundaries being transformed into international frontiers in the full 
sense of the term’.492 However, this doctrine does not factor in the will of peoples or 
their link to a particular territory. This was enunciated by the court in the Case 
Concerning the Frontier Dispute where it stated: 
The essence of the principle lies in its primary aim of securing respect for 
the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved. 
Such territorial boundaries might be no more than delimitations between 
different administrative divisions or colonies all subject to the same 
sovereign.493 
 
As much as the first research question ultimately sought to establish the general 
position of contemporary public international law relating to secession, the second 
research question sought to further the debate and conclude on a practical legal 
approach to secession. Towards this end, the second research question was an 
attempt to find legal certainty based on the authority of the ICJ. This question 
predominately relied on the judgment of the ICJ in the Kosovo Opinion. From the 
onset, one major challenge was encountered under this question. The court made it 
clear that it would not deal with the question of secession, because in its opinion it 
was beyond the scope of the legal question put to it by the UNGA. However, the 
reasoning of the ICJ still provided an opportunity to answer the question based on 
the unilateral declaration. The approach under international jurisprudence has been 
that unilateral conduct is not without legal consequence. This opened up an 
opportunity to interrogate the concept of secession within the context of the unilateral 
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declaration of independence. The ICJ confirmed, in the Kosovo Opinion, that a right 
to independence developed via the right to self-determination during the 
decolonisation period, this contention was interrogated above.494 Self-determination 
seems, in the opinion of the ICJ, to be the legal norm that justifies the declaration of 
independence.  
 
Further, the theme of unilateral secession was analysed in the contexts of the 
Kosovo Opinion. The focus was to highlight the competing interests present within 
the secession debate that might force unilateral conduct. The investigation tested the 
legitimacy of secession where it was embarked upon unilaterally. The research 
interrogated the unilateral declaration of independence as a mechanism that drives 
and gives external expression to the process of secession. One aspect of this 
process became extremely prominent, the element of recognition. Two requirements 
were found to be essential to the legitimacy of the declaration. The first was the 
element of externality and the second the existence of an underlining legal norm. A 
declaration needs to be an expression to the outside world to satisfy the requirement 
of externality. Further, in order for the declaration to carry legitimacy, it needs to be 
based on an underlining legal norm. This can be peoples relying on the right to 
independence, the right to self-determination or even the right to secede to support 
their claim.  
 
From these findings no conclusive conclusion can be drawn on the availability under 
international law of a right to secede. Even though, international law does not 
expressly prohibit the right. However, the reliance on a positive entitlement towards 
the achievement of secession is reconcilable with positivist notions present within 
contemporary international law. The ICJ, in the Kosovo Opinion, indicated that the 
fact that international law does not find certain conduct to be in violation of 
international law, does not however create a positive right. The ICJ pressed at 
lengths that: 
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Indeed, it is entirely possible for a particular act such as a unilateral 
declaration of independence not to be in violation of international law 
without necessarily constituting the exercise of a right conferred by it.495 
 
In summary, the overarching conclusion is that the normative right to secede finds 
direct application under international law. The research revealed two potential 
circumstances under which such a right can be available. Firstly, where the right 
forms part of a municipal constitution and secondly, where a complete denial of basic 
human rights is perpetrated against peoples, which could be termed remedial 
secession. Further, the concept of secession is best conceived as a process rather 
than a single event. Such an approach concludes that a normative approach to 
secession and the right to secede is favoured. Uncertainty over the determining 
characteristics of the right to secede, does not render appeals to that right null. The 
full extent of peoples’ access to the right to secede includes unilateral secession. 
Such unilateral conduct has been proven not to be without legal consequences in 
international law. International law already recognises a few related rights to the right 
to secede, like the right to independence and the right to external self-determination. 
These rights are further available to secessionist movements to use in attaining the 
result of the right to secede. Based on these finding some related recommendations 
follow below. 
 
6 4 Recommendations 
This thesis reflects two salient and connected facts on secession. The first is, not 
only is a legitimate right to secede possible under international law, but a legally 
functional normative right is possible. The second is that the potential of a general 
right to secede is faced with the practical and politicised challenges of effective 
control and state recognition. This is reflected in the conclusion of the ICJ in the 
Kosovo Opinion.  
The first, general, recommendation based on the research is that international 
courts, tribunals and institutions need to recognise that secession and the right to 
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secede can be harmonised with leading principles and doctrines of international law. 
Thus it cannot immediately be dismissed, but needs to be tested ad hoc under 
international law.  Secession cannot survive a blanket approach, but a clear 
prescriptive approach is necessary. As much as a departure from the traditional 
approach to secession is desired, a normative approach needs to fully consider 
traditional notions of secession and develop them. 
 
The aspiration for the formulation of a general theory of secession is flawed. The 
primary reason for this is that too many theoretical variations exist to bring about a 
unified theory. Further, basing secession only on a moral argument does not forward 
the development and realisation of the concept as a norm of international law. 
Rather, secession and more particular the right to secede needs legal justification 
inclusive of to a moral justification. To equip it with legal functionality the right to 
secede needs to portray both substantive and procedural legal characteristics.   
 
Finally, international law should reflect the ever-changing landscape of both its legal 
and practical realities. This advances legal certainty and keeps the law 
contemporary.  The retention of outdated constructs of legal personality does not 
serve international law to this end. The traditional power base of states has shifted 
and this compromises the legitimacy of some states’ dominium over certain peoples. 
International law needs to take a human centred approach to statehood and the 
traditional nation-state. This would include peoples’ right to be responsible for their 
own destinies. The debate towards the realisation of a legitimate right to secede will 
not be born out of moral themes on secession only, but would be expended to legal 
approaches as this thesis endeavoured to highlight. The time is ripe for the 
development of international law in general, but more specifically to bring legal 
certainty to the question of secession. 
. 
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